The Debt-Equity Distinction in a Second-Best World by Pratt, Katherine
Vanderbilt Law Review 
Volume 53 
Issue 4 Issue 4 - May 2000 Article 1 
5-2000 
The Debt-Equity Distinction in a Second-Best World 
Katherine Pratt 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.vanderbilt.edu/vlr 
 Part of the Business Organizations Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Katherine Pratt, The Debt-Equity Distinction in a Second-Best World, 53 Vanderbilt Law Review 1055 
(2000) 
Available at: https://scholarship.law.vanderbilt.edu/vlr/vol53/iss4/1 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Scholarship@Vanderbilt Law. It has been accepted for 
inclusion in Vanderbilt Law Review by an authorized editor of Scholarship@Vanderbilt Law. For more information, 
please contact mark.j.williams@vanderbilt.edu. 
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
VOLUME 53 MAY 2000 NUMBER 4
The Debt-Equity Distinction in a
Second-Best World
Katherine Pratt*
I. INTRODUCTION ...................................................................... 1056
II. THE DEBT-EQUITY DISTINCTION ........................................... 1058
A. Why the Debt-Equity Distinction Matters ................. 1058
B. Standards for Classifying Debt and Equity ............. 1065
1. The Origins of the Debt-Equity Distinction.. 1065
2. Traditional Classification Standards ............ 1067
C. Why the Debt-Equity Distinction Makes
Even Less Sense Now ................................................ 1072
1. Convergence of Public Company
Stock and Debt .............................................. 1072
2. Financial Contract Innovation ...................... 1075
3. Additional Inefficiencies ................................ 1088
III. THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE DEBT-EQUITY
DISTINCTION AND THE CORPORATE TAX ................................ 1094
A. The Historical Debate Regarding
the Theory of the Firm ............................................... 1094
B. Normative Criticism of the Corporate Tax ............... 1098
C. The Conversion of the Corporate Tax into a Tax
on Public Companies ................................................. 1103
D. The Base of the New Corporate Tax .......................... 1113
* Associate Professor, Loyola Law School, Los Angeles. B.A., University of Florida. J.D.,
University of California, Los Angeles. LL.M. (Taxation) and LL.M. (Corporate Law), New York
University. Thanks to Ellen Aprill, Peter Gardiner, Tom Griffith, Mary Heen, Larry Helfer,
Michael Knoll, David Leonard, Deborah Schenk, Ted Seto, and Linda Sugin for their thoughtful




IV. EVALUATION OF THE PROPOSALS TO ELIMINATE
THE DEBT-EQUITY DISTINCTION ........................................... 1117
A. The Second-Best Problem with
Eliminating the Distinction ...................................... 1117
B. The Proposals to Eliminate the
Debt-Equity Distinction ............................................ 1121
1. Shareholder Allocation .................................. 1121
2. Comprehensive Business Income Tax .......... 1125
3. Shareholder Level Dividends
Received Exclusion ........................................ 1129
4. Corporate Level Dividends Paid Deduction.. 1133
5. Eliminate the Corporate Interest
D eduction ....................................................... 1135
6. Corporate Cost of Capital
Allowance Deduction ..................................... 1139
C. Summary of the Proposals ........................................ 1145
D. Evaluation of the Proposals ...................................... 1152
V. CONCLUSION ......................................................................... 1157
I. INTRODUCTION
This Article discusses the time-honored but outdated tax law
distinction between corporate debt and equity. Economic and legal
commentators and the Treasury Department have made various pro-
posals to eliminate the debt-equity distinction. The theory of the sec-
ond best posits that eliminating an economic distortion does not nec-
essarily increase efficiency if other economic distortions remain.'
Policymakers cannot simply assume that eliminating the distortionary
debt-equity distinction will automatically increase efficiency because
other distortions in the income tax will remain. This Article evaluates
a number of the proposals to eliminate the debt-equity distinction,
taking into account numerous distortions that are likely to remain in
our tax system.
The problems associated with the debt-equity distinction have
gotten worse in recent years. Part II traces the origins and evolution
of the debt-equity distinction. The debt-equity distinction has its roots
in the traditional, individualistic conception of debtor-creditor rela-
tions, which treats shareholders as the owners of the corporation and




debtholders as outside suppliers of capital. Things have changed since
the early part of this century when Congress created the debt-equity
distinction. For starters, public ownership of debt and stock has be-
come widely dispersed, creating a separation of corporate ownership
and control. The dispersion of investment led to the development of
two alternative theories of the firm, investment theory and the new
economic theory of the firm, both of which would treat debt and equity
as qualitatively similar.
The recent explosion in financial contract innovation has laid
bare the deficiencies of the debt-equity distinction. The traditional
multi-factor case law tests for classifying debt and equity were created
in the context of closely held corporations and focus on the relation-
ship between the issuing corporation and the investors. The adven-
turers in the business, meaning those who expose their capital to the
risks of the business, are shareholders; those who do not put their
capital at risk are creditors. This traditional risk-based approach to
classification simply does not make sense in an era in which (1) finan-
cial contract innovation allows parties to slice and dice risk and real-
locate it in just about any way imaginable, and (2) the "risk premium"
investors have historically required to invest in stocks instead of
bonds has in recent years virtually disappeared.
The discussion of financial contract innovation in Part II illus-
trates three potential costs associated with the debt-equity distinction:
(1) complexity; (2) uncertainty; and (3) the creation of tax arbitrage
opportunities. Part II also discusses two other inefficiencies caused by
the debt-equity distinction: (1) "overleveraging;" and (2) the tax bias
against investment in risky technology businesses that may dispropor-
tionately fuel economic growth.
Part III discusses the relationship between the development of
the corporate tax and the debt-equity distinction. It explains how the
corporate tax came into existence and was influenced by turn-of-the
century theories of the firm. It also reviews the subsequent normative
criticism of the corporate tax on efficiency and fairness grounds and
discusses potential political and perhaps normative reasons for the
failure of formal attempts to eliminate the double corporate tax. In
addition, Part III explains the partial "back-door" elimination of the
double corporate tax that has resulted from promulgation of the so-
called check-the-box regulations, which permit unincorporated private
(but not public) businesses to elect out of corporate taxation. This
change in the corporate tax raises the question of how the corporate
tax base should be defined, either normatively or positively, given that
private companies can now elect out of the corporate tax but public
companies cannot. Specifically, the conversion of the corporate tax into
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a tax on public companies raises the question of whether public corpo-
rations should be permitted to deduct interest paid or accrued on cor-
porate debt and dividends paid on corporate stock.
Part IV examines various proposals to eliminate the debt-
equity distinction, taking into account second-best theory. For each
proposal, this Article will: (1) describe the proposal; (2) consider
whether the proposal would reduce the debt-equity distinction, in light
of other distortions in the income tax; and (3) consider the effect of the
proposal on other distortions. Each proposal to eliminate the debt-
equity distinction has its strengths and weaknesses; each would re-
duce certain existing tax distortions but exacerbate or create other tax
distortions. The effect that each of the proposals would have on certain
distortions depends on the way in the which the proposal would be
implemented.
Part IV also evaluates the proposals, taking into account the
consequences of adopting each of the proposals in light of other distor-
tions, political feasibility, administrability, revenue concerns, and the
likely reaction of various interest groups such as corporate managers.
In the final analysis, this Article supports adoption of the "cost of capi-
tal allowance" deduction proposal, which would replace the corporate
interest deduction with a corporate deduction based on a corporation's
combined debt and equity capital.
II. THE DEBT-EQUITY DISTINCTION
A. Why the Debt-Equity Distinction Matters
Our federal income tax system treats corporations as taxpaying
entities.2 Each year, a corporation must pay tax on its income for the
year.' The tax is on net income, not gross income, so corporations can
2. I.R.C. § 11 imposes tax on "C" corporations. See I.R.C. § 11 (1994). For purposes of this
Article, assume that the corporation is a "C" corporation, which is any corporation that has not
elected to be treated as an "S" corporations. C corporations and S corporations are named for the
subchapters of the Code that apply to those types of corporations. A corporation can be an S
corporation only if it has 75 or fewer shareholders, no foreign or entity shareholders, and only
one class of stock. See id. § 1361(b)(1) (1994) (amended 1998). S Corporations are not taxpaying
entities; instead S Corporation income and other tax items pass through to the shareholders and
each shareholder reports her allocable share of those items on her individual tax return. See id.
§ 1366 (1994) (amended 1996).
3. Our tax system employs an annual accounting period. See id. § 441 (1994). Although
the annual accounting convention sometimes causes harsh results, for example where the income
and expenses of a transaction do not occur within the same tax year, the Supreme Court has held
that use of the annual accounting system is justified by the need for regular federal revenues and
an administrable tax system. See Burnet v. Sanford & Brooks, 282 U.S. 359, 363-64 (1931).
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deduct the costs of earning their income.4 Corporations finance their
operations by raising debt and equity capital.
A corporation, acting as a borrower, can issue debt (e.g., bonds)
to debtholders, the creditors, in exchange for cash or other property.5
The corporation can also issue stock to shareholders in exchange for
cash or other property.' As compensation for the use of the debthold-
ers' money, the corporation pays the debtholders interest.7 As compen-
However, the Code includes a number of specific sections that are designed to ameliorate the
potentially harsh consequences of using the annual accounting system. See, e.g., I.R.C. § 172
(1994). Section 172 permits a corporation to use a net operating loss ("NOL ) for a tax year to
offset income, from other years, on which the corporation would otherwise pay tax. See id.
§ 172(b) (1994). NOLs may be carried back two years and forward 20 years. See id. § 172(b)(1)(A)
(1994).
4. See I.R.C. § 63(a) (1994) (amended 1997).
5. When a corporation issues bonds, it is obligating itself to pay the holder a specified
amount in the future. The bond typically has a stated term. The date on which that term ends
is called the maturity date of the bond. The amount the corporate issuer is obligated to pay on
that date (aside from any interest due on that date) is sometimes referred to as the face amount
of the loan. The interest owed to the holder may have to be paid periodically throughout the
term of the bond or all on the maturity date.
Bonds are typically denominated in $1,000 increments, so the face amount of the bond is
$1,000. The price at which a bond is sold is referred to as the issue price of the bond. A bond will
sell for $1,000 if the interest rate on that bond is the same as the prevailing market rate of
interest. If a holder pays $1,000 for the bond, the bond is said to have been sold at par. Said
another way, if a bond is sold at par, the issue price will equal the face amount due at maturity.
If the stated interest rate on the bond exceeds the prevailing market rate of interest, the bond
will sell for more than $1,000, referred to as a premium. If the stated interest rate on the bond is
less than the prevailing market rate of interest, the bond will sell for less than $1,000, referred
to as a discount.
After the bonds are issued, they may be traded in securities markets. The value of the
bond depends in part on interest rates. If a bond is sold at par, but interest rates subsequently
rise, the bond will sell at a discount because the bond bears a below-market rate of interest. If a
bond is sold at par, but interest rates subsequently fall, the bond will sell at a premium because
the bond bears an above-market rate of interest. See ROBERT W. HAMILTON & RICHARD A.
BOOTH, BUSINESS BASICS FOR LAW STUDENTS: ESSENTIAL TERMS AND CONCEPTS 427 (2d ed.
1998).
Short term loans made by lenders to corporations are typically called notes. Longer term
loans (i.e., for a period of five or more years) made by lenders to corporations can be classified as
bonds or debentures. The term debenture usually refers to an obligation that is unsecured and
the term bond usually refers to an obligation that is secured by the corporate borrower's
property. The term bond is also commonly used in a generic sense to refer to the class of debt
securities that includes both debentures and bonds. See WILLIAM A. KLEIN & JOHN COFFEE, JR.,
BUSINESS ORGANIZATION AND FINANCE 135-36 (6th ed., 1996).
If a corporation issues bonds to the public, the corporation can alternatively be referred to
as the issuer, the borrower, or the debtor. An investor who buys a bond issued by the corporation
can alternatively be referred to as the bondholder or holder, the lender, or the creditor. The
document that sets forth the terms of the bonds is referred to as the indenture.
6. The stock proceeds the corporate issuer receives from the shareholder are not included
in the corporation's income. See I.R.C. § 1032(a) (1994).
7. The corporate borrower also eventually returns to the bondholders the amount they
loaned the corporation. Interest paid on the bond includes a pure time value of money element
(with an inflation component) and compensation for the risk that the issuer will default.
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sation for the use of the shareholders' money, the corporation pays the
shareholders distributions in the form of dividends
Although, for reasons discussed later, the Internal Revenue
Code (the "Code") should treat debt and equity similarly for tax pur-
poses, the Code has always distinguished between debt and equity.
There are numerous tax differences between debt and equity Some of
these differences relate to the tax consequences to the corporate issuer
of the debt or equity." Some relate to the tax consequences to the
holder of the debt or equity."
8. Distributions to shareholders include "normal profit," which is the time value of money
element and a "pure profit' element, which compensates the shareholder for the risk that the
corporation will fail. Shareholders are also entitled to distributions when the corporation is
liquidated. Exactly what the shareholders are entitled to receive depends on default rules under
state corporate law, the terms in the corporation's articles of incorporation, and the type of stock
the shareholder owns. Undistributed earnings increase the value of the stock of the corporation.
9. For an extensive discussion of the differences between debt and equity, see BORIS
BITTKER & JAMES S. EUsTIcE, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION OF CORPORATIONS AND THEIR
SHAREHOLDERS 4.01, 4.20-4.26 (1998) and sources cited therein.
10. For example, the tax consequences of a corporation retiring its stock or debt differ. A
corporation does not have income when it receives cash or other property in exchange for its
stock. See I.R.C. § 1032(a) (1994). For a discussion of I.R.C. § 1032, see BITTKER & EusTICE,
supra note 9, 3.12, at 3060-65. If the corporation later repurchases the stock for an amount of
cash less than the amount for which the stock was issued, the corporation recognizes no income.
See I.R.C. § 311(a) (1994). Section 1032(a), which insulates the corporate issuer from gain on the
issuance of stock in exchange from property, does not technically apply to the issuer's repurchase
of the stock. See id. § 1032(a) (1994). Treasury Regulations provide that § 1032 does not apply
to a corporation's acquisition of its own shares unless the corporation acquires the shares in
exchange for its own stock (although the regulation crossreferences the § 311 regulations). See
Treas. Reg. § 1.1032-1(b). Section 311(a) provides that a corporation does not recognize gain on
the distribution of property with respect to its stock. See I.R.C § 311(a) (1994). Property
includes cash under I.R.C. § 317(a). See id. § 317 (a) (1994); see also BITTKER & EUSTICE, supra
note 9, 4.25, at 4-71 (6th ed. 1998) ("Upon redeeming or repurchasing its own stock, a
corporation recognizes no gain, even if the amount paid is less than the stock's par or stated
value or the amount received when it was issued; any corporate level gain on the transaction is
instead treated as a tax-free capital contribution under I.R.C. § 118(a), as a distribution covered
by I.R.C. § 311(a)(2), or simply as a nontaxable capital adjustment.!) (footnote omitted).
A corporation does not have to include proceeds from the issuance of debt in income. If a
corporation retires debt for less than the amount owed on the debt, however, the corporation
must generally include in income the difference between the amount owed on the debt and the
amount paid to discharge the debt. See I.R.C. § 61(a)(12) (1994); United States v. Kirby Lumber
Co., 284 U.S. 1, 3 (1931). If the debt discharge occurs in a bankruptcy proceeding, I.R.C.
§ 108(a)(1)(A) permits the corporation to exclude the debt discharge income completely. See
I.R.C. § 108(a)(1)(A) (1994). If the debt discharge does not occur in a bankruptcy proceeding,
I.R.C. § 108(a)(1)(B) and (3), and (d)(3) permit the corporation to exclude the debt discharge
income to the extent of the corporation's insolvency (the corporation's liabilities less assets) prior
to the discharge. See id. §§ 108(a)(1)(B), (a)(3), (d)(3) (1994). Section 108(a) often just defers the
tax on debt discharge income because debt discharge income excluded under I.R.C. § 108(a)
reduces the corporation's net operating losses. See id. § 108(b)(2)(A) (1994). A net operating loss
for one tax year can be used to reduce the corporate taxpayer's tax liability for other profitable
years. Net operating losses can be carried back two years and forward 20 years. See id. § 172(b)
(1994). If the corporation that has excluded debt discharge income later begins earning income
1060
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This Article will focus on the most important difference be-
tween debt and equity at the level of the corporate issuer: a corpora-
tion can deduct interest paid or accrued on the debt it issues but can-
not deduct the dividends it pays on the shares it issues. 2 It will also
consider investor level character and timing differences between debt
and equity because these differences affect the amount of debt and
equity in corporate capital structures.
First consider the character differences. Debtholders pay tax at
ordinary income tax rates on interest paid or accrued on the corporate
debt they own.'3 Shareholders pay tax at ordinary income tax rates on
the dividends they receive.'4 If a corporation retains earnings, instead
of distributing them as dividends, the value of the assets of the corpo-
ration will increase, which will in turn increase the value of the stock
of the corporation held by its shareholders. If a shareholder sells stock
that has appreciated, the shareholder will realize gain equal to the
amount for which the stock was sold less the amount the shareholder
paid for the stock." (The gain from the sale of the stock is usually
taxed at preferential capital gains rates.") In summary, shareholders
typically pay tax on undistributed corporate earnings when they sell
their stock.
again, the § 108(b) reduction in its net operating losses will increase its tax liability because the
net operating losses would otherwise have reduced the corporation's income.
11. Stock and debt instruments are generally "capital assets," so that gain from the sale of
such securities qualifies for preferential capital gain rates and loss from the sale of such
securities is subject to special loss limitation rules. See I.R.C. §§ 1(h) (amended 1997), 1201
amended 1997), 1211, 1221, 1222 (1994); Van Suetendael v. Commissioner, 13 T.C.M. 1071,
1075-76 (T.C. 1944), affd, 152 F.2d 654 (2d Cir. 1945) (holding that sale by an individual who
traded securities generated capital gain, not ordinary income). Special rules may apply,
however, that distinguish between stock and debt instruments in certain circumstances. For
example, I.R.C. § 306, which recharacterizes all or a part of the capital gain from the sale of
preferred stock as ordinary income, does not apply to debt instruments. See I.R.C. § 306(a)(1)
(1994). For a discussion of other special rules, see BITTKER & EUSTICE, supra note 9, 4.20.
For a discussion of other investor level differences between debt and equity, see BITTKER &
EUSTICE, supra note 9, 4.21-4.24.
12. See I.R.C. § 163(a) (1994) (amended 1998).
13. See I.R.C. §§ 61(a)(4) (amended 1997), 1272(a)(1) (amended 1997) (1994).
14. See id. §§ 61(a)(7), 301(c)(1) (1994). The precise treatment to the shareholder depends on
a number of factors, e.g., whether the distributing corporation has earnings and profits and
whether the shareholder is a corporation that qualifies for the dividends received deduction. See
id. §§ 316, 312, 243 (1994).
15. See id. § 1001(a) 1011(a), 1012 (1994).
16. See id. § 1(h) (amended 1997), §§ 61(a)(3), 1221, 1222 (1994). Sale of the stock typically
qualifies for the preferential capital gain tax rates instead of the higher ordinary income tax
rates. See id. §§ 1(a)-(e), 1(h), 1221 (1994); Van Suetendael, 13 T.C.M. at 1075-76 (holding that
sale by an individual who traded stocks generated capital gain not ordinary income). For an
overview of the distinction between ordinary income and capital gain, see JOSEPH BANKMAN ET
AL., FEDERAL INCOME TAX: EXAMPLES AND EXPLANATIONS 451-494 (2d ed., 1998).
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Second, consider the timing differences between the investor
level tax consequences of stock and debt. Shareholders typically in-
clude dividends when they receive the dividends17 and include gain
from the sale of stock when they sell the stock." In other words, corpo-
rate earnings are not typically taxed at the shareholder level until the
corporation pays a dividend or the shareholder sells appreciated stock.
Stock is therefore taxed using what is sometimes called a "wait-and-
see" method.9
Debtholders include (and the issuer deducts) interest as it is
paid or as it accrues. Interest on corporate debt may be stated interest
or unstated interest."0 If all of the interest is stated, the debtholders
include the interest and the issuer deducts the interest as it is paid. If
the debt instrument bears unstated interest, which the Code refers to
as original issue discount ("OID"), the debtholder includes the OID
and the issuer deducts the OID as it accrues." In other words, the
17. See I.R.C. § 61(a)(4) (1994). Under I.R.C. § 451(a) and Treas. Reg. §§ 1.451-1 and 1.451-
2, cash method taxpayers include income when it is actually or constructively received. See id.
§ 451(a) (1994) (amended 1998); Treas. Reg. §§ 1.451-1, 1.451-2. Individual shareholders report
their income on the cash method. See I.R.C. § 446 (1994).
18. See I.R.C. § 1001(a), (c) (1994).
19. See Alvin C. Warren, Jr., Financial Contract Innovation and Income Tax Policy, 107
HARV. L. REV. 460, 463-64 (1993).
20. Interest is "stated" if the bond pays interest periodically throughout the term of the
bond at a specified interest rate. Interest is unstated if the amount payable at maturity on the
bond includes an implicit interest element as illustrated in the examples in the text below.
21. A debt instrument may be issued at a discount (i.e., for less than par) because the stated
interest rate on the bond is less than the prevailing market rate of interest. This discount
inherent in the debt at issuance is referred to as OE). The total OID on a debt instrument
equals (1) the stated redemption price at maturity of the debt instrument, which is the sum of all
payments to be made on the debt instrument other than qualified stated interest (which,
simplifying a bit, is defined as stated interest that is unconditionally payable in cash or property
at least annually at a single fixed rate) less (2) the issue price of the debt instrument, which is
conceptually the amount the corporate issuer borrows (e.g., the price at which the debt is sold).
See I.R.C. § 1273(a)(2) (1994); Treas. Reg. § 1.1273-1(c)(1). The stated redemption price at
maturity is the face amount of the debt instrument if interest is payable periodically and the
principal is to be repaid in a lump sum at maturity. See I.R.C. §§ 1273(a), 1273(b), 1274 (1994)
(amended 1997); Treas. Reg. §§ 1.1273-1, -2.
The aggregate OID on a debt instrument is then allocated over the term of the debt
instrument. The interest allocable to each accrual period equals (1) the product of mutiplying (a)
the adjusted issue price of the debt instrument, which is the issue price of the debt plus any prior
accrued OID, by (b) the yield-to-maturity of the debt instrument, which is "the discount rate that,
when used in computing the present value of all principal and interest payments to be made
under the debt instrument, produces an amount equal to the issue price of the debt instrument,"
less (2) any qualified stated interest on the debt instrument. See I.R.C. § 1272(a)(4) (1994)
(amended 1997); Treas. Reg. § 1.1272-1(b)(1)().
The yield-to-maturity is a constant rate, stated as a percentage. The adjusted issue price
increases each accrual period to reflect the accrued but unpaid OID from the prior periods. The
OID accrued for each period increases over the term of the debt instrument as a constant
percentage yield-to-maturity rate is applied to an ever-increasing adjusted issue price. The
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bondholder's interest inclusion and corporate issuer's interest deduc-
tion may precede the payment of that interest. The following example
illustrates this timing point.
Example 1:'
In year one, Alice pays $1,000 for a BigCo bond which will pay $1,340 at maturity in
three years. The bond does not pay any stated interest during the three-year term of
the bond. The $340 difference between the $1,000 for which the bond was sold and the
$1,340 payable at maturity is original issue discount ("OID').23 The Internal revenue
Code requires that the $340 of OID be allocated over the three-year term of the bond,
using the yield-to-maturity method.24 To allocate the OID, first determine the interest
rate that would produce $1,340 in three years if $1,000 had been invested, which turns
out to be 10 percent (assuming that interest is computed on the outstanding balance
corporate issuer deducts and the holder includes the OIl) allocable to their taxable year. See
I.R.C. §§ 163(e)(1) (amended 1998), 1272(a)(1) (amended 1997), 1272(a)(3) (amended 1997)
(1994). An example may help to illustrate these concepts. Assume that Art pays $900 for a
PublicCo bond that will pay $30 of interest semiannually and $1,000 at maturity in 10 years.
The semiannual interest payments constitute qualified stated interest which is not included in
the stated redemption price at maturity. The bond's stated redemption price at maturity equals
$1,000, the face amount payable at maturity. The bond's issue price is $900, the price Art paid
for the bond. The aggregate OID on the bond equals $100, which is the $1,000 stated redemption
price at maturity less the $900 issue price.
That $100 of OID is allocated over the 10-year term of the bond. The yield-to-maturity on
the bond equals 7.44 percent, compounding semiannually, because that is the discount rate that
produces a $900 issue price when used to compute the present value of the payments to be made
under the debt instrument.
The OID allocable to the first six-month accrual period is $3.46, which is (1) $33.46, which
in turn is the product of multiplying the $900 issue price by the 3.72 percent yield-to-maturity,
(7.44 annual yield-to-maturity, with semiannual compounding, divided by two compounding
periods during the year), less (2) the $30 of stated interest on the bond. The OLD allocable to the
second six-month accrual period is $3.60, which is (1) $33.60, which in turn is the product of
multiplying the $903.46 adjusted issue price by the 3.72 percent yield-to-maturity, (7.44 annual
yield-to-maturity, with semiannual compounding, divided by two compounding periods during
the year), less (2) the $30 of stated interest on the bond. For the tax year which includes the first
two six-month accrual periods, PublicCo deducts and Art includes $7.06 of OID ($3.40 OED
allocable to the first accrual period plus $3.60 allocable to the second accrual period) plus $60 of
stated interest that PublicCo paid on the bond. This example is based on Regulation § 1.1272-
1j), Example 2.
22. This example is based on an example in JOSEPH BANKMAN ET AL., FEDERAL INCOME TAX:
EXAMPLES AND EXPLANATIONS 159-60 (2d ed., 1998).
23. The bond's stated redemption price at maturity is $1,340. The issue price of the bond is
$1,000, the price Alice paid for the bond. The aggregate OID on the bond equals $340, which is
the $1,340 stated redemption price at maturity less the $1,000 issue price of the bond.
24. See Treas. Reg. § 1.1272-1(b)(1). The yield to maturity method is also sometimes
referred to as the constant yield method. This method of allocating interest is more sophisticated
than simply allocating the interest pro rata over the term of the bond. Professors Bankman and
Klein have observed, however, that the yield to maturity method sometimes mismeasures
interest because of the relationship between economic interest and the term structure of interest.
See Joseph Bankman & William A. Klein, Accurate Taxation of Long-Term Debt: Taking into
Account the Term Structure of Interest, 44 TAX L. REV. 335, 348 (1989).
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every six months.)25 Alice includes and BigCo. deducts $102.50 of OD as interest in
year one, 26 $113.00 of OD in year two, 2
7 and $124.50 of OlD in year three.
28
To summarize, the corporate earnings distributed or allocable
to the debtholders as interest are taxed once at the debtholder level
because the corporate issuer deducts the interest and the bondholder
includes the interest.' On the other hand, corporate earnings distrib-
uted to shareholders as dividends are taxed twice, first at the corpo-
rate level (since the corporation cannot deduct the dividends paid to
shareholders) and second at the shareholder level when the dividends
are paid."0 The corporate earnings that are not distributed are also
taxed twice, first at the corporate level, and second at the shareholder
level when the shareholder sells the stock, which has appreciated to
reflect the earnings retained by the corporation.
25. Said more technically, the yield-to-maturity is 10 percent, compounded semiannually,
because discounting the $1,340 payment to be made under the debt instrument at 10 percent,
compounded semiannually, produces a $1,000 issue price for the debt instrument.
26. The OD for the first six-month period during which the bond is outstanding equals $50,
which is 5 percent (10 percent annual interest rate divided by two compounding periods during
the year) of the $1,000 issue price of the bond. Alice includes in income that $50 of OD and
BigCo deducts that $50 of OD. The OID allocable to the second six-month period is $52.50,
which is 5 percent of the $1,050 adjusted issue price of the bond ($1,000 issue price plus $50 of
OlD allocable to the first six-month accrual period). Alice includes in income that $52.50 of OD
and BigCo deducts that $52.50 of OlD. Notice that the OlD for the second accrual period is more
than the OID for the first accrual period because the OED is calculated by applying a constant
yield-to-maturity rate to an ever increasing adjusted issue price.
27. The OIlD for the third six-month period during which the bond is outstanding equals
$55.13, which is 5 percent of the $1,102.50 adjusted issue price of the bond ($1,000 issue price
plus $102.50 of OD allocable to the two prior six-month accrual periods). Alice includes in
income that $55.13 of OlD and BigCo deducts that $55.13 of OD. The OID allocable to the
fourth six-month period is $57.88, which is 5 percent of the $1,157.63 adjusted issue price of the
bond ($1,000 issue price plus $157.63 of OlD allocable to the three prior six-month accrual
periods). Alice includes in income that $57.88 of OD and BigCo deducts that $57.88 of OD.
28. The OD for the fifth six-month period during which the bond is outstanding equals
$60.78, which is 5 percent of the $1,215.51 adjusted issue price of the bond ($1,000 issue price
plus $215.51 of OID allocable to the four prior six-month accrual periods). Alice includes in
income that $60.78 of OID and BigCo deducts that $60.78 of OID. The OD allocable to the sixth
six-month period is $63.81, which is 5 percent of the $1,276.29 adjusted issue price of the bond
($1,000 issue price plus $276.29 of OID allocable to the five prior six-month accrual periods).
Alice includes in income that $63.81 of OD and BigCo deducts that $63.81 of OHD. The sum of
all OD deductions (correcting a bit for rounding error) equals $340.
29. This holds true only if the bondholder is not exempt from tax. Some taxpayers, such as
pension plans, do not have to pay income tax. See I.R.C. § 501(a) (1994) (amended 1998). If the
bondholder is exempt from tax, the corporate earnings distributed or allocable as interest are not
taxed at the corporate or bondholder level.
30. If the shareholder is a "tax-exempt" organization, the corporate earnings retained or
distributed as dividends are generally taxed only once at the corporate level. See id. §§ 501(a),
511(a), 512(a) (amended 1998), (b)(1), 513(a) (amended 1997) (1994).
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B. Standards for Classifying Debt and Equity
1. The Origins of the Debt-Equity Distinction
The adoption of the corporate tax at the beginning of the twen-
tieth century required Congress to determine the base of the tax. Al-
though the corporate tax enacted in 1909 was called an excise tax, the
tax was based on corporate "income."" Income was a net income con-
cept, not a gross income concept, so Congress had to determine which
costs were deductible by corporations and which were not. Although it
was generally agreed that the costs of labor and supplies were de-
ductible, the question of whether a corporation should be allowed a
deduction for its cost of debt capital was debated at the time of the
1909 Act."2 That debate was colored by the theory of debtor-creditor
relations that dominated at that time.
As Professor Bratton has observed, until the twentieth century,
economic theory and legal theory were "individualistic," meaning that
both theories assumed that economic producers were individuals and
that transactions occurred between individuals." A "traditional" no-
tion of debtor-creditor relationships, which assumed that "flesh and
blood" debtors borrowed funds from "flesh and blood" creditors, un-
derlay early debtor-creditor legal rules.'
At the beginning of this century, the traditional debtor-creditor
model dominated debtor-creditor theory. Shareholders were thought of
as the owners of the corporation but debtholders were not thought of
as owners.35 Under the traditional debtor-creditor model:
[c]orporate law associates equity interests with risk, control, and ownership; it leaves
debt out of this association. This conception draws on [nineteenth century] classical
economic theory, which modeled economic life in terms of production by individual
producers and transactions between individuals.... In the nineteenth century,
corporate doctrine adapted this individual conception to group production, re-
31. See Tariff Act of 1909, ch. 6, § 38(2d), 36 Stat. 113.
32. See Marjorie E. Kornhauser, Corporate Regulation and the Origins of the Corporate
Income Tax, 66 IND. L. REV. 53, 111-12 (1990). For the history of the corporate interest
deduction prior to the 1909 Act., see Michael Asimow, Principal and Prepaid Interest, 16 UCLA
L. REV. 36, 62-63 (1968).
33. See William W. Bratton, Jr., The New Economic Theory of the Firm: Critical
Perspectives from History, 41 STAN. L. REV. 1471, 1483 (1989). As Bratton notes, an "individual
perspective undergirded business law." Id.
34. William W. Bratton, Jr., Corporate Debt Relationships: Legal Theory in a Time of
Restructuring, 1989 DuKE L.J. 92, 98-99. Although the debtor and creditor usually knew each
other and had a personal relationship, their interests were adverse so that unilateral action by
one of the parties could injure the other party. See id. at 99. Legal rules governing debtor-
creditor relationships developed to stop the parties from inflicting economic or physical injury on
each other. See id.
35. See id. at 103.
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constructing the classical individual's entrepreneurial behavior pattern within the
corporate structure. Under this view, the entrepreneurial mantle-the role of
"adventurer"-falls on the stockholder, conceived as the owner-manager. Among the
corporate claimants, the stockholder faces the highest risk of loss and enjoys the
highest potential for gain ....
Under this model, creditors join the firm not as "owners" or "members," but as
contractual suppliers of capital.... [C]reditors, being "contractually" tied to the firm,
are not members of the firm entity.... Creditors trade incidents of ownership, like
control and profit, first, for periodic payments made without regard to profit, and,
second, for repayment of principal at a fixed date, with priority over the equityholders'
claims to the corporation's assets. This paradigm contract, in effect, interprets the basic
debtor-creditor exchange to exclude incidents of corporate ownership.36
Under this view of corporate debt, the shareholders "own" the
corporation and the debtholders do not so the interest on corporate
debt is deductible as a cost of the corporation earning income. Divi-
dend distributions to shareholders, on the other hand, are considered
distributions of corporate profits to the owners of the corporation, so
the corporation is not entitled to a deduction for the dividends it
distributes."
During the debate of the 1909 Act, noted tax commentator
Edwin Seligman challenged the traditional debtor-creditor model of
corporate debt. He argued that, as a theoretical matter, interest on
corporate debt should not be deductible in measuring the net income
of corporations, despite the fact that an interest deduction should be
allowed for purposes of computing individual income. In his view, an
interest deduction on individual debt incurred to produce income was
warranted because personal income was defined as "that which comes
into an individual above all necessary expenses of acquisition, and
which is available for his own consumption."'" However, Seligman con-
ceptualized corporate income as the earnings on the assets invested in
the corporation, either as debt or as equity. In his view, corporations
should not be allowed an interest deduction because both equity and
36. See id. at 103-104 (citations and footnotes omitted).
37. See Adam 0. Emmerich, Comment, Hybrid Instruments and the Debt-Equity Distinction
in Corporate Taxation, 52 U. CHI. L. REV. 118, 122 (1985).
Apparently, the idea that interest payments are deductible as an ordinary business
expense is so intuitively appealing that Congress has thought it unnecessary to explain
section 163(a) or its predecessors. Indeed, if one considers a typical small business that
simply borrows money from the bank to finance its operations, it seems obvious that the
cost of that capital is a business expense and therefore should be deductible. When one
considers that equity is simply another source of capital, however, this basis for the
distinction begins to fall apart.
Id. at 122 n.23 (citations omitted).
38. Alvin C. Warren, Jr., The Corporate Interest Deduction: A Policy Evaluation, 83 YALE L.
J. 1585, 1597 (1974) (quoting Edwin R.A. Seligman, ESSAYS IN TAXATION 246 (9th ed. 1921)).
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debt comprised the corporation's "earning capacity."39 Therefore, he
defined corporate income as "total revenue from all sources minus all
actual expenditures except interest and taxes.""
Congress, in 1909, ultimately adopted the traditional view of
corporate debt and equity and permitted corporations to deduct inter-
est on corporate debt.4' Congress limited the interest deduction, how-
ever, to discourage corporations from converting their equity into debt
in an attempt to avoid the new corporate tax. The 1909 Act limited the
deduction to the interest on an amount of debt that did not exceed the
stock of the corporation.2 Congress relaxed this limitation on the in-
terest deduction in 1913"' and in 1916,"" then eliminated it in 1918."'
2. Traditional Classification Standards
Prototypic equity and prototypic debt are end points on a con-
ceptual continuum with most real securities falling in the middle of
that continuum. Prototypic debt is "an unqualified obligation to pay a
sum certain at a reasonably close fixed maturity date along with a
fixed percentage in interest payable regardless of the debtor's income
or lack thereof.'"" An example would be a corporate bond that will pay
$1,000 at maturity in 10 years and pays $100 of interest a year for
each of those 10 years. Prototypic equity "connotes an unlimited claim
to the residual benefits of ownership and an equally unlimited subjec-
tion to the burdens thereof."7 An example would be a share of common
stock.
Courts have been forced to address the classification issue in
part because Congress has not been willing to define the terms debt
and equity in the Code.48 Left to their own devices, courts have strug-
39. Id. at 1597 (quoting Edwin R.A. Seligman, ESSAYS IN TAXATION 685 (9th ed. 1921)).
40. Id.
41. See Tariff Act of 1909, ch. 6, § 38(2d), 36 Stat. 113.
42. See id.
43. See Tariff Act of 1913, ch. 16, § IIG(b), 38 Stat. 173.
44. See Revenue Act of 1916, ch. 463, § 12(a)(3d), 39 Stat. 768.
45. Congress eliminated the limitation on the interest deduction in conjunction with
enactment of the excess profits tax. See Revenue Act of 1918, ch. 18, § 234(a)(2), 40 Stat. 1077.
The excess profits tax did not allow a corporation to include borrowings in the computation of the
corporation's excess profits tax credit, so it was thought that the limitation on deductibility of
interest on corporate borrowings should be repealed. Although the excess profits tax was
subsequently repealed, the limitation on the deductibility of interest did not reappear. See
Revenue Act of 1921, ch. 136, §§ 300-38, 42 Stat. 271-77.
46. BITTKER & EUSTICE, supra note 9, 4.0211], at 4-12 (quoting Gilbert v. Commissioner,
248 F.2d 399, 402 (2d Cir. 1957)).
47. BITTKER & EUSTICE, supra note 9, 4.02(1], at 4-12.
48. See id. 402[8][a]. In 1954, the House drafted definitions that would have
distinguished between debt and equity, but the Senate deleted that language from the House
2000] 1067
1068 VANDERBILT LAWREVIEW [Vol. 53:1055
gled to distinguish between debt and equity. In an early case, the Sec-
ond Circuit Court of Appeals defined classic debt and equity: 'The
stockholder is an adventurer in the corporate business; he takes the
risk, and the profits from success. The creditor, in compensation for
not sharing the profits, is to be paid independently of the risk of suc-
cess, and gets a right to dip into the capital when the payment date
arrives. 49
The debt-equity classification issue has been heavily litigated
over the years, with courts articulating many factors to be considered
in classifying an instrument. For example, the court in Fin Hay Realty
Co. v. United States' stated that classification is based on the follow-
ing factors:
(1) the intent of the parties; (2) the identity between creditors and shareholders; (3) the
extent of participation in management by the holder of the instrument; (4) the ability
of the corporation to obtain funds from outside sources; (5) the "thinness" of the capital
structure in relation to debt; (6) the risk involved; (7) the formal indicia of the
arrangement; (8) the relative position of the obligees as to other creditors regarding the
payment of interest and principal; (9) the voting power of the holder of the instrument;
(10) the provision of a fixed rate of interest; (11) a contingency on the obligation to
repay; (12) the source of the interest payments; (13) the presence or absence of a fixed
maturity date; (14) a provision for redemption by the corporation; (15) a provision for
redemption at the option of the holder, and (16) the timing of the advance with
reference to the organization of the corporation.51
Courts have been reluctant to treat any one factor as disposi-
tive or to assign weights to the various factors.2 Their task has been
made more complicated by the fact that many instruments are a blend
of equity characteristics and debt characteristics. The fact that all of
these factors bear on the classification allows taxpayers to manipulate
the factors and courts to reach inconsistent results.'
bill. See id. (citing H.R. Rep. No. 1337, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. A-98 - A-99 (1954) and S. Rep. No.
1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 42 (1954)); see also Anthony P. Polito, Useful Fictions: Debt and Equity
Classification in Corporate Tax Law, 30 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 761, 783-85 (1998). For a discussion of
§ 385 and the regulations issued under that section, which were later withdrawn, see infra text
accompanying notes 106 to 116.
49. Commissioner v. O.P.P. Holding Corp., 76 F.2d 11, 12 (2d Cir. 1935).
50. 398 F.2d 694 (3d Cir. 1968).
51. Id. at 696. As if 16 factors are not enough, William Plumb listed over 30 relevant
classification factors derived from case law. See William T. Plumb, Jr., The Federal Income Tax
Significance of Corporate Debt: A Critical Analysis and a Proposal, 26 TAX L. REV. 369, 407
(1971).
52. See BITTKER & EUSTICE, supra note 9, 4.03[2][a], 4-22 (citing Tyler v. Tomlinson, 414
F.2d 844, 848 (5th Cir. 1969) as an example).
53. See Plumb, supra note 51, at 407-08; Polito, supra note 48, at 781.
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Classifying instruments as debt or equity has always been
problematic.' For the reasons discussed in the next section, debt-
equity classification may be more problematic now than in the past,
and may warrant the adoption of one of a number of proposals that
would reduce or eliminate the debt-equity distinction.
Until fairly recently, debt-equity classification issues typically
involved classification of the debt of a closely held corporation (i.e., one
with a small number of shareholders), not debt of public companies.
For most of this century, investors were inclined to incorporate their
businesses in order to obtain the benefit of limited liability. Investors
wanted limited liability but did not want to owe corporate tax at the
end of the tax year so investors tried to arrange for the corporation to
have little or no income at the end of the year. One common device for
reducing corporate income was to arrange for the corporation to pay
returns to investors as interest instead of dividends.' In other words,
shareholders of closely held corporations often financed some of the
operations of the corporation by making loans to the corporation in-
stead of making additional capital contributions.
Today, businesses can have the benefit of limited liability with-
out being subject to the double corporate tax. First, a business can
operate in corporate form but make an S Corporation election and be
subject to pass-through tax treatment. Second, a business can oper-
ate in noncorporate form (e.g., as a limited liability company), still
obtain the benefits of limited liability, and yet be subject to pass-
54. Various commentators have made suggestions to simplify debt-equity classification. See
generally, Alan J. Feld, Feld Proposes Debt-Equity Ratio Test as LBO Solution, 42 TAX NOTES
735 (1989) (reprinting testimony Professor Feld gave before the House Ways and Means
Committee) (suggesting that debt of large corporations be treated as equity if the corporation's
debt-equity ratio exceeds 4:1); see also Polito, supra note 48, at 795-810 (suggesting either (1)
that debt be treated entirely as equity if the return on the debt exceeds the return on the
corporation's safest debt multiplied by a fixed multiplier or (2) that debt be bifurcated into debt
and equity components, again based on the expected rate of return on the instrument); David V.
Ceryak, Note, Using Risk Analysis to Classify Junk Bonds as Equity for Federal Income Tax
Purposes, 66 IND. L.J. 273, 288 (1990) (suggesting that debt be treated as equity if the yield on
the debt is at least equal to the one-month Treasury bill rate plus three percent); Emmerich,
supra note 37, at 143 (suggesting that debt of large corporations be treated as debt only if the
debt instrument provides for the payment of a fixed, certain sum on demand or on a specified
future date).
55. Another common device was to "zero out" the corporate income by paying shareholder-
employees salary in an amount equal to the earnings of the corporation. The corporation could
deduct the salary so the corporation was left with zero income. See I.R.C. § 162(a)(1) (1994)
(amended 1998). If the salary was high, the corporation ran the risk, however, that the Internal
Revenue Service would disallow the salary deduction as unreasonable compensation. See Tress.
Reg. § 1.162-7.
56. See I.R.C. §§ 1361-79 (1994) (amended 1996, 1997, 1998). Subchapter S was enacted in
1958. See Technical Amendments Act of 1958, Pub. L. No. 85-866, § 64, 72 Stat. 1606, 1650-57
(1958).
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through tax treatment.57 Allowing small private firms to have both
limited liability and pass-through treatment has taken pressure off
the debt-equity distinction in the context of closely held businesses
since many small businesses are not subject to the double corporate
tax.
Until the 1980s, debt-equity classification was not usually a
problem for public companies because the debt and equity of such
large corporations assumed fairly standard forms and only the pre-
ferred stock and common stock were considered to be equity.' During
the 1980s, public corporations began to issue significantly more debt.
This debt was frequently issued in exchange for outstanding stock of
the corporation. The result was that corporate capital structures, on
average, included more debt and less equity.59
What caused the rapid growth in the issuance of corporate debt
by public companies during the 1980s? The development of the high-
yield bond (or junk bond) market made debt financing available to
corporations that could not issue so-called "investment grade" bonds.'
At the same time, management perceptions of junk bonds and zero
coupon bonds began to change:
Until [the mid-1980s] corporations were rather reluctant to accept high levels of debt
despite the fact that interest payments on corporate debt are deductible. Although the
restrained level of debt depressed the return to equity investors, and therefore lowered
the price of corporate shares, it is easy to understand why corporate managers were
57. Limited liability companies are subject to the pass through partnership rules of
Subchapter K unless the LLC elects to be treated like a corporation. See Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-
3(a), T.D. 8697, 61 Fed. Reg. 66590, Dec. 18, 1996. General partnerships have never been subject
to the corporate tax but general partners have unlimited liability for partnership debts. See, e.g.,
Tariff Act of 1913, ch. 16, § ll(G)(a), 38 Stat. 114. If a business operates as a limited partnership,
the general partner has unlimited liability for partnership debts but the limited partners have
limited liability. Until recently, however, limited partnerships were taxed like corporations if the
partnership had more than two of the following four corporate characteristics: limited liability,
centralization of management, continuity of life, and free transferability of interests. See Former
Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-3. Private limited partnerships are now subject to the pass through
partnership rules of Subchapter K unless the partnership elects to be taxed as a corporation.
Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-3(a), T.D. 8697, 61 Fed. Reg. 66590, Dec. 18, 1996. Publicly traded
partnerships are generally taxed as corporations. See I.R.C. § 7704 (1994) (amended 1998).
58. Jeremy I. Bulow et al., Distinguishing Debt from Equity in the Junk Bond Era, in DEBT,
TAXES, AND CORPORATE RESTRUCTURING 135, 139 (John B. Shoven & Joel Waldfogel eds., 1990).
59. See Henry Kaufman, Halting the Leverage Binge, INSTITUTIONAL INVESTOR, Apr. 1989,
at 23. (During the 1980s, "the debt of U.S. nonfinancial corporations has gone up by an estimated
$840 billion while their equity position has contracted by nearly $300 billion. That translates
into a 15.4 percent annual growth rate in debt, compared with an average annual increase of
only 8.4 percent for the previous six cycles of economic growth.!)
60. See Leveraged Buyouts and Corporate Debt: Hearings Before the Senate Finance Comm.,
101st Cong., 1st Sess. 186, 187 (Jan. 25, 1989) (Statement of Lawrence H. Summers, Professor of
Economics, Harvard University). Investment grade bonds are bonds that receive the highest
credit ratings from credit rating agencies such as Moody's.
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the price of corporate shares, it is easy to understand why corporate managers were
nevertheless reluctant to use as much debt as their shareholders want. Although a
shareholder [holding a diversified portfolio] can accept the risk of an occasional
bankruptcy .... a bankruptcy could destroy the career as well as the personal fortune
of the manager. In [the mid-1980s], however, managers have overcome their previous
reluctance and have begun to increase their debt-equity ratio. One reason for the
change in their behavior has been the fear of a hostile takeover if they do not increase
the return to shareholders through greater leverage.
61
High-yield debt is typically deeply subordinated to other credi-
tor interests, so that it is senior (in bankruptcy priority) only to equity
interests. In return for assuming greater risk than more senior bond-
holders, high-yield bondholders are promised significantly more in-
terest than the interest on senior bonds. High-yield bonds raise debt-
equity classification issues because deeply subordinated debt that
bears a disproportionately high interest rate starts to look like pre-
ferred stock.62
David Hariton has observed that, in recent years, corporate tax
practitioners have begun focusing more on the debt-equity distinction
61. Tax Policy Aspects of Mergers and Acquisitions: Hearings Before the House Comm. on
Ways and Means, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. 210 (1989) (statement of Martin Feldstein, Professor of
Economics, Harvard University) [hereinafter House Hearings on Mergers and Acquisitions].
Mark Gergen and Paula Schmitz have also explored the reasons for the change in the level of
corporate borrowing during the 1980s:
[W]hy did taxpaying corporations wait so long to issue zeros and discounted bonds... ?
An answer from a vice-president at Salmon [sic] Brothers is that corporate treasurers
tend to be conservative and chary of innovative securities, and that it took the
extraordinarily high interest rates of the early 1980s, along with the unusual inverse
shape of the yield curve (short-term rates exceeded long-term rates) to make the tax
benefits of discounted debt sufficiently attractive to overcome this resistance ....
It appears that even in this favorable environment, discounted debt was hard to sell to
issuers. The reluctance of CFOs to be the first issuer need not be ascribed to their being
irrational. There are costs to innovation-from the issuer's perspective ..., the fear of
sending a falsely negative signal that one's corporation had cash flow problems, for until
the early 1980s, only distressed corporations used discounted debt....
Thus, psychological factors seem to explain best why publicly issued zeros were not
marketed until 1981.
Mark P. Gergen & Paula Schmitz, The Influence of Tax Law on Securities Innovation in the
United States, 52 TAXL. REV. 119, 150-51 (1997) (footnotes omitted).
62. Congress demonstrated concerns about the debt-equity classification of high-yield bonds
in the late 1980s and later amended I.R.C. § 163 to provide that corporate issuers cannot deduct
a portion of the OED on certain high-yield bonds. See Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of
1989, 101 Pub. L. No. 239, 7202, 103 Stat. 2106 (1989) (amending I.R.C. § 163(e)(5) (commonly
referred to as the HYDO rules because they apply to "applicable high yield discount
obligations')). The House bill in 1989 would have gone further and reclassified certain high-yield
bonds as preferred stock. See H.R. 3299, 101st Cong., § 11202 (1989). The House provision was
dropped in the Conference Committee because of concerns about potential manipulation of the
proposed rule. See Lee A. Sheppard, Conference Committee Goes After the Junk Bond Junkies,
45 TAX NOTES 1042 (1989).
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as various other loopholes in the corporate tax have been eliminated.'
In the last five years, investment banks have begun to fashion inno-
vative types of traded securities that are treated like debt for tax pur-
poses, but are treated like equity for accounting, regulatory, and credit
rating purposes. These new financial products, which will be discussed
later in this Part, further blur the debt-equity distinction in the
context of public companies. Debt-equity classification has thus be-
come a significant problem for public companies.
C. Why the Debt-Equity Distinction Makes Even Less Sense Now
1. Convergence of Public Company Stock and Debt
The traditional individualistic debtor-creditor model that was
in vogue at the turn of the century viewed shareholders, but not credi-
tors, as the owners of corporations. By the 1930s, ownership of public
company stock and debt became more dispersed and stock and debt
began to look more passive and contractual.' Around 1930, a new "in-
vestment" or "managerialist" theory of the firm grew out of the Legal
Realist movement.' Prominent corporate legal theorists, such as Berle
and Means, observed that there was a separation of ownership and
63. See David P. Hariton, Distinguishing Between Equity and Debt in the New Financial
Environment, 49 TAXL. REV. 499 (1994).
[Tihe distinction between debt and equity still is foremost in the practitioner's mind.
Perhaps this is because the double taxation of corporate earnings that are distributed to
individual investors as dividends remains the greatest anomaly in the U.S. tax system.
As each escape hatch from imposition of corporate level tax is closed... , more pressure
is placed on the few that remain .... And most importantly, there is no double taxation
of corporate earnings that are distributed to investors as interest and principal on debt
capital.
Id. at 499-500 (footnotes omitted).
64. During the early part of this century, states relaxed their statutory creditor protections,
such as the so-called legal capital rules. Creditors of large corporations nonetheless expected
their loans to be repaid, even if the loan was unsecured, because the large public companies
seemed stable and permanent. See Bratton, supra note 34, at 108-09. "As creditors abandoned
the ancient requirement of a tangible security, contract became feasible as the sole basis for long-
term corporate debt. Debt became 'contractual' in legal theory .... Creditors [evolved] into
passive investors holding strictly delimited rights and presenting no threat to management
control." Id. at 109 (footnote omitted).
The nature of stock ownership was evolving at the same time. Ownership of stock
"became widely dispersed as small investors joined the full-time capitalists as equity investors"
in large public corporations. See Bratton, supra note 33, at 1492 (footnote omitted). Stock, like
debt, began to look more "contractual" in nature. See id. at 1493.
65. See Bratton, supra note 33, at 1493.
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control in large public companies; management, not the shareholders,
controlled the corporation.'
As managers of large public corporations took control from the
corporations' shareholders, the characteristics of debt and stock of
large public corporations converged. Repayment of funds borrowed by
a debtor corporation was guaranteed only if the corporate debtor con-
tinued and was successful in the future. The debtor's promise to pay a
fixed amount in the future "in reality, amounted to a promise to 're-
fund' if the enterprise succeeded, and a basis for priority over equity-
holders if the enterprise failed .... Thus linked to the business's
fortunes, creditors became investors.""7 The investment theory treats
debt and equity securities as similar forms of investment in the corpo-
ration differing "only in degree:"'
The classical stockholder-entrepreneur has disappeared, and the creditor no longer
appears as a refined and hostile opponent. More likely than not, the creditor is a
bondholder-a single investor holding a piece of paper that gives no practical means of
achieving corporate power.
In this conception, creditors are aligned with the stockholders in the antimanagerialist
vision of corporate power relationships. Both occupy a position resembling that of the
weak party in a trust relationship; the managers possess the power. Carried to its
logical conclusion, the conception questions why corporate law directs management
fiduciary duties to equity interests only. Creditor protection in law follows as a
practical possibility and a policy priority.69
Investment theory played a central role in federal legislation
enacted during the 1930s, including the 1933 and 1938 bankruptcy
acts, the 1933 and 1934 securities acts, and the Trust Indenture Act of
1939.70 The investment theory did not supplant traditional debtor-
66. See id. at 1494-95. 'With the separation of ownership and control, the entrepreneurial
drive assumed in classical economics had become split between management and capital.
Management, the group controlling the means of production, was not motivated primarily by
profit-seeking, but by drives for power, prestige, and job security." Id. at 1494 (footnote omitted).
Consistent with the managerialist theory, "Berle and Means recognized that shares of stock no
longer carried the traditional incidents of property ownership. They offered a substitute concept
of shareholder/corporate relations built around intermediate securities markets. This was a
contractual concept .... " Shareholders did not actually control management. Id. at 1493
(footnotes omitted). On the bondholder side, Professor Warren had noted that "exclusion of
debtholders from the corporate family has traditionally been defended on the basis of property
law concepts of ownership. The application of those concepts to the modern corporation is at the
least problematic." Warren, supra note 38, at 1589 (footnote omitted).
67. Bratton, supra note 34, at 114. The investment theorists advocated greater creditor
protections. For example, they argued that corporate management had a fiduciary duty to both
equity and debt. See id. at 115.
68. Id. at 113 (footnote omitted).
69. Id. at 115 (footnotes omitted).
70. See id. at 115-16. The two bankruptcy acts treated both bondholders and stockholders
as owners of the corporation, with the bondholders having a more senior claim against the
corporation's assets. See id. The two securities acts protected both bondholders and
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creditor theory, however. Although the implications of the two theories
are quite different, the conflicting theories coexist.71
In the last thirty years, yet another competing theory has
emerged. This new agency theory, incorporating concepts from neo-
classical microeconomic theory, assumes that microeconomic actors
are rational and profit maximizing. 2 The corporate firm is conceptu-
alized as a "nexus of contracts among factors of production:" 3
Suppliers of capital hire managers as their agents. Rational actors, who retain some
freedom to pursue their own ends, tend to shirk on the job and behave in other
opportunistic ways with respect to the capital invested .... [Information asymmetries
prevent market self protection from curing all conflicts of interest. These failures of self
protection give rise to "agency costs." Contracting can reduce these costs and increase a
firm's value. Indeed, the contractual devices that make up complex capital structures
exist to control agency costs.7 4
The agency model treats debt and equity as qualitatively simi-
lar.7" Investors, both debtholders and shareholders, determine the
stockholders. See id. The Trust Indenture Act required that "debt contracts governing publicly
issued bonds include certain procedural protections, most notably a prohibition against less-
than-unanimous waivers of important contract rights." Id. at 116 (footnotes omitted).
71. See id. at 98 (describing the normative contradiction created by competing debtor-
creditor models). Following World War H, the investment and traditional theories coexisted in
practice, with corporate practitioners incorporating into their debt contracting process both
adversarial and cooperative features. See id. at 117. The model indentures drafted by the
corporate bar included provisions designed to reach consensus among potential adversaries. See
id.
As adversity waned, bondholders also demanded less security. With the largest, most
stable corporate borrowers, contract protections, even those following model forms, began
to disappear from practice. Given these institutions' strength and their managers' clear
interest in continued stability, these protections seemed superfluous. Thus, bonds
conceived in theory to resemble stock, began to resemble it in practice. A bond without
covenants, like a share of stock, is an investment made under loose legal guidelines that
leave management discretion largely unimpaired.
Id. at 117 (footnotes omitted).
Courts, on the other hand, viewed the investment and traditional debtor-creditor theories as
mutually exclusive theories. The Delaware courts, for example, held that corporate directors owe
fiduciary duties to shareholders, but not to creditors such as bondholders, which is consistent
with the traditional model. The Delaware courts treat bondholders as having only the rights
enumerated in their contract, unless the corporation is insolvent or fraud was involved. See id. at
118-19 (citing authorities). See also Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. RJR Nabisco, Inc., 716 F. Supp.
1504 (S.D.N.Y., 1989) (denying protection to RJR Nabisco bondholders whose RJR Nabisco bonds
lost value as a result of a leveraged buyout of RJR Nabisco that increased RJR Nabisco's
aggregate debt from $5 billion to $24 billion and caused the bond rating agencies to downgrade
the outstanding RJR Nabisco bonds).
72. See Bratton, supra note 34, at 122.
73. Id. at 125.
74. Id. at 126 (footnotes omitted).
75. See id. Both the investment model and agency model treat debt and equity as
comparable. However, the investment model envisions the investor maintaining a relationship
with the corporate issuer for a long period of time, whereas the agency model assumes that the
"investor" may trade her investment in the market at any time. See id. at 130.
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terms of their participation in the corporation by contract. 6 The logical
extension of the contractual theory of corporations is that debt and
equity should receive equivalent treatment since both are contractual
suppliers of capital to the corporation.7
During the last century, stock and debt interests have evolved
into similar financial instruments, but in corporate law, the individu-
alistic traditional debtor-creditor model, the investment model, and
the agency each wield influence, with the traditional debtor-creditor
model still dominating state corporate law.78 In the tax area, the tradi-
tional debtor-creditor model also dominates.' To this day, tax law
compares a financial instrument to "pure debt" and "pure equity," in
order to classify the instrument.' As Professor Polito has stated, "ex-
isting law is hopelessly flawed .... [I]t pursues the nonexistent holy
grail of a security's true nature as debt or equity."81
2. Financial Contract Innovation
The recent explosion in financial contract innovation has fur-
ther highlighted the deficiencies of the debt-equity distinction. Until
the early 1970s, the types of financial instruments typically used, such
as stock, bonds, options, 2 and futures,' were limited.' Since that time,
76. See id. at 129 ("Equity loses its property-based identity with the firm; its participation is
restated in contractual terms.') (footnote omitted).
77. In fact, the true logical extension of the theory is to treat all parties with whom the
corporation contracts, including suppliers of capital (stockholders, bondholders, and noteholders),
suppliers of labor, and suppliers of materials as "owners" of the corporation.
78. See id. at 121, 134-35.
79. See id. at 104.
80. I.R.C. § 385(a), as amended in 1989, grants to the Secretary of the Treasury the
authority to issue debt-equity classification regulations that bifurcate an instrument into debt
and equity components. Treasury to date has not utilized this grant of authority to issue final
§ 385 regulations that require bifurcation.
81. Polito, supra note 48, at 777 (1998). Said another way: 'There is nothing more complex
than trying to draw a line which does not exist." Plumb, supra note 51, at 619 (1971), (quoting
Lanning, Some Realities of Tax Reform, 1 COMPENDIUM OF PAPERS ON BROADENING THE TAX
BASE (Comm. Print 1959)). William Plumb also captured the essence of the problem: "'The fault,
dear Brutus, is not in our definition but in our dichotomy." Id. at 619 (adapted from WILLIAM
SHAKESPEARE, JULIUS CAESAR, Act I, scene ii).
82. An option gives the option buyer the right, but not the obligation, to buy or sell a
specified asset for a price specified at the time the option contract is written for the period of
time specified in the contract. See CHARLES W. SMITHSON, MANAGING FINANCIAL RISK: A GUIDE
TO DERIVATIVE PRODUCTS, FINANCIAL ENGINEERING, AND VALUE MAXIMIZATION 190-91 (3d ed.
1998). An option is a call option if the option buyer has the right to buy the specified asset. An
option is a put option if the option buyer has the right to sell the specified asset. The buyer of
the option pays the party writing the option for the option. The price at which the specified asset
will be bought or sold is referred to as the exercise price or the strike price of the option. See id.
An American option may be exercised throughout the term of the option. A European option may
be exercised only on the last day of the term of the option. See id.
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there has been an explosive growth of hundreds of new financial
products.' This period of rapid innovation resulted from a number of
factors.' In part, the new financial products were created to help cor-
porations manage increased economic risks that emerged in the early
1970s." In part, the new instruments were created to take advantage
of asymmetries in tax or other regulatory rules governing financial
instruments.' Also, issuers discovered they could reduce their cost of
capital by offering investors instruments that prepackaged features
that investors otherwise would have had to assemble on their own."
Advances in finance theory gave investment banks the tools for engi-
neering the new financial products.'
83. "A futures contract obligates its owner to purchase a specified asset at a specified
exercise price on the contract maturity date." Id. at 30.
84. Id. at 321, Figure 15-1. Smithson explains the history of futures contracts (dating back
to the 17th century), forward contracts (dating back to the 12th century), options (dating back to
the 18th century), and hybrid securities (with a Civil War example), and the rediscovery of them
in the 1970s and 1980s. Id. at 23-25.
85. See Warren, supra note 19, at 460. For a timeline of the development of hybrid
securities, see SMITHSON, supra note 82, at 321, Figure 15-1.
86. See Warren, supra note 19, at 460 and sources cited in note 1, including John D.
Finnerty, An Overview of Corporate Securities Innovation, 4 CONTINENTAL BANK J. APPLIED
CORP. FIN. 23 (1992), Robert C. Merton, Financial Innovation and Economic Performance, 4
CONTINENTAL BANK J. APPLIED CORP. FIN. 12 (1992), Merton H. Miller, Financial Innovation."
The Last Twenty Years and the Next, 21 J. FIN. & QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS 459 (1986). See also
Gergen & Schmitz, supra note 61, at 126. David Hariton has observed:
A corporation's objectives in raising capital (apart from obtaining it at the lowest possible
price), vary, and may include obtaining a favorable rating agency treatment, meeting a
specified regulatory objective, getting a certain accounting treatment, matching
anticipated payments with anticipated cash flows, hedging a perceived exposure to price
or interest rate risk, reducing exposure to the operation of certain high-risk businesses,
hedging against perceived cyclicality in business operations, responding to a wide variety
of U.S. tax rules, lowering foreign taxes, meeting foreign regulatory requirements,
manipulating control of the company, altering the perceptions of market analysts and
providing incentives to employees and management. Investors' objectives vary as well,
for investors are equally likely to have regulatory objectives or constraints, tax and
accounting considerations and views as to the direction of the market. Furthermore, the
relevant regulatory, accounting or other rules are themselves in evolution and flux.
Rights or obligations satisfy objectives today that they could not have satisfied in the
recent past.
Hariton, supra note 63, at 501.
87. See SMITHSON, supra note 82, at 2-23. These increased risks included foreign currency
rate risk, interest rate risk, and commodity price risk. Id. Smithson observes that corporations,
when faced with increased risk, first tried unsuccessfully to forecast the future prices better,
then turned to risk management tools that included derivatives. See id. at 28.
88. See id. at 352.
89. See id. at 351; see also Gergen & Schmitz, supra note 61, at 127-28, 145-49. Innovative
financial products were sometimes "low-cost substitutes for more costly synthetic strategies." Id.
at 128.
90. See Gergen & Schmitz, supra note 61, at 126. Over time, firms began to use derivatives
more and more. The perception of derivatives gradually evolved in the corporate community.
During the 1980s and early 1990s, innovative financial instruments were perceived as
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The put-call parity theorem is one of the most important of
these financial concepts. That theorem posits that stock, bonds, puts,
and calls are each financial building blocks that can be used to con-
struct synthetic financial instruments. Assume that the bond is a zero-
coupon bond, meaning that it does not pay any interest until it
matures. The face amount payable at maturity on the bond is E, so the
bond is represented as the present value of E, or PV(E). The share of
stock is referred to as S. The call option, referred to as C, is an option
to buy S. The call option expires on the date the bond matures. The
strike price of the call option is the face amount of the bond. The put
option, referred to as P, is an option to sell S. The put option expires
on the date the bond matures. The strike price of the put option is the
face amount of the bond. Any three of the four building blocks can be
used to construct the fourth synthetically. For example: PV (E) = S + P
- C. In other words, a zero coupon bond can be synthesized by an in-
vestor by buying the stock and the put and selling the call.92
Example 2:
A one-year Public Co. bond will pay $100 at the end of the year. The bond is a zero-
coupon bond, meaning that the bond pays no stated interest. Public Co. is a very
creditworthy borrower, so investors are willing to lend money to Public Co. at a yield
that approximates the yield on U.S. Treasury bonds. If that yield equals six percent,
PV(E) equals $94.33.93
hypertechnical or risky by many conservative corporate managers and so were shunned. Today,
innovative financial products, including derivatives "have come to be recognized simply as a
corporate finance tool .... Today, the question is not whether the firm will use derivatives, but
is instead how these tools can be used." SMITHSON, supra note 82, at ix (emphasis omitted). For
a discussion of the role of psychological factors in the corporate community's acceptance of
innovative instruments, see Gergen & Schmitz, supra note 61, at 150-51.






r is the discount rate.
n is the number of periods of discounting.
92. See Michael S. Knoll, Financial Innovation, Tax Arbitrage, and Retrospective Taxation:
The Problem with Passive Government Lending, 52 TAX L. REV. 199, 203 (1997); see also Warren,
supra note 19, at 465-467 (setting forth other examples of the put-call parity theorem).
93. The face amount payable at maturity, $100, discounted at 6 percent, compounded
annually for one period, produces a present value of $94.33:
PV = FV
(1 + On
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Public Co. common stock, S, currently trades at $95 per share. The call option to buy a
share of Public Co. common stock, C, has a strike price equal to the face amount of the
bond, $100. The price of the call option is $11.63, based on the Black-Scholes option
pricing model.94 The put option to sell a share of Public Co. common stock, P, also has a
strike price equal to the face amount of the bond, $100. The price of the put option is
$10.96, based on the Black-Scholes option pricing model. 95 Both the call and put
options are European options. Both the call and put options expire in one year, on the
date the bond matures.
PV(E) = S+P-C
$94.33 = $95 + 10.96 - 11.63
$94.33 = $94.33
Based on this theorem, standard financial instruments like
stock and bonds can be disaggregated into their component parts. The
parts can be sold separately or recombined into new kinds of financial
instruments."
A separate class of innovative financial products, called no-
tional principal contracts or swaps, also permits corporations to real-
locate risk. Notional principal contracts allow a party to transfer risk,
such as interest rate risk, to a counterparty.97 Parties to a notional
principal contract agree to exchange streams of payments based on a






94. This option price was calculated using the Black-Scholes option pricing formula on the
Bloomberg L.P. Option Valuation Screen. The Black-Scholes price for an option is based on the
following variables: (1) the risk-free interest rate; (2) the expiration date of the option; (3) the
price of the stock; (4) the strike price of the option; and (5) the volatility of the stock. See JOHN C.
HULL, OPTIONS, FUTURES, & OTHER DERIVATIVES 250, (4th ed. 2000). The volatility of the stock
was assumed to be 30 percent here.
95. See id.
96. See Warren, supra note 19, at 460. Securitization and stripping transactions involve the
disaggregation of cash flows and sale of the constituent parts. See David A. Weisbach, Tax
Responses to Financial Contract Innovation, 50 TAx L. REV. 487, 495 (1995).
97. See Warren, supra note 19, at 460-61.
98. Here is an example of an interest rate swap, which is one type of notional principal
contract. X Corporation has outstanding $60 million of debt. The debt bears a floating interest
rate, such as LIBOR (the London Interbank Offered Rate). X Corporation wants to cap its annual
interest payments at $6 million (or 10 percent of its debt); it does not want to run the risk that
the LIBOR rate might increase to a rate in excess of 10 percent. In order to limit its interest rate
risk, X Corporation enters into an interest rate swap contract with a counterparty, Y. The
contract obligates X Corporation to pay Y an annual amount equal to 10 percent of a $60 million
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The shortcomings of the debt-equity dichotomy, as well as
other tax asymmetries, have been highlighted as a result of financial
contract innovation. The tax law determines the tax consequences of a
financial instrument by assigning the instrument to a tax "cubbyhole,"
such as debt or equity, each of which has its own set of known tax con-
sequences." The problem with financial contract innovation is that
there is often no existing cubbyhole that fits the new instrument and
it is difficult to determine which existing cubbyhole the new instru-
ment should go into because the instrument has characteristics of
more than one traditional instrument. Sometimes the placement of an
instrument is uncertain. Even if the placement is certain, it some-
times winds up mismeasuring income and creating opportunities for
tax arbitrage."°
Innovative financial products highlight the problems with sev-
eral traditional distinctions in the tax law. For example, the realiza-
tion requirement creates a distinction between assets that provide for
a fixed return and assets that provide for a contingent return. The
current tax system taxes the former on an accrual basis and the latter
when the contingent return is realized."' It also distinguishes between
gain from the sale of a capital asset and ordinary income,"2 and be-
tween foreign source income and U.S source income. As explained
earlier, it also distinguishes between debt and equity. '
notional principal amount. (The notional principal amount is not actually loaned. It is simply
used to determine each party's payment obligation to the other party.) Y is obligated to pay X
Corporation the floating LIBOR rate on the $60 million notional principal amount. In year one,
X Corporation pays $7 million of interest on its outstanding debt, based on the LIBOR rate.
Under the notional principal contract between X Corporation and Y, X Corporation is obligated
to pay Y$6 million and Yis obligated to pay X Corporation $7 million. The payments are netted
and Y pays X Corporation $1 million. X Corporation's actual interest cost is $6 million ($7
million X Corporation paid the debtholders less $1 million X Corporation received from 1). By
entering into the notional principal contract, X Corporation has locked in a fixed 10 percent
interest cost. What would have happened if, in year one, X Corporation had owed its debtholders
$5 million of interest based on the floating LIBOR rate? Under the notional principal contract
between X Corporation and Y, X Corporation would have been obligated to pay Y $6 million and
Y would have been obligated to pay X Corporation $5 million. The payments would have been
netted and X Corporation would have owed Y $1 million. X Corporation's actual interest cost
would still have been $6 million ($5 million X Corporation paid the debtholders plus $1 million X
Corporation owed 1).
99. See Edward D. Klienbard, Equity Derivative Products: Financial Innovation's Newest
Challenge to the Tax System, 69 TEX. L. REV. 1319, 1320 (1991).
100. See Deborah H. Schenk, Taxation of Equity Derivatives: A Partial Integration Proposal,
50 TAXL. REV. 571, 575-77 (1995).
101. See Warren, supra note 19, at 460 (citing I.R.C. §§ 1001, 1272, 1273 (1994)).
102. See id. at 461.
103. Commentators have struggled with the issue of how the income tax system should
respond to the proliferation of new financial products. Professor Strnad has described four
possible approaches to dealing with innovative financial instruments: bifurcation, integration,
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Derivatives (also known as hybrid securities) deliberately blend
debt and equity features, often for legitimate business reasons."M The
cubbyhole approach requires that these instruments be labeled as debt
or equity. °5 Although Congress enacted § 385"° to address the debt-
local pattern taxation, and global pattern taxation. See Jeff Strnad, Taxing New Financial
Products: A Conceptual Framework, 46 STAN. L. REV. 569, 570 (1994). Bifurcation splits a
financial instrument into its component parts, each of which has a known tax treatment. See id.
at 570-71. (Deconstruction or decomposition might be more accurate terms, since the instrument
may have more than two component parts, but the term bifurcation seems to be the term most
often used.) Integration aggregates financial instruments and taxes the aggregate cash flow
based on its "predominant characteristic." See id. at 571 (citing Randall K.C. Kau, Carving Up
Assets and Liabilities-Integration or Bifurcation of Financial Products, 63 TAXES 1003, 1007-10
(1990)). Local pattern taxation "applies a single generic set of rules [including timing,
characterization, and source rules] to all new financial products." See id. Global pattern
taxation "applies a single generic treatment [e.g., cash flow taxation or accretion taxation] to all
instruments." Id. at 572.
Commentators have generally focused on the bifurcation and integration approaches.
Commentators have generally criticized the bifurcation approach although a minority of
commentators support it. For example, Hariton, Kau, and Kleinbard have all criticized the
bifurcation approach. See David P. Hariton, New Rules Bifurcating Contingent Debt-A
Mistake?, 51 TAX NOTES 235, 235 (1991); Kau, supra, at 1003, and Edward D. Kleinbard, Beyond
Good and Evil Debt (and Debt Hedges): A Cost of Capital Allowance System, 67 TAXES 943, 952-
53 (1989). On the other hand, Professors Lokken and Weisbach have argued for the bifurcation
approach. See Lawrence Lokken, New Rules Bifurcating Contingent Debt-A Good Start, 51 TAX
NOTES 495 (Apr. 29, 1991); Weisbach, supra note 96, at 539. Professor Strnad makes the point
that bifurcation and integration are interdependent in second-best setting, so it is not clear that
bifurcation alone could be used to resolve the problems caused by innovative financial contracts.
See Jeff Strnad, Taxing New Financial Products in a Second-Best World: Bifurcation and
Integration, 50 TAXL. REV. 545, 553 (1994) [hereinafter Strnad, Bifurcation and Integration].
104. See BITTKER & EUSTICE, supra note 9, 4.03[l], at 4-21:
As lenders have contemplated inflation and the growth in the value of real estate and
some other equities, they have increasingly sought to share in the earnings and
appreciation that historically inured exclusively to the benefit of the borrower's
shareholders. Conversely, even in a high-risk financial environment, some
entrepreneurial investors have attempted to cut their exposure by bargaining for some of
the protections that have traditionally been the hallmarks of the lender. To satisfy these
conflicting appetites for risk and security, financial planners have devised a bewildering
variety of fence-straddling securities (a/k/a innovative financial products) that, although
by no means innocent of tax motivations, seek to meet genuine business objectives
achievable only by abandoning the historic distinction between the terms 'pure debt' and
'pure equity.'
Id.
105. Note that the case law debt-equity classification factors were typically litigated in cases
involving closely held corporations, where the "debt" at issue was held by shareholders in
proportion to their stock ownership. See BITTKER & EUSTICE, supra note 9, 4.03[2], at 4-22.
I.R.C. § 385(a), as amended in 1989, grants Treasury the authority to issue debt-equity
classification regulations that bifurcate an instrument into debt and equity components.
Treasury to date has not utilized this grant of authority to issue final § 385 regulations that
require bifurcation. For a discussion of various Clinton administration proposals that did and
did not get enacted, including certain provisions that in effect treat the security as "neither fish
nor fowl," with the "worst-of-both-worlds" tax consequences, see BITTKER & EUSTICE, supra note
9, 4.02, 4.03, 4-31, 4-36.
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equity classification issue, § 385 does not actually define debt and
equity. Instead, § 385 delegates to the Secretary of the Treasury the
authority to issue regulations that would distinguish between debt or
equity. ' Section 385 provides that the regulations should set forth
classification factors, including five listed factors. 8 Treasury labored
on the § 385 regulations for a decade before they were issued in
1980.'°9
The § 385 regulations shifted the approach to the classification
of debt and equity. The traditional case law approach characterized
the instrument based on the relationship between the issuer and the
holder of the instrument. The cases looked to all the facts and circum-
stances to determine whether the relationship was a debtor-creditor
relationship or a corporation-shareholder relationship. The approach
in the § 385 regulations characterized the instrument, in part, based
on the factors that determined the amount of the payments under the
instrument."' Under that approach, an instrument might be charac-
106. See Tax Reform Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-172, § 415(a), 83 Stat. 487, 613 (1969),
reprinted in 1969-3 C.B. 10, 83-84.
107. See I.R.C. § 385(a) (1994). As Bittker, Eustice, and Cummings have colorfully stated,
"[h]aving dropped the hot potato in 1954, Congress decided in 1969 to pass it on to the Treasury."
BITrKER & EUSTICE, supra note 9, 1 4.0218] [a], at 4-18.
108. The five factors are: (1) whether there is a written unconditional promise to pay on
demand or on a specified date a fixed amount in exchange for adequate consideration, and to pay
a fixed rate of interest; (2) whether there is subordination to or preference over any indebtedness
of the corporation; (3) the issuing corporation's debt-equity ratio; (4) whether the instrument is
convertible into stock of the issuing corporation; and (5) the relationship between holdings of
stock of the issuing corporation and the instrument to be classified. See I.R.C. § 385(b) (1994).
109. Proposed regulations were issued in 1980. Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 45 Fed. Reg.
18,957 (1980). After hearings, the regulations were made final in 1981, but the effective date of
those regulations was repeatedly postponed. T.D. 7747, 1981-1 C.B. 141; T.D. 7774, 1981-1 C.B.
168; T.D. 7801, 1982-1 C.B. 60; Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 1982-1 C.B. 531; T.D. 7822,
1982-2 C.B. 84.
110. See David P. Hariton, The Taxation of Complex Financial Instruments, 43 TAX L. REV.
731, 771, 778 (1988). For the classification of publicly issued instruments, the regulations
focused on two factors: first, the factors that determined the amount that would be paid under
the instrument, and, second, the holder's right to compel the payments. The regulations
provided that an instrument would be classified as debt if the present value of its "debt features"
at least equaled 50% of the instrument's issue price. See Treas. Reg. § 1.385-5(a) (1981). A
payment provided for in the obligation was a "debt feature" if (1) the amount of the payment was
"definitely ascertainable," and (2) "the holder's right to receive it could not be impaired." Treas.
Reg. § 1.385-5(d)(3), (4) (1981). A payment was "definitely ascertainable" if it (1) was fixed, or
(2) was variable but not within the issuer's control or tied to the success of the issuer's business.
Treas. Reg. § 1.385-5(d)(4)(I)(B) (1981). A holder's right to receive payment could not be
"impaired" if the holder had the right to compel the payment even in the face of insufficient
earnings and profits or insolvency. Treas. Reg. § 1.385-10(1981). Hariton noted:
This broad definition of when a holder's right to receive a payment could be
impaired placed a substantial emphasis on creditor's rights. In fact, the emphasis
on creditor's rights sometimes overshadowed the emphasis on the factors which
determined the amount of the payments. Thus, a conventional 20-year debt obligation
with annual payments floating at 3% above LIBOR was treated as equity if it did not
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terized as equity if the amount of the payments due under the instru-
ment depended on the trading price of the issuer's stock, the dividends
the issuer paid, or the issuer's profits.
Just before the § 385 regulations were to take effect, the Borg
Warner Corporation issued a type of instrument referred to as an ad-
justable rate convertible note (ARCN).11 The ARCNs were engineered
to be classified as debt under the proposed § 385 regulations, despite
the fact that the ARCNs also possessed certain equity characteris-
tics."1 The Internal Revenue Service (the "Service") responded by
issuing Revenue Ruling 83-98,"' in which it took the position that the
ARCNs were equity, not debt, because there was no debtor-creditor
relationship between the issuer and the holders of the ARCNs. The
rationale of the ruling was that the instrument was not designed so
that the amount payable at maturity on the debt would actually be
paid. Instead, specifying the amount payable at maturity just ensured
that the debt instrument would be converted into equity"' or provided
a floor that would be utilized only if the stock price dropped by more
than 40 percent. The Ruling did not mention the § 385 regulations or
the factors that determined the amount to be paid under the instru-
ments, although the returns on the ARCN's tracked the returns on the
permit the holder to force the issuer into bankruptcy in the event of insolvency, and a
share of perpetual preferred stock (i.e., stock with no maturity date or other right of
redemption) was treated as debt if the holder had a right to compel the payment of
accrued dividends, notwithstanding insolvency.
Id. at 778 (footnote omitted).
111. See id. The following discussion of Revenue Ruling 83-92 is primarily based on
Hariton's discussion of the ruling.
112. At the time the ARCNs were issued, Borg Warner common stock traded for about $38 a
share. The stock typically paid dividends of around $1.52 per share per year. The ARCNs were
issued for $1,000 each and were convertible into about 26 shares of the Borg Warner common
stock. (At the time the ARCNs were issued, $1,000 equaled the fair market value of about 26
shares of the Borg-Warner common.) Each year the ARCN was outstanding, the holder of the
ARCN was entitled to receive minimum annual interest of 4.95 percent until 1986 and 6.84
percent from 1987 until the ARCN matured in 2002. In the alternative, the holder could be paid
the sum of (1) $7.36 of annual interest, plus (2) the annual dividends payable on 26 shares of
Borg-Warner common stock, which was $40 at the time the ARCNs were issued. If this latter
sum exceeded the minimum interest due, the ARCN holder was entitled to receive the latter
sum. At maturity, the holder would also be paid $550 if the holder had not yet converted the
ARCN into Borg Warner common stock. See id. at 778-79 & nn.149-52 (citing the Borg Warner
Corp. Prospectus (Dec. 2, 1982)). The ARCNs would have been classified as debt under the § 385
regulations because the present value of the ARCNs' "debt features" at least equaled 50 percent
of the ARCNs' issue price.
113. 1983-2 C.B. 40.
114. David Hariton criticized that rationale, arguing that "most convertible debt obligations
are likely to be converted into common stock." Hariton, supra note 110, at 779. 'If the ARCNs
were equity rather than debt, it is not because they were convertible into the issuer's stock but
rather because the amount of the payments under the instrument mimicked the returns on the
issuer's common stock." Id. at 779-80.
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Borg-Warner common stock, which would have been a factor in favor
of equity classification.
Treasury subsequently withdrew the § 385 regulations."' The
withdrawal of the § 385 regulations signaled a return to the
traditional approach in the case law. The traditional factors in the
case law look to risk-based ownership notions: Equity owns the
corporation because it participates in the risk of the venture. Debt
does not participate in the risk of the venture so is outside the
corporation. David Hariton has noted:
The species of financial instruments began to mutate in the 1980s, as capital markets
developed high yield debt, zero coupon debt, hybrid debt, floating rate debt, money-
market preferred and liquid yield option notes. With the proliferation of derivative
transactions in the 1990s, however, distinguishing between equity and debt has
become especially difficult. In exchange for capital, corporations can offer investors any
set of rights that can be described by words, subject to any conceivable set of
qualifications, and in consideration of any conceivable set of offsetting obligations. In
doing so, corporations do not have a specific objective to attract "shareholders,"
"creditors" or something in between. Nor do they have an intention that can be
identified as such, such as to permit investors to embark upon the corporate venture or
to permit investors to avoid taking risk.116
Said another way, using risk-based rules for classifying debt
and equity makes even less sense now than it did at the beginning of
the century because financial contract innovation permits the con-
struction of synthetic corporate securities that slice and dice and re-
allocate risk.1 7
115. T.D. 7920, 1983-2 C.B. 69. For other descriptions of the § 385 regulations, see Polito,
supra note 48, at 785-790; Ceryak, supra note 54, at 281; and Emmerich, supra note 37, at 118.
116. Hariton, supra note 63, at 500-01 (footnotes omitted). Hariton's thesis is that, if we
must try to classify debt and equity according to risk-based ownership principals, we cannot
classify instruments based on static factors; instead, we must classify the instrument based on
how the instrument in question fits into the issuer's overall capital structure. He explains:
The real question, then, is not how many debt characteristics does the instrument
possess, but rather to what extent does the instrument insulate the investor from the
risks and rewards of the issuer's business.... The question only has meaning in the
context of the relationships among various classes of investors in the corporate
enterprise.... [O]ne must consider the rights conferred by other investments in the
capital of the issuer, what other capital exists to support the issuer's obligations and
what other obligations must be met by the issuer first.
Therefore, it is not possible to characterize an instrument as equity or debt by reference
to a checklist of abstract attributes that equity or debt supposedly possesses; the
relationships among different classes of investors will not always be on the checklist. The
only way to shed light on these relationships is to ask such questions as: (1) How much
equity capital supports the investor's rights? (2) How much debt capital is senior to it?
(3) To what extent will the investor participate in the issuer's profits? and (4) What
rights, if any, will the equity still have if the lender loses money? The factors in [Notice
94-47] and under case law are useful only insofar as they speak to these questions.
Id. at 522.
117. Professor Shaviro argues that we should abandon the debt-equity distinction:
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Professor Gergen argues that the tax problems created by fi-
nancial contract innovation have been overstated because transactions
that work in theory are expensive or impossible to implement in the
real world.1 '8 The theoretical possibilities created by the put-call parity
theorem work only if long-term options on the underlying stock are
readily available, because the term of the option must coincide with
the term of the bond. Gergen notes that publicly traded long-term op-
tions are not readily available and creating substitutes for such long-
term options is costly."1
On the other hand, the risk-based distinction between stock
and debt may be outmoded, even if financial contract innovation
works better in theory than in practice, because there is evidence that
investors are no longer demanding a significant "risk premium" to
invest in stock. Average stock returns have historically exceeded aver-
age bond returns." The extra return on stock is sometimes referred to
as a "risk premium." Investors historically have demanded a higher
return on stock because owning stock is viewed as riskier than owning
bonds; the notion is that returns on stocks are uncertain and volatile,
whereas returns on bonds are fixed and stable.
The risk premium has historically averaged about 3.5 per-
cent. 1 Recently, the risk premium has virtually disappeared.' Said
another way, investors are investing at lower levels of equity returns.
Although the press has decried the elimination of the risk premium as
evidence of the irrationality of investors,"a a few commentators have
[T]he effort to subject stock and debt... to different tax regimes, under the assumption
that, in at least some cases, investors' risk preferences will determine their tax positions,
is seriously compromised if, by using such devices as options and offsetting positions,
investors can construct any type of ownership interest synthetically, without needing to
declare explicitly what risk position they really hold in the aggregate.
Daniel Shaviro, Risk-Based Rules and the Taxation of Capital Income, 50 TAX L. REV. 643, 652
(1995). Professor Shaviro's larger point is that, in light of the ability to slice and dice, reallocate,
and repackage risk, relying on risk-based rules in our tax system is increasingly problematic.
See id. at 724. Other commentators have made similar arguments. See, e.g., id. at 643 n.1.
118. See Mark P. Gergen, Apocalypse Not?, 50 TAXL. REV. 833, 841 (1995).
119. See id.
120. See James K. Glassman & Kevin A. Hassett, Are Stocks Overvalued? Not a Chance,
WALL ST. J., Mar. 30, 1998, at A18.
121. See JOHN C. BOGLE, COMMON SENSE ON MUTUAL FUNDS 440 (1999).
122. See Jeremy J. Siegel, Are Stocks Underpriced? Well, Not Quite., WALL ST. J., Apr. 14,
1998, at A23.
123. See James K. Glassman & Kevin A. Hassett, Dow 36,000, THE ATLANTIC MONTHLY,
Sept. 1999, at 37, 38. In December, 1996, Federal Reserve Chairman Alan Greenspan spooked
the financial markets by asking the following question in a speech: "How do we know when
irrational exuberance has unduly escalated asset values, which then become subject to
unexpected and prolonged contractions ... ?" Floyd Norris, Greenspan Asks a Question and
Global Markets Wobble, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 7, 1996 (Saturday late ed., final), sec. 1, p. 1.
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defended the reduction in the risk premium on the grounds that, in
the long run, stocks are not riskier than bonds.'
In the short run, stocks are riskier than bonds. In the last two
centuries, the worst annual inflation-adjusted return for the stock
market was -38.6 percent. In other words, a $100 investment made at
the beginning of the year was worth only $61.40 at the end of the year.
The best annual inflation-adjusted return for the stock market was
66.6 percent. In other words, a $100 investment made at the begin-
ning of the year was worth $166.60 at the end of the year.' These are
large swings. In addition, the odds of losing money in the stock market
in a given year are more than one in four.'
In the long run, however, stocks are less risky than bonds. The
worst average annual return over a 30-year period was 2.6 percent. In
other words, a $100 investment made at the beginning of the 30-year
would have been worth $215.98 at the end of the 30-year period. 27 In
the long-run, investment in stock is even less risky than investment in
short-term Treasury bonds or bills:
If you keep your money at work for more than twenty years, stocks are actually safer
than short-term T-bills rolled over annually.
124. See Glassman & Hassett, supra note 123, at 37, 38; Siegel, supra note 122, at A23.
125. See Glassman & Hassett, supra note 123, at 39.
126. See id.
127. See id. at 39. Glassman and Hassett illustrate the relationship between the riskiness of
stock and the period of time over which an investment in stock is held:
Over a one-year period the standard deviation for stocks is 18 percent. This means that
in two out of three years the return on a stock will vary by no more than 18 percentage
points from the average-in either direction. Since the average real return is about seven
percent, returns should vary two thirds of the time between 25 percent and -11 percent.
That's very risky. But over ten-year holding periods the standard deviation drops to five
percentage points. Over thirty-year periods it drops to about two percentage points-
meaning that two thirds of the time the range is five to nine percent. That's not risky at
all.
Id. at 40. Glassman and Hassett have made a controversial argument that "[s]tocks are.., in
the middle of a one-time-only rise to much higher ground-to the neighborhood of 36,000 for the
Dow Jones Industrial Average." Id. at 37. Glassman and Hassett made a less extreme claim
earlier in the wall Street Journal. See Glassman & Hassett, supra note 120, at A18. Professor
Jeremy Siegel responded, taking issue with Glassman and Hassett's assumptions about growth
in per-share cash flows. See Siegel, supra note 122, at A23. Glassman and Hassett had assumed
that per-share cash flows would grow at the same rate as the overall economy, plus inflation.
See id. Siegel argued that Glassman and Hassett had failed to take into account the need to
make additional future investments to fuel that future earnings growth; the future investment
would have to be financed with retained earnings or new stock or debt, which would reduce per-
share cash flows. See id. Siegel therefore concluded that "it is wrong to say that stocks are
underpriced at current levels." Id. Siegel agrees, however, that investors "are bidding up share
prices so that there will be little premium return on stocks over bonds." Id. Siegel notes that
"there are favorable factors facing the stock market today that are unprecedented. These include
extremely low inflation, high employment, and an international economy that positions
American firms for outstanding growth." Id.
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Over a twenty-year period the worst inflation-adjusted return by stocks was an annual
average of 1.0 percent. For bonds, however, the worst was -3.1 percent, and for T-bills -
3.0 percent. Over one-year periods stocks have outperformed bonds only 61 percent of
the time, but stocks beat bonds 92 percent of the time over twenty-year periods and 99
percent of the time over thirty-year periods m
The risk-based debt-equity distinction does not make sense in
an environment in which investors are willing to invest in stock with
no significant risk premium.
Edward Kleinbard has also observed, that, since issuers often
hedge interest rate risk, the nominal interest accrued on corporate
debt may-be a poor measure of the issuer's cost of debt capital." In
1989, Kleinbard issued a warning:
As applied to corporate issuers, current tax law also places enormous stress on whether
a particular capital market instrument is deductible debt or nondeductible equity,
again without regard to the overall economic result achieved by that instrument in the
context of the issuer's other positions. As the equity derivative product marketplace
matures, corporate issuers can be expected to use those products more frequently, not
only to manage their cost of equity capital but also to seek to convert nondeductible
equity expenses into deductible derivative payments.130
Kleinbard was prescient. In the last five years, issuers have
begun to issue a class of securities that the press has dubbed "tax de-
ductible preferred stock."" ' This class of securities includes Monthly
Income Preferred Shares (MIPS) and the progeny of MIPS.13' These
types of securities are treated like debt for federal tax purposes, but
are treated like equity for accounting, credit rating, and bank regula-
tion purposes."
128. Id.
129. Kleinbard, supra note 103, at 946. He observes that, although we calculate the issuer's
bond interest deduction using the relatively sophisticated economic accrual concepts of the OID
rules (I.R.C. §§ 1272-74), the issuer's interest cost may have been swapped to a counterparty in a
notional principal contract, in which case the interest on the issuer's nominal debt is not actually
the issuer's cost of debt capital. See id. at 953. We nonetheless permit the issuer to deduct the
interest on the issuer's nominal debt. See id.
130. Kleinbard, supra note 99, at 1363.
131. See Gergen & Schmitz, supra note 61, at 132.
132. The progeny of MIPS include Quarterly Income Capital Securities (QICs), Quarterly
Income Debt Securities (QUIDs), Preferred Capital Securities, Trust Originated Preferred
Securities (TOPrS), and Trust Preferred Stock (TRUPS). These instruments are explained in
Gergen & Schmitz, supra note 61, at 134 n.58.
133. See id. at 132, nn.56, 126. Technically, the rating agencies do not actually classify MIPS
as debt or equity; the rating agencies instead give partial equity credit for MIPS. See Gergen &
Schmitz, supra note 61, at 132 n.56; Hariton, supra note 63, at 518. The discussion of MIPS that
follows in the text is based on the discussion of MIPS in Gergen & Schmitz, supra note 61, at
153, and Hariton, supra note 63, at 517.
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In a typical MIPS transaction (simplifying somewhat), a corpo-
ration creates a new entity." The new entity issues preferred interests
to investors. The new entity then lends the corporate parent the pro-
ceeds from the sale of the preferred interests and the funds the corpo-
rate parent invested in the new entity. The loan to the corporate par-
ent is subordinated and has a 30-year term with a possible 20-year
extension of the loan. The corporate parent pays the entity interest,
which the entity then distributes to the holders of the preferred inter-
ests. The note agreement permits the corporate parent to defer the
payment of interest for up to five years. The corporate issuer deducts
the interest on the note.
In 1994, Treasury issued a ruling and two notices that the legal
and investment communities interpreted as "blessing" MIPS.'35 A large
volume of MIPS and MIPS progeny have subsequently been issued."
Some of the MIPS progeny have eliminated the new entity in the
MIPS structure. In these transactions, the corporate borrower directly
issues the long-term subordinated debt with an interest deferral pro-
vision to investors.'7 These types of tax deductible preferred stock
permit the corporate issuer to deduct distributions to investors, while
providing some of the flexibility of actual preferred stock. At the same
time, these instruments receive beneficial accounting, regulatory, and
rating agency treatment.
As the foregoing discussion of financial contract innovation has
illustrated, it has grown increasingly difficult to distinguish between
the stock and debt of public companies. The debt-equity distinction
causes numerous problems including complexity, uncertainty, and
opportunities for tax arbitrage. Tax lawyers devote significant time to
camouflaging equity-like instruments to resemble debt for tax pur-
poses.'38 Uncertainty about the tax consequences of innovative debt-
equity hybrid securities inhibits the creation and sale of such
134. In the original transaction, the entity was an off-shore Turks and Caicos Islands
company, which was treated as a partnership for tax purposes. Gergen & Schnmitz, supra note 61,
at 153, n.125; Hariton, supra note 63, at 519. The SEC subsequently issued a no-action letter
that alleviated regulatory concerns about using on-shore limited liability companies and limited
partnerships MIPS transaction. See id. at 134 n.58. See also Hariton, supra note 63, at 518-19.
135. See Gergen & Schmitz, supra note 61, at 156 n.139 (citing and explaining Rev. Rul. 94-
28, 1994-1 C.B. 86, Notice 94-47, 1994-1 C.B. 357, and Notice 94-48, 1994-1 C.B. 357). Notice 94-
48 reiterated the traditional multifactor caselaw debt-equity classification test, listing eight
factors to be considered, among others. See 1994-1 C.B. at 357. The Notice states, however, that
two equity features are "of particular interest:" (1) an unreasonably long maturity, and (2) the
ability to repay the principal on the note with the corporate parent's stock. Id. David Hariton
analyzes the Notice in detail and criticizes its approach. See Hariton, supra note 63, at 513-24.
136. See Gergen & Schmitz, supra note 61, at 135 (Chart 1) & n.56.
137. See id. at 155 (describing QUIDs); Hariton, supra note 63, at 520.
138. See, e.g., Bulow et al., supra note 58, at 146.
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securities. 3' The inconsistent tax treatment of equivalent cash flows
with different labels permits taxpayers to reap tax profits from paper
transactions that otherwise produce no economic gain or loss. "' The
debt-equity distinction thus distorts behavior."'
3. Additional Inefficiencies
The debt-equity distinction causes inefficiencies in addition to
those described above in connection with financial contract innovation.
First, allowing a corporation to deduct interest but not dividends en-
courages corporations to overuse debt in their capital structures. (This
problem is sometimes referred to as "overleveraging.") Second, the
corporate interest deduction creates an inefficiency because it dis-
courages investment in high growth businesses.
The greater the amount of debt in a corporation's capital struc-
ture, the greater the risk that the corporation will experience financial
distress during recessions. 4' Financial distress is costly to the failing
139. See Gergen & Schmitz, supra note 61, at 157-63.
140. See Knoll, supra note 92, at 203-05. Knoll includes an example of a taxpayer issuing a
bond and using the bond proceeds to (1) buy a share of stock, (2) buy a put option on the share of
stock that matures on the date the bond matures and has a strike price equal to the face amount
of the bond, and (3) sell a call option on the share of stock that matures on the date the bond
matures and has a strike price equal to the face amount of the bond. See id. The interest on the
bond is deductible against ordinary income, which is taxed at a maximum rate of 39.6 percent.
See id. The gain from the stock-put-call portfolio is taxed at the preferential capital gains rate of
28 percent. See id. The transaction produces no economic gain or loss. (Under the put-call
parity theorem, the cash flows from buying the bond will equal the cash flows from buying the
stock and put and selling the call.) The transaction produces a tax profit of 11.6 percent because
the interest is deductible at the 39.6 percent rate and the gain is taxed at the 28 percent rate.
See id. Professor Knoll states: "Thus, the arbitrage possibility is a 'money machine,' generating
cash for the trouble of shuffling papers." Id. at 205.
141. Edward Kleinbard also argues that inconsistent tax treatment of innovative financial
contracts sometimes renders them ineffective as risk-management tools:
Corporate issuers have been substantial users of derivative interest rate financial
products (such as interest rate swaps), primarily as devices to hedge or otherwise manage
their liabilities. Issuers increasingly find, however, that many sophisticated liability
strategies currently being developed, while appearing very elegant on a pretax basis,
simply cannot be implemented once tax costs are taken into account, because the
instrument-by-instrument approach required by current law leads to a wide variety of
anomalous (and expensive) results.
Kleinbard, supra note 99, at 1363 (footnote omitted).
142. In this context, financial distress means difficulty paying debts as they come due.
Dividends do not have to be paid until the corporation's board of directors approves the payment
of the dividend. The board of a corporation can defer the payment of dividends during
recessions. Interest due on corporate debt is owed regardless of whether there is a recession.
The more debt in the corporation's capital structure, the greater the fixed obligations of the
corporation and the greater the likelihood that the corporation will not be able to pay its debts as
they come due during recessions. Numerous economic commentators have decried the
decapitalization of United States corporations. See, e.g., Kaufman, supra note 59, at 23; Henry
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business. The costs of distress include both direct costs and indirect
costs. The direct costs are the costs of being in bankruptcy."' The indi-
rect costs include: (1) the increased cost of obtaining ongoing debt
financing;"" (2) the costs associated with operational constraints that
the distress places on the corporation;'.5 (3) the costs associated with
management adopting risky projects that would disproportionately
benefit equity or forgoing potentially profitable projects that would
disproportionately benefit debtholders;' and (4) the costs associated
with disruption in the corporation's relationships with employees, cus-
tomers, and suppliers.' Studies of the indirect costs of bankruptcy
indicate that the indirect costs of the sampled firms were significantly
greater than the direct costs.'
4 8
Overleveraging can also have harmful macroeconomic effects.
The failing businesses' failures to make interest payments may cause
a domino effect in the economy, as creditors of the failing businesses
in turn find themselves unable to service their debt. On a macro-
economic level, the increased economic vulnerability to recessions in-
Kaufman, Debt: The Threat to Economic and Financial Stability in DEBT, FINANCIAL STABILITY,
AND PUBLIC POLICY: A SYMPOSIUM SPONSORED BY THE FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF KANSAS CITY
(Jackson Hole, Wyoming, Aug. 27-29, 1986). In his 1989 article, Kaufiman notes:
During the latest economic cycle, the debt of U.S. nonfinancial corporations has gone up
by an estimated $840 billion while their equity position has contracted by nearly $300
billion. That translates into a 15.4 percent annual growth rate in debt, compared with an
average annual increase of only 8.4 percent for the previous six cycles of economic growth.
In the process, interest payments by these companies have swelled to 26 percent of
internal cash flow, and all-time high. And the explosion in leverage has caused a severe
drop in [the credit ratings of U.S. companies].
Kaufman, supra note 59, at 23.
143. Estimates of the magnitude of these direct costs vary. For corporations with assets of
$100 million or more, the direct costs may be in the neighborhood of three percent of the asset
value of the corporation. The direct costs for smaller corporations may be a higher percentage of
asset value. See Michael S. Knoll, Taxing Prometheus: How the Corporate Interest Deduction
Discourages Innovation and Risk-Taking, 38 VILL. L. REV. 1461, 1476, (1993) (citing Lawrence A.
Weiss, Bankruptcy Resolution: Direct Costs and Violation of Priority Claims, 27 J. FIN. ECON.
285, 288-90 (1990) and Michelle J. White, Bankruptcy Costs and the New Bankruptcy Code, 38 J.
FIN. 477, 486-87 (1983)).
144. See STAFF OF THE JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 101ST CONG., 1ST SESS., FEDERAL INCOME
TAX ASPECTS OF CORPORATE FINANCIAL STRUCTURES 54, 70 (Comm. Print 1989) [hereinafter
CORPORATE FINANCIAL STRUCTURES].
145. See id.
146. See Knoll, supra note 143, at 1477-79. The former problem is referred to as the asset
substitution problem and the latter is referred to as the underinvestment problem. Knoll gives
an example of each type of problem. See id. nn.77, 79.
147. See id. at 1479-80.
148. See, e.g., Edward Altman, A Further Empirical Investigation of the Bankruptcy Cost
Question, 39 J. FIN. 1067, 1076-83 (1984). Knoll notes that it is difficult to measure indirect
costs of distress. See Knoll, supra note 143, at 1476; see also CORPORATE FINANCIAL STRUCTURES,
supra note 144, at 70.
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cident to overleveraging may pressure the Federal Reserve to adopt
defensive expansionist policies that may increase inflation."9
The problems associated with overleveraging are partially off-
set for various reasons. For example, the corporate level tax advan-
tages of using debt in the capital structure are offset to some degree
because of investor level tax consequences. Corporate capital struc-
tures are influenced both by the corporate tax and the investor level
tax on the corporation's debt and equity." Debtholders include inter-
est income when it is paid or accrued. The interest income is taxed at
ordinary income rates unless, as is often the case, the debtholder is
tax-exempt. Shareholders include dividends in income when the divi-
dends are paid. The dividends are taxed at ordinary income rates. If
some of the corporation's earnings are not distributed, the shareholder
is not currently taxed on those earnings. Those earnings are taxed,
instead, when the shareholder sells the stock, the value of which has
increased to reflect the shareholder's share of the undistributed earn-
ings. In other words, the shareholder benefits from the deferral of the
tax liability on those earnings."' In addition, the gain from the sale of
the stock qualifies for preferential capital gains rates.
The long-run effect of the differing investor level tax conse-
quences of debt and equity is that high bracket taxpayers tend to want
to buy equities (which offer the benefits of deferral and capital gains
rates) and low-bracket or tax-exempt taxpayers tend to want to buy
corporate debt. This affects the demand for debt and equity invest-
ments. Over time, if the demand for equities is greater than the de-
mand for debt, corporate issuers will be forced to discount the price of
their debt, which will cause investors who would otherwise prefer to
buy equity to buy the discounted debt instead. The tax advantages to
issuing corporations of issuing debt are offset by the discounts at
which the debt must be sold.
5
Merton Miller has argued that, if the economy is in equilib-
rium, there would be an optimal level of debt in the corporate sector as
149. In other words, the need to adopt expansionist policies may overconstrain the Fed. See
Benjamin M. Friedman, Increasing Indebtedness and Financial Stability in the United States, in
DEBT, FINANCIAL STABILITY, AND PUBLIC POLICY: A SYMPOSIUM SPONSORED BY THE FEDERAL
RESERVE BANK OF KANSAS CITY (Jackson Hole, Wyoming, Aug. 27-29, 1986).
150. See Merton H. Miller, Debt and Taxes, 32 J. FIN. 261, 268-72 (1977).
151. The benefit to the shareholder equals the tax that would have been paid currently,
absent the deferral, less the present value of the tax payment that will be made in the future
with the deferral.
152. See RONALD W. MASULIS, THE DEBT/EQUITY CHOICE 23 (1988); CORPORATE FINANCIAL
STRUCTURES, supra note 144, at 57. Professor Knoll gives an example. See Knoll, supra note
143, at 1470 n.39.
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a whole but an individual corporation could not increase its value by
issuing debt."u Finance professor Ronald Masulis and law professor
Michael Knoll, among others, have challenged Miller's model." For
example, Professor Knoll argues that each corporation does have an
optimal capital structure that balances the tax shield from interest
deductions and the costs of financial distress."
Also, as noted above in the discussion of financial contract in-
novation, some instruments that are structured to be debt for tax pur-
poses are de facto preferred stock. For example, billions of dollars of
MIPS and other so-called tax deductible preferred stock have been
issued in the last few years." If some of the increased debt in this
country is de facto equity, the documented increase in debt burdens in
recent years may be exaggerated. 57
In addition, increased corporate debt '58 could represent a bene-
ficial form of do-it-yourself "hack-door" integration of the individual
tax and corporate tax. As discussed in the next Part, the double
corporate tax also creates economic distortions. For years,
commentators have argued for integration of the individual and
corporate taxes, but so far all formal integration attempts have failed.
One could also argue that, if corporate integration is the theoretically
153. Miller, supra note 150, at 269.
154. See MASULIS, supra note 152, at 24-30; Knoll, supra note 143, at 1474.
155. Professor Knoll argues that Miller's model is incorrect, in part because it is based on
faulty assumptions. Knoll, supra note 143, at 1474. For example, Miller assumed that
corporations can always make immediate use of their interest deductions. See id. Corporate
losses left after any carrybacks are not refundable. They may be carried forward and used to
offset corporate income in later years, but the present value of the tax savings from such a loss
are diminished because the tax savings from the loss are deferred. In addition, the losses are not
freely transferable to a profitable corporation that could use them immediately. Knoll argues
that, in such an environment, there would be an optimal level of debt which would take into
account the expected marginal value of the tax shield and the marginal individual income tax
rate. As leverage increases, it becomes more likely that the corporation will be unable to make
full use of the tax shield attributable to the interest deductions. Said another way, as leverage
increases, the value of the tax shield decreases. See id.; see also MASULIS, supra note 152, at 24-
30. The theory of corporate capital structure is, of course, much more involved than the brief
passage in the text of this Article indicates. Knoll summarizes the theory of corporate capital
structures, including a brief description of static tradeoff theory and alternatives to that theory.
See Knoll, supra note 143, at n.90.
156. For a discussion of MIPS, see supra notes 132-36 and accompanying text.
157. See Bulow et al., supra note 58, at 146.
158. See id. From 1984 to 1987, there was a dramatic increase in the debt burdens of United
States corporations. In 1976, aggregate corporate interest deductions equaled about one-quarter
of aggregate taxable income before the interest deduction. By 1985, aggregate corporate interest
deductions equaled about one-half of aggregate taxable income before the interest deduction.
The increased interest deductions have potentially reduced the corporate tax collected from the
debtor corporations. The potential decrease in corporate tax may have been offset by increased
income tax collected from the debtor corporations and their investors. See CORPORATE FINANCIAL
STRUCTURES, supra note 144, at 80-81.
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correct but politically unfeasible approach to corporation taxation, the
backdoor integration from increased corporate debt could benefit
United States corporations by reducing their cost of capital for new
investments."9 Bulow, Summers, and Summers noted the increased
availability of the high-yield bond financing for risky businesses
during the 1980s, but observed that most high-yield bonds were issued
in restructurings, not to finance new investment."w They take the
position that the increased use of debt in restructurings does not
reduce the cost of capital.
Some commentators have also argued that using debt in a cor-
poration's capital structure is beneficial because it reduces manage-
ment incentives to retain earnings to the detriment of investors.'
Without the constraint imposed by interest obligations, management
has an incentive to horde earnings even if the projects available to
management do not have a positive net present value. If interest obli-
gations force managers to distribute earnings, managers have to go
back to the capital markets in order to raise capital to fund projects.
This increased scrutiny potentially disciplines managers. Other
commentators have countered, however, that debt is not a particularly
effective device for disciplining management."
Even in light of all of the potential offsets to the tax advantages
of corporate debt, the consensus view of economists is that corporate
159. See Bulow et al., supra note 58, at 146.
160. See id. at 147. Most of the high-yield debt issued in 1988 by Drexel Burnham Lambert
was issued in connection with leveraged buyouts, recapitalizations, and refinancings.
161. See, e.g., Michael C. Jensen, Agency Costs of Free Cash Flow, Corporate Finance and
Takeovers, 32 AM. ECON. REV. 323, 323-24 (1986). A variation of that argument is that debt-
financed leveraged buyouts are beneficial because the debt obligations "force managers to
disgorge cash rather than spend it on empire-building projects with low or negative returns."
Michael C. Jensen, Eclipse of the Public Corporation, 67 HARV. BUS. REV. 61, 67 (1989). The
1992 Treasury Integration Study cites the 1986 Jensen study and states:
Debt finance may have nontax benefits. Analysts most sanguine about high levels of
corporate debt and debt-service burdens typically maintain that the discipline of debt is
desirable because it gives lenders indirect means to monitor the activities of managers.
This need for supervision owes to the separation between ownership and management
that is characteristic of the traditional corporate structure.
UNITED STATES DEP'T OF THE TREASURY, INTEGRATION OF INDIVIDUAL AND CORPORATE TAX
SYSTEMS: TAXING BUSINESS INCOME ONCE 11 (1992) (citing Jensen's 1986 article) [hereinafter
TREASURY INTEGRATION STUDY].
162. See, e.g., Mark Gertler & R. Glenn Hubbard, Taxation, Corporate Capital Structure and
Financial Distress, in 4 TAX POLICY AND THE ECONOMY 43, 51-53 (Lawrence Summers ed., 1990);
Bulow et al., supra note 58, at 152-53. In addition, economist James Poterba notes that "when
firms distribute a higher fraction of dividends the national savings rate declines, since
corporations tend to retain earnings and save at a relatively high rate while shareholders tend to
consume out of cash receipts to a higher degree." House Hearings on Mergers and Acquisitions,
101st Cong., 1st Sess. 210 (1989) [hereinafter House Hearings on Mergers and Acquisitions]
(statement of James M. Poterba).
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debt is significantly tax favored over corporate equity." The tax ad-
vantages of debt financing encourage corporations to use debt in their
capital structures.
Professor Knoll also argues that the corporate interest deduc-
tion creates inefficiency because it discourages investment in high
growth businesses."s The interest deduction encourages investment in
activities that have the capacity to employ a high level of debt and
discourages investment in activities that do not have the capacity to
employ a high level of debt. Activities with high debt capacity tend to
have stable earnings and to employ tangible assets. Activities with low
debt capacity tend to be riskier" and to employ intangible assets.'"
The upshot of this is that corporations with low debt capacity and high
growth potential have a higher cost of capital than more stable corpo-
rations with high debt capacity."7 The interest deduction thus discour-
ages investment in businesses that have high growth potential.'68
163. See, e.g., JANE G. GRAVELLE, CRS REPORT FOR CONGRESS, CORPORATE TAX
INTEGRATION: ISSUES AND OPTIONS 11 (1991) (estimating that the difference between the total
effective tax rates on debt and equity is about 50 percent.).
164. Knoll, supra note 143, at 1465-66.
165. The greater the volatility of the corporation's earnings, the greater the likelihood that
the corporation will not owe tax at the end of any year. Also, the greater the volatility of the
corporation's earnings the greater the likelihood that the corporation will suffer financial
distress. For these reasons, "a corporation's debt capacity is inversely related to risk." Id. at
1492; see also Knoll, supra note 143, at 1492 n.114 (documenting this effect).
166. Intangible assets tend to disproportionately lose value if a corporation experiences
financial distress. Corporations that employ intangible assets tend to steer away from debt
financing in order to avoid those disproportionately high financial distress costs. See id. at 1495.
On the other hand, one could argue that the inefficiency described by Professor Knoll is offset to
some degree by the Code's tendency to permit immediate expensing of the costs of generating
intangible assets while permitting only cost recovery deductions over the useful life of tangible
assets. Cf. House Hearings on Mergers and Acquisitions, supra note 162, at 214, 216 (statement
of Martin Feldstein, Professor of Economics, Harvard University) (noting tax bias against
investment in tangible property and in favor of creation of intangible assets). The costs of
generating intangible assets (e.g., the costs of advertising and labor costs) may often be deducted
currently. If the taxpayer maintains inventories, some of those costs may be allocated to
inventory costs under the I.R.C. § 263A uniform capitalization rules and deducted as that
inventory is sold. See I.R.C. § 263A (1994). The costs of tangible assets are typically deducted
over a longer period of time based on the § 168 cost recovery rules. See I.R.C. § 168 (1994)
(amended 1998). Some types of assets, such as tools may be immediately expensed, and I.R.C.
§ 179 permits a limited expensing of depreciable property. See I.R.C. § 179 (1994) (amended
1996). The cost of most depreciable property is deducted according to the cost recovery rules of
I.R.C. § 168. If depreciable equipment is used to construct depreciable property with a useful life
longer than the useful life of the assets used to construct the property, the costs of the equipment
are capitalized into the cost of the property constructed and deducted according to the cost
recovery schedule for the property constructed. See Commissioner v. Idaho Power Co., 418 U.S. 1
(1974).
167. Knoll, supra note 143, at 1492.
168. See id. at 1466. Knoll also points out that the interest deduction encourages
corporations to reduce the volatility of their earnings by entering into conglomerate mergers,
some of which are inefficient. See id. at 1493.
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The next part of this Article will explore the relationship be-
tween the corporate tax and the tax treatment of debt and equity. The
impact of eliminating the debt-equity distinction depends, in large
part, on whether the corporate tax still exists and, if so, in what form.
This part will explain how the historical debate regarding the theory
of the firm has influenced the corporate tax. It will review the norma-
tive criticism of the corporate tax and potential normative and politi-
cal reasons why attempts to formally integrate the corporate tax and
individual income tax have failed. Understanding the past experience
with failed formal integration attempts can provide lessons for
designing a viable debt-equity proposal.
Part III will also discuss the informal partial integration that
has resulted from the promulgation of the so-called "check-the-box'
regulations, which allow many privately owned businesses (but not
publicly owned businesses) to elect out of the corporate tax system.
This part will then consider whether it makes sense to attempt to
define a comprehensive corporate income tax base. Each of several
potential definitions of a comprehensive tax base would imply a differ-
ent tax treatment of corporate debt and equity.
III. THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE DEBT-EQUITY
DISTINCTION AND THE CORPORATE TAX
A. The Historical Debate Regarding the Theory of the Firm
The evolution of the corporate tax has been influenced by con-
ceptions of the firm that date back to the turn of this century. Until
1850, very few businesses operated in corporate form because incorpo-
ration required that the state grant the business a "special charter."1
From 1850 to 1880, states began to replace the special grant statutes
with general incorporation statutes." ' By the 1890s, large corporations
appeared and rapidly gained economic power. These new large
corporations were run by professional managers, not by the individual
169. See Bratton, supra note 33, at 1484; Marjorie E. Kornhauser, Corporate Regulation and
the Origins of the Corporate Income Tax, 66 IND. L. REV. 53, 57, 58 (1990). Much of the text that
follows is based on these articles by Professors Bratton and Kornhauser.
170. See Bratton, supra note 33, at 1485; Kornhauser, supra note 169, at 57. The first
general incorporation statutes limited shareholder liability for the debts of the corporation but
also imposed so-called 'legal capitar' rules that protected creditors of corporations. These rules
required that shareholders pay for stock and restricted distributions to shareholders. Later
turn-of-the-century 'liberal incorporation" statutes diluted the legal capital rules. See Bratton,
supra note 34, at 106-07 n.52.
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corporate shareholders, so there was a separation of ownership and
control of the corporations. "'
The emergence of large corporations alarmed many citizens,
legislators, and commentators." ' They were worried that "[i]ndividual
economic power seemed to decline as corporate manufacturing ex-
panded."'' 3 Commentators were concerned that conducting business in
large corporations was inefficient and that corporations "subverted
market control of private economic power."174 The economic model in
vogue at the time, which assumed that the same individuals owned
and managed the firm, did not fit the new management corporations,
so new theories and forms of regulation developed. 5 Around the turn
of the century, a consensus developed that the new large corporations
required regulation,"6 but citizens and legislators disagreed about the
form such regulation should take.'
Competing theories of the firm developed to describe the nature
of the new large corporations. While some envisioned a corporation as
the aggregate of its owners, others viewed a corporation as an entity
separate from its owners."' The entity theory proponents either
viewed a corporation as a natural entity, with the rights of a natural
person, or as an artificial entity created by the grant of the corporate
charter from the state.
7 9
The aggregate theory, on the other hand, was contractual in
nature and treated the corporation as the analogue of a partnership.'"
The analogy between the corporate form and the partnership form was
not perfect, however, because partnerships did not have the special
171. See ADOLF BERLE & GARDINER MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE
PROPERTY (1932) (identifying and analyzing problems caused by separation of corporate
ownership and control).
172. See Bratton, supra note 33, at 1486-87; Kornhauser, supra note 169, at 56-57.
173. Bratton, supra note 33, at 1486.
174. Id. (citing JAMES WILLARD HURST, THE LEGITIMACY OF THE BUSINESS CORPORATION IN
THE LAW OF THE UNITED STATES 1780-1970, at 43, 48 (1970) (expressing the concern that
corporate agents would not work as hard as individual business owners)).
175. See Bratton, supra note 33, at 1486-87, 1489-91.
176. The proposed regulation responded to several concerns that were mentioned during the
debate of the Corporate Excise Tax of 1909. For example, one aspect of the proposed regulation,
publicity, was intended to expose "stock watering" abuses. Stock watering occurred when little
or no consideration, or property the value of which was overstated, was received by the corporate
issuer in exchange for its stock. The assets of a corporation with watered stock tended to be only
the proceeds from the corporation's issuance of bonds. Stock watering was thought to injure both
investing bondholders and the general public. Kornhauser, supra note 169, at 75-79.
177. See id. at 56.
178. See id. at 57-58.
179. See id. at 57-59.
180. See Bratton, supra note 33, at 1489; Kornhauser, supra note 169, at 58.
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corporate characteristics of limited liability, centralization of man-
agement, and continuity of life.8'
The natural entity theory was thought to be consistent with the
special corporate characteristics of limited liability, continuity of life,
and centralization of management because those characteristics de-
pended on the separate existence of the entity." However, treating
corporations as natural entities was thought to be inconsistent with
adopting special measures to regulate the emerging large corpora-
tions."l The artificial entity theory was consistent with the various
special corporate characteristics and with regulation of the state-cre-
ated artificial entity."u
The debates as to the legal personality of corporations contin-
ued during the consideration of the Corporate Excise Tax of 1909."
The 1909 Act was designed to both tax and regulate corporations so
181. See Kornhauser, supra note 169, at 58.
182. See id. at 59.
183. See Bratton, supra note 33, at 1490 (According to the corporate realist conceptualization
of the corporation, "[t]he corporate entity was real, and group dynamics were more significant
than individual contributions.... Since individuals and not the state supplied the creative force
that brought the group into existence, respect for individuals counseled against regulation.")
184. See Kornhauser, supra note 169, at 61-62.
185. The first income tax statutes, enacted around the time of the Civil War, required
shareholders to include corporate dividends in their income but did not tax corporations. In
other words, corporate earnings were only taxed at the shareholder level, consistent with an
aggregate model. See, e.g., Act of June 30, 1864, ch. 173, § 117, 13 Stat. 223, 281-82. Under the
1894 Act, corporations and individuals were both subject to a two percent income tax but
shareholders did not include corporate dividends in their income. In other words there was still
a single layer of tax on corporate earnings but it was imposed at the corporate level. See Act of
August 27, 1894, ch. 349, §§ 27, 28, 32, 28 Stat. 509, 553-54, 556. For a discussion of the debates
surrounding the enactment of the 1894 Act, see Kornhauser, supra note 169, at 86-91. The
Supreme Court later held that the 1894 Act was unconstitutional as a direct tax that had not
been properly apportioned among the states based on population. See Pollock v. Farmers' Loan
and Trust Co., 157 U.S. 429, reh'g granted, 158 U.S. 601 (1895). At the time the 1909 Act was
being debated, Congress was also considering the proposal that later became the Sixteenth
Amendment to the Constitution. See Kornhauser, supra note 169, at 93. The Sixteenth
Amendment paved the way for Congress to enact a new income tax in 1913. See U.S. CONST.
amend. XVI; Tariff Act of 1913, ch. 16, 38 Stat. 114. The 1913 income tax subjected corporations
and individuals to income taxation; the individual income tax had two components: a flat rate
"normal" individual income tax and a progressive rate "additional" income tax. See Tariff Act of
1913, ch. 16, §§ II(A)1, H(A)2, 38 Stat. 114, 166-67. Shareholders did not include dividends, for
purposes of computing their normal tax liability, but did include dividends for purposes of
computing their additional tax liability. See Tariff Act of 1913, ch. 16, §§ H(B), 38 Stat. 114, 167-
68. For a chart showing corporate tax rates, shareholder tax rates, and effective tax rates for
corporate income distributed as dividends, in effect from 1913 to 1935, see Jeffrey L. Kwall, The




the theory of legal personality adopted needed to be consistent with
both goals."
President Taft advocated an artificial entity view of corpora-
tions and argued that corporations should pay taxes, based on a "bene-
fit" theory, for the special privileges of operating in corporate form,
such as limited liability.'87 Opponents of the corporate tax argued that
taxing corporate earnings at both the corporate level and again at the
shareholder level was a double tax on the shareholders of the corpora-
tion, in effect adopting an aggregate view of the corporation." Oppo-
nents of the corporate tax also took issue with the benefit theory of the
tax, arguing that the privileges granted to corporations were granted
by the states and could only be taxed by the states."' Consistent with
artificial entity theory and the benefit theory, Congress enacted the
1909 Act, which subjected corporations to an excise tax."' In 1910, the
Supreme Court upheld the tax "as an excise upon the particular
privilege of doing business in a corporate capacity."'
91
The burden on income earned through corporations has in-
creased over the course of this century. Until 1935, dividends were
only partially subject to individual income tax."2 Beginning in 1936,
dividends were fully included for purposes of the individual income
tax. As Professor Kwall has noted, this structure may have been inad-
186. Professor Kornhauser argues that the Corporate Excise Tax of 1909 was, in part, a
measure to regulate the emerging large public corporations. See Kornhauser, supra note 169, at
54, 62-82. Although President Taft advocated the adoption of a federal incorporation statute, his
proposal to directly regulate corporations was rejected. See id. at 65-68. Later, in 1914, the
Clayton Antitrust Act became law and the Federal Trade Commission was established. Id. at 67;
Clayton Act, ch. 323, 38 Stat. 730 (1914) (current version at 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1998)); Federal Trade
Commission Act, ch. 311, 38 Stat. 717 (1914) (current version at 15 U.S.C. § 44-51 (1998)). The
1909 Act served a regulatory function because its "publicity feature" (i.e., reporting
requirements) provided the federal government with information about corporations.
Kornhauser, Origins of the Corporate Tax, supra note 169, at 54, 113-118.
187. See Kornhauser, supra note 169, at 103, 107.
188. See id. at 94.
189. See id. at 107. Professor Kornhauser notes that, throughout the consideration of the
1909 Act, distinctions were drawn between large and small corporations, and that members of
Congress were hostile towards large corporations and believed that they should be regulated.
See id. at 106. Some supporters of the 1909 corporate tax proposal argued for an exemption for
small corporations for various reasons; for example, some of the people arguing for a small
corporation exemption thought that only large corporations created the type of abuses that
warranted government regulation. See id. at 106.
190. See Tariff Act of 1909, ch. 6, § 38(2d), 36 Stat. 113.
191. Flint v. Stone Tracy Co., 220 U.S. 107, 108-09 (1910).
192. Until 1935, the individual income tax included a "normal" tax and an "additional" tax.
Until 1936, shareholders did not include dividends in income for purposes of computing the
normal tax but did include dividends for purposes of computing the additional tax. For a chart of
corporate tax rates on corporate income, individual tax rates on dividends, and effective tax rates
on dividends, from 1913 to 1935, see Kwall, supra note 185, at 618-19 n.32.
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vertent."' In 1936, President Roosevelt proposed that shareholders
fully include dividends in income and that.the corporate tax apply to
earnings retained but not to earnings distributed as dividends.19 In
other words, this proposal would have eliminated the partial double
taxation of dividends, with dividends being taxed at the shareholder
level but not the corporate level and retained earnings being taxed at
the corporate level. This proposal was apparently based on the view
that the partial double taxation of dividends overtaxed dividends and
that dividends could be appropriately taxed solely under the individ-
ual income tax."' Retained earnings, on the other hand, would be un-
dertaxed under the individual income tax so retained earnings needed
to be taxed at the corporate level."' Ultimately, however, Congress
fully subjected dividends to the individual income tax but failed to
repeal the corporate tax."7 The double corporate tax has been with us
ever since.
B. Normative Criticism of the Corporate Tax
The goals of a good tax system include efficiency and equity."8
Commentators have criticized the separate corporate tax on both
193. See Kwall, supra note 185, at 619-20.
194. See id. at 620 (citing 1939-1 C. B. 667).
195. See id.
196. See id.
197. See Revenue Act of 1936, ch. 690, 49 Stat. 1648.
198. See, e.g., PAUL McDANIEL ET AL., FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION 46 (4th ed. 1998).
Basically, efficiency means allocating resources to their most productive use. More specifically,
an allocation of resources is Pareto-efficient if there are no further opportunities for making
changes that would not harm one group of people and would improve the situation of another
group. See EDWIN MANSFIELD, MICROECONOMICS 511 (9th ed. 1997). Any tax distorts economic
decision-making, so, as applied to the tax system, the efficiency norm would require that we try
to minimize the misallocation of resources on our way to collecting revenue and accomplishing
various social goals. See MCDANIEL, supra, at 47.
The equity norm is sometimes divided into two components: (i) "Vertical equity" (i.e., we
should apply an appropriate pattern of differentiating between taxpayers who are unequally
situated), and (ii) "horizontal equity" (i.e., taxpayers in equal positions should be treated alike).
See generally Paul A. McDaniel & James R. Repetti, Horizontal and Vertical Equity: The
Musgrave/Kaplow Exchange, 1 FLA. TAX REV. 607 (1993) (arguing against formulaic use of the
horizontal and vertical equity norms). Tax policymakers typically look to economic income as the
measure of equality and inequality. See RICHARD A. MUSGRAVE, THE THEORY OF PUBLIC FINANCE
165 (1959). Tax policymakers have traditionally applied the vertical equity norm by considering
whether taxpayers pay tax according to their ability to pay. Money is assumed to have declining
marginal utility, so a progressive income tax is thought to represent the most appropriate
pattern for differentiating between taxpayers with different amounts of income. See MUSGRAVE,
supra, at 90-115; Louis Kaplow, Horizontal Equity: Measures in Search of a Principle, 42 NAT'L
TAX J. 139, 143, 147 (1989). Some commentators, however, have cautioned that the concept of
vertical equity is meaningful only if it is infused with a specific theory of distributive justice.
See, e.g., McDaniel & Repetti, supra at 611. In addition, tax policymakers disagree as to whether
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efficiency and equity grounds. " The corporate tax is generally thought
to produce three types of inefficiency. First, the corporate tax raises
the cost of capital for corporate businesses and encourages investment
in businesses that are not subject to the corporate tax.'0 Second, the
corporate tax creates an incentive for corporations to retain their
the horizontal equity norm should be considered an independent equity norm; for a summary of
these controversies involving the equity norm, see Katherine Pratt, Funding Health Care with
an Employer Mandate: Efficiency and Equity Concerns, 39 ST. Louis L.J. 155, n. 140 (1994). In
applying the vertical equity norm, various theories of distributive justice could provide an
"appropriate" standard for differentiating between two unequally situated taxpayers. These
theories of distributive justice may either be entitlement theories or welfarist theories. See
Joseph Bankman & Thomas Griffith, Social Welfare and the Rate Structure: A New Look at
Progressive Taxation, 75 CAL. L. REV. 1905, 1915 (1987). Entitlement theories focus on a person's
right to keep what she owns. See, e.g., ROBERT NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA 150-53
(1974). Welfarist theories instead focus on the welfare of some or all members of society. See
Bankman & Griffith, supra, at 1915. The two most prominent welfarist theories are
utilitarianism and the leximin. See id. at 1915-16. Utilitarianism seeks to maximize the
aggregate welfare of a society;, the leximin seeks to maximize the welfare of the least well off
persons in society. See id. at 1916. If seeming inequities are discovered, tax policymakers must
also consider whether the potential inequities might be eliminated as people adapt their
behavior due to economic incentives. See generally Boris I. Bittker, Equity, Efficiency, and
Income Tax Theory: Do Misallocations Drive Out Inequities?, in THE ECONOMICS OF TAXATION 19-
31 (Henry J. Aaron & Michael J. Boskin eds., 1980).
199. See, e.g., Joseph M. Dodge, A Combined Mark-to-Market and Pass-Through Corporate-
Shareholder Integration Proposal, 50 TAX L. REV. 265, 268-278 (1995); Thomas D. Griffith,
Integration of the Corporate and Personal Income Taxes and the ALI Proposals, 23 SANTA CLARA
L. REV. 715 (1983); Charles E. McLure, Jr., Integration of the Personal and Corporate Income
Taxes: The Missing Element in Recent Tax Reform Proposals, 88 HARV. L. REV. 532, 534-49
(1975); Alvin C. Warren, Jr., The Relation and Integration of Individual and Corporate Income
Taxes, 94 HARV. L. REV. 717, 721-38 (1981); CHARLES E. MCLURE, JR., MUST CORPORATE INCOME
BE TAXED TWICE? 7, 19-42 (1979).
For sources defending the corporate tax, see generally RICHARD GOODE, THE
CORPORATION INCOME TAX (1951); Hideki Kanda & Saul Levmore, Taxes, Agency Costs, and the
Price of Incorporation, 77 VA. L. REV. 211 (1991); Kwall, supra note 185; Stanley Surrey,
Reflections on Integration of Corporation and Individual Income Taxes, 28 NAT'L TAX J. 335
(1975). Professor Rudnick advocates a profits tax imposed at the corporate level. See Rebecca S.
Rudnick, Who Should Pay the Corporate Tax in a Flat Tax World? 39 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 965,
1066-98 (1988-89).
200. TREASURY INTEGRATION STUDY, supra note 161, at vii, 112-15. The double rate of tax on
corporate equity investments is higher than the single rate of tax on equity investments in
businesses that do not operate in corporate form, such as partnerships or limited liability
companies. The higher tax on corporate equity encourages businesses to operate in noncorporate
form. See id.
Under the classical Harberger view of the long-run effects of the corporate tax, the
corporate tax reduces the after-tax return on corporate equity, which encourages investors to buy
noncorporate equity which has a higher after-tax return. Relative demand for noncorporate
equity, over time, reduces the returns on noncorporate equity and increases the returns on
corporate equity until they are equal. An inefficiency results because the corporate tax causes
investors to invest in less productive uses, which, in turn, reduces total production. The
Harberger theory is based on a number of assumptions that are controversial. See Griffith,
supra note 199, at 729-31.
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earnings instead of distributing them."1 Third, the corporate tax, in
conjunction with the debt-equity distinction discussed in Part II, en-
courages corporations to use debt instead of stock to raise new capi-
tal"2 and to substitute new debt for outstanding stock."3
The corporate tax is also generally thought to be unfair, be-
cause it does not impose a single level of tax at the shareholder's indi-
vidual rate."° The imposition of the double corporate tax is thus
thought to overtax shareholders on corporate income. The alleged
overtaxation is greater for taxpayers in low tax rate brackets than it is
for taxpayers in high tax rate brackets."n
Advocates of integration argue that only shareholders should
be taxed on corporate income because a corporation should be viewed
as a conduit, not an artificial entity.' For years following the 1909
Act, the benefit theory of the corporate tax and the artificial entity
201. See Griffith, supra note 199, at 729-31. This arguably causes a misallocation of
resources because it encourages managers to retain earnings instead of distributing the earnings
and having the shareholders invest the earnings in the potential project with the highest yield.
In addition, the bias in favor of retained earnings favors established businesses with retained
earnings over growth businesses without retained earnings. See id. at 732-33.
202. See TREASURY INTEGRATION STUDY, supra note 161, at vii, 115-16. The inefficiencies
caused by overleveraging, such as increasing the risk of widespread defaults in economic
downturns, have been discussed earlier. See supra notes 142-49 and accompanying text.
203. See id. at vii. The Treasury Integration Study indicates that "[b]y 1990, over one-
quarter of corporate interest payments were attributable to the substitution of debt for equity
through share repurchases." Id.
204. See, e.g., Dodge, supra note 199, at 293 ("On the normative plane (fairness, distributive
justice, economic efficiency), the focus should be on the taxation of the income of shareholders
derived from their ownership of corporate equity.").
205. See Griffith, supra note 199, at 718-19. The following is an example, based on Griffith's
article. Assume that a corporation, X Co., is subject to a 35 percent corporate tax rate and an
individual, Z, is subject to a 40 percent individual tax rate. Income of an incorporated firm is not
taxed at the entity level; the income flows through to the investors and is reported by them on
their individual income tax returns. If Z invested in an unincorporated firm and Z's share of the
earnings of that firm were $200, Z would owe $80 of tax on that $200 of business income. If Z
instead invested in a corporation, how much tax would be paid on $200 of corporate income? If X
Co. earned $200 of income, the corporation would owe $70 of tax at the corporate level, leaving
$130 to distribute to the shareholder. Z would owe $52 of tax (40 percent of $130) on that
distribution, leaving Z with $78. The total tax on the $200 of corporate income would be $122
($70 plus $52), $42 more than the tax would have been had the income been earned by an
unincorporated firm. The extra $42 of tax is a 52.5 percent increase in the shareholder's tax
burden. Individual Y is subject to a 20 percent individual tax rate. Y would owe $40 of tax on
$200 of noncorporate income passed through to Y. If Y instead invested in a corporation, how
much tax would be paid on $200 of corporate income? If X Co. earned $200 of income, the
corporation would owe $70 of tax at the corporate level, leaving $130 to distribute to Y. Y would
owe $26 of tax (20 percent of $130) on that distribution, leaving Y with $104. The total tax on
the $200 of corporate income is $96 ($70 plus $26), $56 more than the tax would have been had
the income been earned by an unincorporated firm. The extra $56 of tax is a 140 percent
increase in the shareholder's tax burden.
206. See, e.g., Dodge, supra note 199, at 293.
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view of corporations were dominant.' Over time, however, commen-
tators discredited both the benefit theory and the artificial entity view.
The benefit theory has been attacked on several grounds. 8 First,
income taxes are not generally imposed on a "benefits received"
basis.' Second, states, not the federal government, charter corpora-
tions and it is the charter that creates the corporate privileges of
limited liability and continuity of life."' In addition, the corporate tax
rates are not related to the costs of granting a business the various
corporate privileges. 11
Aggregate views of the corporation began to emerge as eco-
nomic and legal commentators noted that corporate entities do not
bear the economic burden of the corporate tax because only natural
persons can bear economic burdens. Commentators rejecting the
entity view of the corporation endorsed an aggregate or "conduit" view
of the corporation. Under this view, the corporation is a conduit
through which the shareholders of the corporation accrue wealth,
either in the form of dividends or retained earnings."2 Commentators
have noted that the income of a corporation ultimately inures to the
benefit of its owners, and argued that a corporation should not there-
fore pay a separate level of tax on its earnings.1' Instead, the owners
of the corporation should pay a single layer of tax on the earnings of
the corporation.
As Victor Thuronyi has stated, "income... is best considered
an attribute that only individuals can have. A corporation cannot have
207. In 1920s, a series of critiques of corporate realism made a "conclusive" case for the
artificial entity theory of corporations. See Bratton, supra note 33, at 1491.
208. See, e.g., Griffith, supra note 199, at 715, 722-24 (1983); Alvin C. Warren, Jr., The
Corporate Interest Deduction: A Policy Evaluation, 83 YALE L.J. 1585, 1600, n.72 (1974).
209. See Griffith, supra note 199, at 723.
210. See id.
211. See id.
212. See Warren, supra note 208, at 1598 (citing RICHARD MUSGRAVE, THE THEORY OF
PUBLIC FINANCE 173-74 (1959)).
213. See, e.g., Leon Gabinet & Ronald J. Coffey, The Implications of the Economic Concept of
Income for Corporation-Shareholder Income Tax Systems, 27 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 895, 913-14
(1977) (quoting McLure):
[Tihe corporation is simply the aggregate of its owners and can best be described as a
'conduit' through which income earned in the corporation is passed to the shareholders as
dividends or retained earnings. Under this view, the corporation cannot be said to have
tax paying ability beyond that of its shareholders.
214. See, e.g., id. at 912-18:
In fact, it may be argued that a firm cannot have income. If income is indeed a measure
of better-offness, can a firm be better off apart and distinct from the better-offness of
stockholders, managers, or employees? People may be better off, but a firm, a fictional
entity, cannot be better-off and thus does not have income.
Id. at n.72 (quoting George Sorter, Accounting Income and Economic Income, in 2 AICPA,
OBJECTIVES OF FINANCIAL STATEMENTS 107 (1974)).
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income, any more than it can have a blood type. [Tihe appropriate
taxable units under an ideal income tax are individuals, not en-
tities.""5 Although some commentators have argued that a corporation
has capacity to pay tax, separate from the investors' ability to pay
tax,216 the consensus view is that a corporation should be treated as a
conduit through which income flows to the corporate investors."7 From
this conduit theory, it follows that corporate income should be taxed
once at the individual shareholders' tax rates, not at a separate corpo-
rate rate.218
The argument that the corporate tax is an unfair double tax
on shareholders rests on an assumption that corporate share-
holders bear the burden of the corporate tax. In fact, some or all of
the corporate tax may be shifted forward to consumers or backward
to suppliers of labor or materials."' If the corporate tax were shifted
forward or backward, the corporate tax would be the rough
equivalent of a general sales tax on corporate production, measured
by corporate profits.'
Even if the corporate tax is not shifted to consumers or sup-
pliers of labor or capital, it may be shifted to other suppliers of
capital. The alleged inequitable overtaxation of shareholders from
the double corporate tax may be eliminated because stock prices
will reflect the extra tax burden on the stock. If noncorporate
equity bears a higher after-tax return than corporate equity,
investors may invest in the noncorporate sector which would, in
turn, decrease the return on noncorporate equity and increase the
return on corporate equity. Under this model, the returns in each
sector would be equal in equilibrium."' This model is based on a
number of controversial assumptions and it may or may not be ac-
curate.' To the extent it is accurate, the corporate tax would create
an inefficiency instead of an inequity.'
If one were to assume that the corporate tax is not shifted,
one might defend the corporate tax on the grounds that progres-
215. Victor Thuronyi, The Concept of Income, 46 TAX L. REV. 45, 78-79 (1990).
216. See, e.g., Rudnick, supra note 199, at 991-99.
217. See, e.g., Dodge, supra note 199, at 293.
218. See id.
219. For a discussion of the potential shifting of the corporate tax, see Griffith, supra note
199, at 724-28.
220. See id. at 726.
221. See id. at 719 (discussing this model, which is referred to as the classic Harberger view
of the long-run effects of the corporate tax).
222. See id. at 729-31.
223. Cf. Bittker, supra note 198 (pointing out that one must consider whether a seeming
inequity is eliminated by taxpayer responses to economic incentives).
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sivity is desirable and that the corporate tax is borne by high in-
come shareholders.' On the other hand, a large percentage of stock
is held by institutional investors, such as pension funds and
mutual funds, which invest on behalf of many people who are not
in the highest tax brackets.' Also, the corporate tax overtaxes low-
income shareholders relatively more than it overtaxes high-income
shareholders.'
C. The Conversion of the Corporate Tax into a
Tax on Public Companies
Based on the conduit view of corporations, commentators have
increasingly argued for "integration" of the corporate and individual
income taxes, which means that corporate income would be taxed only
once and preferably at the shareholders' individual tax rates." The
American Law Institute"a and some members of Congress' have also
studied and advanced integration proposals. Both in 1977 and in 1992,
the Treasury Department issued reports that proposed some form of
integration to make the income tax more fair and efficient.' The 1992
Treasury Integration Study noted that most of the United States'
major trading partners have adopted some form of integration and
stated that United States corporations are disadvantaged in interna-
tional markets because of the economic inefficiencies caused by the
corporate tax.' The study concluded that integration would create
billions of dollars a year of welfare gains for the U.S. economy."
224. See Polito, supra note 48, at 767-68.
225. See id. at 768 n.14.
226. See Griffith, supra note 199, at 718-19. This does not necessarily mean, however, that
integration would increase progressivity because shareholders are disproportionately high-
bracket taxpayers. See id. at 734, 739.
227. See, e.g., Dodge, supra note 199, at 268-78. For an illustrative list of commentators
favoring integration, see sources cited at supra note 199. As indicated in that note, a minority of
commentators have defended the corporate tax or some variation of double tax on corporations.
228. In 1993, the American Law Institute released a report in which it advocated integration
of the corporate tax. See generally ALI, FEDERAL INCOME TAX PROJECT, INTEGRATION OF THE
INDVDUAL AND CORPORATE INCOME TAXES, REPORTER'S STUDY OF CORPORATE TAX INTEGRATION
(Mar. 31, 1993) (Prof. Alvin C. Warren, Jr., Rep.) [hereinafter ALI INTEGRATION STUDY]. For an
overview and critique of the ALI integration proposal, see George K. Yin, Corporate Tax
Integration and the Search for the Pragmatic Ideal, 47 TAX L. REV. 431, 436-49 (1992).
229. For a list of House and Senate bills that would have partially or completely integrated
the corporate income tax and individual income tax, see Jennifer Arlen & Deborah M. Weiss, A
Political Theory of Corporate Taxation, 105 YALE L.J. 325, 330 n.20 (1995).
230. See generally U.S. DEP'T OF THE TREASURY, BLUEPRINTS FOR BASIC TAX REFORM (1977);
see also TREASURY INTEGRATION STUDY, supra note 161.
231. See TREASURY INTEGRATION STUDY, supra note 161, at 2.
232. See id. (predicting annual welfare gains for the U.S. economy of $2.5 billion to $25
billion in 1991 dollars).
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Despite widespread support from academics and the Treasury
Department, formal attempts to integrate the corporate tax and indi-
vidual tax have failed thus far. 3 Given this support for integration,
what accounts for the resilience of the corporate tax?
First, the transition from our current system to an integrated
system may cause many economic dislocations, with windfall winners
and losers.' The adoption of an integration proposal that causes such
windfall gains and losses could itself be criticized on both equity and
efficiency grounds."
Second, integration is complex and can take many forms, each
of which has its strengths and weaknesses.' Adopting any integration
prototype would require trade-offs that may be difficult to accept.2
7
233. For a discussion of integration failures, see generally Robert J. Leonard, A Pragmatic
View of Corporate Integration, 35 TAX NOTES 889 (1987); William A. Klein & Eric M. Zolt,
Business Form, Limited Liability and Tax Regimes: Lurching Towards a Coherent Outcome?, 66
U. COLO. L. REV. 1001, 1024-26 (1995).
234. See Bulow et al., supra note 58, at 161; see also, Griffith, supra note 199, at 734-39.
The degree to which one thinks that integration would confer windfall benefits depends on the
type of integration proposal. For example, if integration were accomplished by adopting one of
the dividend relief prototypes, the extent to which the dividend relief would confer windfall
benefits on outstanding equity depends on whether one subscribes to the "new view" or
"traditional view" of dividend taxation. According to the "new view" of dividend taxation, the
taxes to be paid when retained earnings are later distributed as dividends have been capitalized
into the value of the equity. Under this view, shareholder level taxes on dividends do not
prevent dividend distributions. Extending the benefits of integration to the outstanding equity
would therefore result in a windfall to the outstanding equity. Under the "traditional view" of
dividend taxation, the burden of the tax on dividends is offset by nontax benefits of dividends,
such as sending a positive signal to the investing community about the economic health of the
distributing corporation. Under the traditional view, a corporation will pay dividends as long as
the nontax benefits at least equal the tax burden on the dividend. The tax burden on dividends
is a relative burden which takes into account the shareholder level tax burdens on dividends and
capital gain from the sale of shares. The 1992 Treasury Integration Study subscribed to the
traditional view and took the position that a reduction of the tax on dividends would increase the
amount of dividends paid and economic efficiency. For a description of the "traditional view" and
the "new view" of dividend taxation, see TREASURY INTEGRATION STUDY, supra note 161, at 109
&ch. 13.
235. See, e.g., Griffith, supra note 199, at 734-39.
236. The 1992 Treasury Integration Study discusses five integration prototypes: (1) a
shareholder allocation prototype; (2) an imputation credit prototype; (3) a dividend exclusion
prototype; (4) a dividend deduction prototype; and (5) a Comprehensive Business Income Tax
prototype. See TREASURY INTEGRATION STUDY, supra note 161, at viii. The Treasury Integration
Study favored the dividend exclusion prototype and the Comprehensive Business Income Tax
prototype. See id. The Study discussed the shareholder allocation prototype but ultimately
rejected it; the Study mentioned the imputation credit prototype and the dividend exclusion
prototype but rejected those prototypes. See id. at vii, 93, 107. The shareholder allocation
prototype would effectively treat the corporation as a conduit through which corporate income
passes to shareholders. See id. at 27-37 (discussing this approach). This integration method
would tax shareholders annually on their allocable share of corporate income whether the
corporation distributed the income or not, in a manner similar to the current "pass through"
treatment of partnerships and S corporations. See I.R.C. §§ 702, 1366 (1994) (amended 1996).
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Third, eliminating the corporate tax would require Congress to
make up a large amount of lost revenue." This need to make up reve-
The corporation would still pay tax on its corporate income at corporate tax rates but that tax
would be conceptualized as a withholding tax. Each shareholder would receive a credit for her
allocable share of the tax withheld at the corporate level. The credit would offset the
shareholder's taxes due on her allocable share of the corporate income. Like the shareholder
allocation prototype, the imputation credit prototype would ultimately tax the shareholders but
would require the corporation to withhold tax at the corporate level. The TREASURY
INTEGRATION STUDY discussed but rejected this approach. See TREASURY INTEGRATION STUDY,
supra note 161, at 95-105. Professor Alvin Warren, the ALI Reporter, favored a more full-blown
variation of this method of integration. See generally ALI INTEGRATION STUDY, supra note 228.
The imputation credit system would, however, not require shareholders to include in income
undistributed corporate earnings; instead, shareholders would include dividends in income when
the dividends are distributed but that dividend income would be offset by a credit for the
shareholder's portion of the tax withheld by the corporation. The shareholder dividend exclusion
prototype would retain the separate corporate tax but would allow shareholders to exclude from
income the dividends distributed to them out of earnings that had already been taxed at the
corporate level. See id. at 17-25. The corporate dividend deduction prototype would retain the
separate corporate tax but would allow corporations to deduct dividends paid to shareholders.
See id. at 107.
The Comprehensive Business Income Tax ("CBIT') prototype would retain the corporate
level tax and not permit the corporation to deduct interest or dividends. See id. at 39-60.
Bondholders would exclude from income interest paid or accrued on corporate debt.
Shareholders would exclude from income corporate dividends. CBIT would apply to almost all
businesses, regardless of whether the business was operated as a C corporation, an S
corporation, a partnership, a limited liability company, or a sole proprietorship. See id. at 39-40.
Very small businesses would be exempt from CBIT. According to the 1992 Treasury Integration
Study, the main goal of corporate integration is to tax business income once, either at the
business entity level or the shareholder level. See TREASURY INTEGRATION STUDY, suipra note
161, at 12-13. The Study articulated several other goals as well: first, integration should not
permit corporations to pass their corporate tax preferences through to their shareholders;
second, integration should not reduce the aggregate tax collected on corporate income allocable to
tax-exempt shareholders; third, foreign shareholders should not be permitted to benefit from
integration unless the benefits are specifically extended through foreign tax treaties. See id. at
viii-ix. Much of the discussion of the various integration prototypes focuses on these ancillary
goals, which greatly complicate the choice of integration prototype.
237. For example, commentators who advocate the conduit theory view the shareholder
allocation prototype as the most theoretically pure form of integration. See Yin, supra note 228,
at 433-34. Treasury, however, chose not to endorse the shareholder allocation method in the
1992 Integration Study for a variety of policy and administrative reasons. For example,
Treasury considered modifying the shareholder allocation method to avoid extending corporate
tax preferences to shareholders, but rejected that approach because it would be unwieldy and
was inconsistent with the theory of the shareholder allocation method. See TREASURY
INTEGRATION STUDY, supra note 161, at 30. Allowing corporate tax preferences to pass through
to shareholders was flatly inconsistent with one of the ancillary goals articulated in the Treasury
Study, so Treasury rejected the shareholder allocation method. See id.
238. See TREASURY INTEGRATION STUDY, supra note 161, at 119. The corporate tax raises
over $110 billion a year. In percentage terms, the corporate tax represents around 7 percent of
total Federal tax receipts. See id. at 156; INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, STATISTICS OF INCOME
(1993): CORPORATE INCOME TAX RETURNS 25 (1996) (dollar amounts of corporate tax revenue);
STAFF OF THE JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 103D CONG., 2D SESS., DESCRIPTION AND ANALYSIS OF
PROPOSALS TO REPLACE THE FEDERAL INCOME TAX 130 thl. 7 (Comm. Print 1995) (corporate tax
percentage of total tax receipts). One 1989 estimate of the revenue loss from corporate
integration put the cost at around $40 billion. Kwall, supra note 185, at n.15 (1990) (citing Brady
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nue raises both normative and political issues. Professor Kwall argues
that the efficiency and equity arguments made in favor of integration
fail to consider the potential inefficiencies and inequities of tax
measures that would have to be adopted to make up for the lost corpo-
rate tax revenue."s
Professor Kwall argues that raising the lost corporate tax
revenue by increasing individual income tax rates may make the in-
come tax more inequitable. Increasing marginal individual tax rates
would make it less likely that the capital markets would reach a state
of equilibrium, in which investment on corporate returns and invest-
ment on noncorporate returns produce the same yield, because tax-
payers of more divergent rates would all be investing in the markets
together."° He also argues that increasing the marginal individual
income tax rates would pressure Congress to adopt inequitable base-
narrowing tax preferences." The combination of these factors may
make the income tax less equitable than it is now with a corporate
tax. Professor Kwall also argues that the revenue-raising substitute
tax might be less efficient than the existing corporate tax. For exam-
ple, he argues that increasing individual income taxes to fund integra-
tion would be replacing part of the corporate tax, some of which does
not distort behavior, with a distortionary tax on labor."
The need to make up revenue lost by corporate integration also
raises political issues. The public seems to prefer the corporate tax to
its alternatives. Most taxpayers would be unhappy about having their
income taxes raised in order to fund repeal of the corporate tax."'
Most taxpayers are unaware that they may ultimately be
bearing the economic burden of the corporate tax. There are two varia-
tions on this theme. 4 One variation is that some voters think of corpo-
Offers Sermon on Capital Gains Cut and Corporate Integration to the Converted, 44 TAX NOTES
1311, 1311 (1989)).
239. See Kwall, supra note 185, at 616 ('To determine whether integration is desirable, the
equity and efficiency gains achieved by eliminating double taxation must be weighed against the
equity and efficiency costs incurred by utilizing an alternative revenue source.")
240. See id. at 640.
241. See id.
242. See id. at 652-54. Professor Kwall points out that part of the corporate tax base
represents a normal profit for investors and part represents a pure profit for investors. Although
the corporate tax on the normal profit distorts behavior, the corporate tax on the pure profit
portion does not distort behavior. Kwall argues that eliminating the corporate tax on the portion
of the base that does not distort behavior will make the tax system more inefficient if the
replacement tax is distortionary. See id.
243. See, e.g., Leonard, supra note 233, at 895. Congress could raise additional revenue by
increasing tax rates or increasing the tax base, for example by reducing specific types of tax
subsidies such as accelerated depreciation.
244. See Arlen & Weiss, supra note 229, at 331.
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rations as entities with taxpaying capacity."5 The second variation is
that some voters understand that people bear the burden of a tax but
think that the burden is borne by rich shareholders who deserve to
pay more taxes.us
Consider the first class of voters; it does not occur to them that
only people can bear the burden of a tax. 7 Professor Klein has argued
that early reification of corporations as separate entities was followed
by animism or anthropomorphism. In his view, people mentally trans-
formed the abstract legal device, the corporation, into a physical body
with human attributes, including the capacity to bear the burden of a
tax. 4' Conceptualizing the corporation as a person was "a significant
element in the public's support of the law imposing the [corporate]
tax.)'2
9
This view is consistent with polling data on the corporate tax:
Around three quarters of the polled public favors corporate tax in-
creases; around half oppose a corporate dividend deduction; yet only
about a third of those polled were in favor of double taxation.' One
could infer from these data that the public thinks of the corporation as
having taxable capacity and its own income, separate from its share-
holders."
Other voters understand that people bear the burden of a tax
but think that the burden is borne by rich shareholders who deserve to
245. See id.; see also MERVYN KING, PUBLIC POLICY AND THE CORPORATION 50 (1977).
246. See Arlen & Weiss, supra note 229, at 331-32.
247. Professor McCaffery characterizes the corporate tax as a "fully hidden" tax, meaning
that "money is diverted from what would otherwise be its course in private commerce and sent to
the government, without the potential recipient of the value ever necessarily being aware of the
levy." Edward J. McCaffery, Cognitive Theory and Tax, 41 UCLA L. REV. 1861, 1876, 1886
(1994).
248. See William A. Klein, Income Taxation and Legal Entities, 20 UCLA L. REV. 13, 53
(1972).
249. Id. at 54. Some voters may even believe that large public corporations should pay tax
because they are somehow suspect or even "evil." Professor Klein argues that the public
perception of corporations affects the taxation of corporations:
[There is some evidence, however uncertain, that political ideology and American social
history do help to account for the existing tax system. In fact, I would venture that the
current willingness to rely so heavily on the corporation income tax as a source of
revenue-and the corresponding unwillingness to talk about raising individual rates
without simultaneously raising corporate rates-is in part a function of the public's
lingering (some might say reawakened) image of the corporation as the embodiment of
evil.
Id. at 70.
250. See Arlen & Weiss, supra note 229, at 333-34.
251. Professors Arlen and Weiss draw a different inference from these data. They conclude
that respondents' answers are colored by the way in which the polling questions are framed and
that framing differences account for the apparent discrepancies between the polling results. See
id. at 334-35.
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pay more taxes."s Economists disagree about who bears the burden of
the corporate tax.' In the short run, the corporate shareholders
probably do bear the tax.' Over half of all corporate stock is held by
institutional investors, such as pension plans, mutual funds, mutual
insurance companies, and charitable endowments, however. These
institutional investors represent many people who are not wealthy.'
In the long run, the corporate tax may be shifted to corporations' em-
ployees, suppliers of materials, customers, or even to suppliers of capi-
tal in general.' If economists cannot agree on the issue of who bears
the burden of the corporate tax in the long run, it is likely that many
of the individuals who currently bear a portion of the corporate tax
have no idea that they may be bearing it.
Third, public corporation managers have not unanimously sup-
ported integration; some public corporation managers have been am-
bivalent towards integration or even have opposed it.'l Some man-
agers have not supported integration because they are more concerned
about preserving special tax subsidies, such as accelerated deprecia-
tion, than about eliminating the corporate tax.' Some public company
managers have opposed integration because the double tax encourages
the retention of earnings and the managers prefer to use retained
earnings to fund new corporate projects instead of having to raise new
capital."s Corporate managers would, on the whole, probably be most
enthusiastic about partial integration proposals that would eliminate
252. Cf. Klein, supra note 248, at 69. In speculating about the reasons for different early tax
treatment of cooperatives, which were not taxed, and corporations, which were taxed, Professor
Klein has suggested that:
[l]n the past there were many people, including members of Congress, whose image of a
cooperative had something to do with a small group of hardy, hard working, honest
Midwestern farmers banding together to protect themselves from the rapacious Eastern
robber barons on whose corporate alter egos the farmers were dependent for their
economic life. At the same time, their probable image of the corporation was that of a
small group of wealthy, heartless individuals endowed with enormous economic power
and determined to increase their riches with callous disregard for the interest of all other
people. These notions may have been founded partly on reality and partly on
predispositions determined by egalitarian political ideologies. It is largely irrelevant for
our purposes how accurate this set of images may have been in promoting desired
political objectives. If these images were operative.., they could easily account for the
initial pattern of taxation of cooperatives and corporations: the bad guys (the
corporations) were taxed and the good guys (the cooperatives) were not.
Id.
253. For a summary of the debate surrounding the shifting of the corporate tax, see Griffith,
supra note 199, at 724-31.
254. See id. at 728.
255. See Polito, supra note 48, at 768, n.14.
256. See Arlen & Weiss, supra note 229, at 328-29 n.9.
257. See id. at 327-28, 338-41; Leonard, supra note 233, at 895.
258. See Arlen & Weiss, supra note 229, at 338-41.
259. See id. at 356-62.
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the incentive to issue debt instead of equity, but would not eliminate
the incentive to retain earnings.2
Although the consensus view among academics is that the con-
duit theory of the corporation is correct and that integration is war-
ranted from a normative point of view, a few commentators argue that
the corporate tax, or a related form of double tax, can be justified from
a normative perspective. Professor Rudnick argues that it is appropri-
ate to double tax the equity of public companies whose stock is traded
and liquid because shareholders benefit from the regulated trading
markets and have greater ability to pay based on the liquidity of their
stock positions."' Liquidity permits shareholders to diversify and be
less exposed to idiosyncratic firm-level risk.' She argues that the de-
mand for liquidity is inelastic, so taxing liquid investments at a higher
rate than nonliquid investments would not distort behavior.' Pro-
fessor Rudnick distinguishes between the "normal profit' return to
equity, which is the portion of the equity return that merely compen-
sates the shareholder for the use of the shareholder's money, and the
"pure profit!' return to equity, which is the rest of the equity return.'
She argues that the corporate tax should be replaced with a profits tax
on the "pure profit" return to equity.2 The profits tax base would not
include the normal return to equity, so the corporation would be per-
mitted to deduct that amount.2
Professors Kanda and Levmore also offer a justification for the
corporate tax that is based on the efficiency norm.' They argue that
the corporate tax reduces certain agency costs that arise in the corpo-
rate context because of the separation between ownership and con-
trol." If shareholders of a corporation are in different tax brackets and
the corporate manager (whom they refer to as M) is also a share-
holder, M may make decisions on behalf of the business in a self inter-
ested way."' Kanda and Levmore focus on management (1) disposition
260. See id. at 362.
261. See Rudnick, supra note 199, at 1088, 1090-92, 1094, 1099.
262. See id. at 1098.
263. See id. at 1178-86. Professor Rudnick bases this argument on optimal tax theory, which
posits that taxing inelastic goods can be justified from an efficiency perspective because the tax
would not distort behavior. See id.
264. See id. at 1172-73 & n.729.
265. See id. at 969, 1171-78. Professor Dodge argues that the liquidity advantage enjoyed by
shareholders could be better addressed by adopting the imputation credit type of integration or
by taxing shareholders on unrealized appreciation in their stock on mark-to-market basis.
Dodge, supra note 199, at 267, 271-72.
266. See Rudnick, supra note 199, at 1172.
267. See Kanda & Levmore, supra note 199, at 229-34.
268. See id. at 213, 229-34.
269. See id. at 231.
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policies, (deciding when unrealized firm-level gains should be real-
ized)27 and (2) distribution policies (deciding when retained earnings
should be distributed)."' If the firm is operated in a pass-through
form, M will be motivated to act in self-interest in making the firm-
level decision on these two issues. For example, if M is a high-bracket
taxpayer, M may choose to defer the sale of an appreciated firm asset
even if most of the equity investors would have preferred to sell the
asset."' This type of problem creates agency costs. Kanda and Levmore
observe that the corporate tax eliminates agency costs as to disposi-
tion decisions because the tax on the sale of firm assets depends on the
corporate tax rate, not the tax rates of individual equity investors."
On the other hand, the corporate tax does not eliminate the agency
costs associated with the distribution decision; high bracket equity
investors will prefer that the firm retain earnings, even if the amount
retained could better be used if distributed."4 Kanda and Levmore
argue that disposition policy conflicts are more significant than distri-
bution policy conflicts. 5 The pass-through form may be best for busi-
nesses that can control the agency costs associated with the
disposition conflict (e.g., by adopting contractual provisions to regulate
self-interested behavior by managers). Most large firms could better
reduce agency costs by operating in corporate form.76
Professor Rudnick's profits tax proposal is explicit about sub-
jecting corporations to double tax only if the corporation's securities
are publicly traded.27 She argues that a profits tax based on liquidity
is normatively justified by benefit theory, ability to pay theory, and
optimal tax theory. The efficiency argument made by Professors
Kanda and Levmore would also warrant a distinction between large
public companies and closely held corporations because the corporate
tax is justified, in their view, if the agency costs associated with dispo-
sition decisions exceed the costs of the double tax. These disposition
agency costs are highest where shareholders tax rates vary and it
would be difficult to arrange by contract to limit self-interested
270. See id. at 230-34.
271. See id. at 234-35.
272. See id. at 231.
273. See id. at 233.
274. See id. at 234.
275. See id. at 237.
276. See id. at 239 ("so long as the corporate tax rate is not prohibitive, investors who face
different individual rates may best reduce their agency costs by agreeing on a form of
organization in which their individual tax circumstances will not color decisions regarding the
purchase and sale of assets").
277. See Rudnick, supra note 199, at 1099.
278. See id. at 1084-93, 1178-91.
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behavior by management. These agency costs are likely to be lower for
closely held corporations than for large public corporations, whose
shareholders will have difficulty responding to the agency problems
because of collective action problems.
To date, formal integration proposals have failed for political
and perhaps normative reasons. Meanwhile, back in the trenches of
tax law practice, an informal type of backdoor integration has devel-
oped. Although Treasury's formal integration models described in the
1992 Integration Study have not been adopted, Treasury in 1996 is-
sued regulations that permit most unincorporated businesses to decide
whether to be subject to the corporate tax system or the pass-through
system.2 9 These regulations tax most unincorporated businesses as
partnerships unless the business elects to be taxed under the corpo-
rate tax system. (The regulations are commonly referred to as the
"check-the-box" regulations.) Until the promulgation of the check-the-
box regulations, the government had classified an unincorporated
business as a corporation and subjected it to the corporate tax system
if the business possessed more than two of four possible corporate
characteristics: limited liability, continuity of life, centralization of
management, and free transferability of interests." ° The upshot of the
check-the-box regulations is that most unincorporated businesses can
elect to have pass-through tax treatment regardless of state law
formalities. In other words, it operates like a pure integration model
for eligible businesses.
Unincorporated businesses with publicly traded securities are
still stuck with the corporate tax, however, because a "partnership"
(which would include an unincorporated business electing noncor-
porate classification under the check-the-box regulations)"' is treated
like a corporation for tax purposes if any interests in the partnership
are publicly traded." In other words, eligibility for pass-through
treatment turns, in part, on whether the interests in the unincor-
porated business are publicly traded.'
279. See Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-3(a), T.D. 8697, 61 FR 66590 (1996).
280. See Former Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-3. For a representative list of articles in which the
former "corporate resemblance" test was criticized, see George K. Yin, The Taxation of Private
Business Enterprises: Some Policy Questions Stimulated by the "Check-the-Box" Regulations, 51
SMU L. REV. 125, 126 n.6 (1997).
281. See Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-3(b)(1)( i).
282. See I.R.C. § 7704(a) (1994) (amended 1998). Section 7704 was originally enacted to
staunch revenue loss from conversions of corporations into publicly traded partnerships. See Yin,
supra note 280, at 131-32.
283. See Jeffrey L. Kwall, Taxing Private Enterprise in the New Millenium, 51 TAX LAW. 229,
230 (1998).
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Following the promulgation of the check-the-box regulations,
there are two separate systems of business taxation: (1) a double tax
system for public firms," and (2) a pass-through system for private
firms. The pass-through system includes the Subchapter S regime..5
applicable to eligible corporations making a pass-through election and
the Subchapter K partnership regime" applicable to unincorporated
businesses that do not elect out of pass-through under the check-the-
box regulations.
As indicated earlier, a pass-through system of corporate inte-
gration has long been favored by academics because they subscribe to
the conduit theory of corporations. 7 Recently, however, Professor
Kwall has argued for an entity level tax even for complex private
businesses on the grounds that pass-through taxation does not work
well for complex businesses." Although in an ideal world, taxing
shareholders annually on their allocable share of corporate income,
deductions, gains, losses, and credits would make sense, it is impracti-
284. Commentators do not agree on the issue of whether public trading should be used to
draw the line for pass through treatment. For example, Professor Yin has argued that a
distinction based on public trading has no basis in policy. See Yin, supra note 280, at 131-33.
Although liquidity does provide some benefit, Professor Yin argues that private firms can access
the capital markets indirectly without issuing traded securities. See id. at 132. In addition, he is
concerned that drawing the double tax line at public trading would create a new type of
distortion by discouraging public trading and causing capital to flow to private, unincorporated
businesses. See id. at 132-33. He concedes, however, that pass through taxation of public
businesses, whether operated in corporate or noncorporate form, is problematic from an
administrative perspective. See id. at 133. Professor Yin argues that, if administrative and
enforcement problems require excluding public businesses from pass through treatment, the
exclusion should be broader. See id.
Professor Kurtz, on the other hand, supports a distinction based on public trading. See
Jerome Kurtz, The Limited Liability Company and the Future of Business Taxation: A Comment
on Professor Berger's Plan, 47 TAX L. REV. 815, 825 (1992). Professor Kurtz's article responds to
a proposal made by Professor Berger that the income of "large" corporations be taxed at the
entity level but that the income of "small" corporations be passed through to its shareholders, as
under the current S corporation or partnership systems. See id. at 823-26 (discussing Curtis J.
Berger, W(h)ither Partnership Taxation?, 47 TAX L. REV. 105, 162-63 (1991)). Professor Berger
recommended that corporations be classified as large or small based on the corporation's gross
revenues. See Berger, supra, at 163-67. Professor Kurtz, in his response to Professor Berger,
argued that classification based on whether an entity is publicly traded would be preferable to
classification based on gross revenue. See Kurtz, supra at 823-26. He argued that public trading
is a workable distinction and is less subject to manipulation than a gross revenue standard. See
id. He also argued that pass through treatment for all business income is the ideal and should
be extended as broadly as possible, but that the problems of allocating income among a large
number of ever-changing shareholders make pass through treatment of public companies
unworkable. See id. at 826.
285. See I.R.C. §§ 1361-79 (1994) (amended 1996, 1997, 1998).
286. See id. §§ 701-77 (1994) (amended 1997, 1998).
287. See, e.g., George K. Yin, The Future Taxation of Private Business Firms, 4 FLA. TAX REV.
141, 153 (1999).
288. See Kwall, supra note 283, at 242-53.
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cal in the real world; in fact, the Subchapter K pass-through regime is
not working very well now for non-publicly traded complex partner-
ships.' It would likely work even less well for public companies.
So where does business taxation stand now? Although no for-
mal integration model has been adopted, our system of taxing busi-
nesses is evolving into a system that distinguishes between public and
private companies.' Public companies are taxed at the entity level
and again at the shareholder level. It remains to be seen whether the
earnings of public companies will continue to be taxed twice or
whether Congress will adopt an integration proposal that would result
in only one level of tax. Most private firms are taxed once on a pass-
through basis at the investor level. Whether Congress will adopt two
separate systems of taxation for private firms, as Professor Kwall has
suggested, is uncertain.
D. The Base of the New Corporate Tax
How should "corporate income" be defined in light of that fact
that public companies are subject to the corporate tax? Given the
widely accepted view that, in an ideal world, there would be no corpo-
rate "income" separate from the income of the investors, it is not sur-
prising that very few commentators have attempted to define income
for purposes of the corporate income tax." For purposes of the per-
sonal income tax, "income" is generally defined, under the Haig-
Simons formula, as the sum of (1) the taxpayer's consumption during
the period and (2) the taxpayer's change in wealth during the period. 2
289. As Professor Larry Lokken has acknowledged, "Subchapter K is a mess." Lawrence
Lokken, Taxation of Private Business Firms: Imagining a Future Without Subchapter K, 4 FLA.
TAX REV. 249, 250 (1999). Professor Lokken's article highlights some of the shortcomings of the
Subchapter K partnership tax rules. See id. at 250-53. Professor Yin also catalogues the
deficiencies of the partnership tax rules. See Yin, supra note 287, at 153-64.
290. Many commentators regard the chances of Congress adopting an integration proposal as
slim. See, e.g., Klein & Zolt, supra note 233, at 1024 (noting the "bleak prospects for large-scale
integration reform).
291. The few articles in which authors have attempted to define income for purposes of the
corporate income tax include Warren, supra note 208, at 1589-98; Patricia Bryan, When Junk
Bonds Go Bad. Protecting the Corporate Tax Base on Repurchases and Defaults, 42 FLA. L. REV.
645, 658-661 (1990) [hereinafter Bryan, Junk Bonds]; Patricia Bryan, Cancellation of
Indebtedness by Issuing Stock in Exchange: Challenging the Congressional Solution to Debt
Equity Swaps, 63 TEx. L. REV. 89, 114-115 (1984) [hereinafter Bryan, Swaps]; Leon Gabinet &
Ronald J. Coffey, The Implications of the Economic Concept of Income for Corporation-
Shareholder Income Tax Systems, 27 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 895, 915 (1977); Charlotte Crane,
Toward a Theory of the Corporate Tax Base: The Effect of a Corporate Distribution of
Encumbered Property to Shareholders, 44 TAX L. REV. 113, 142-43 (1988).
292. See Robert M. Haig, The Concept of Income-Economic and Legal Aspects, in THE
FEDERAL INCOME TAX 7 (Robert M. Haig, ed., 1921), reprinted in AM. ECON. ASS'N, READINGS IN
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"Income" is a net income concept, meaning that expenditures incurred
to produce income should be excluded from the base. Therefore, in this
context, "consumption" denotes personal expenditures. 3
The Haig-Simons "ideal" definition of income fits the corporate
taxpayer poorly, for as Professor Alvin Warren has said, "it is difficult
to comprehend how a corporation can consume anything." " Since the
Haig-Simons definition is incongruous in the corporate income tax
context, the conventional tax policy approach, starting out by defining
the "ideal" income tax base, is not helpful in the context of the corpo-
rate tax. 5
Given the fact that the corporate tax exists, however, it may be
helpful to think about defining a "comprehensive" corporate tax base
in order to try to reduce discontinuities that create inefficiencies. "
THE ECONOMICS OF TAXATION 54 (Richard A. Musgrave & Carl Shoup eds., 1959); HENRY
SIMONS, PERSONAL INCOME TAXATION 50 (1938).
293. Commentators have defined consumption in a variety of ways. See, e.g., Warren, supra
note 208, at 1591 (defining consumption as "the use of wealth for personal gratification" or "the
destruction of economic resources") (citing George F. Break, Capital Maintenance and the
Concept of Income, 62 J. POL. ECON. 48, 52 (1954)).
294. Id.
295. Professor Polito has observed:
The term "corporate income" is an oxymoron. As a legal fiction designed to facilitate the
assembling of resources into a joint enterprise, a corporation is not capable of accruing
income in the economic sense. Income is commonly defined as consumption plus
increases in wealth. A corporation cannot consume because it cannot experience utility,
but individuals are able to consume through corporate expenditures on their behalves. A
corporation accumulates wealth only for the benefit of individuals who have claims
against that wealth. Few, if any, would question that a corporation is only a stand-in for
those who hold claims against it. Nevertheless, the tax law persists in imposing tax upon
the "taxable income" of every corporation.
Polito, supra note 48, at 766-67 (footnotes omitted).
296. Discontinuities create opportunities for tax arbitrage, meaning the taxpayer can
structure a transaction that does not produce any net cash flow but does produce tax savings. See
Jeff Strnad, Taxing New Financial Products: A Conceptual Framework, 46 STAN. L. REV. 569,
573 (1994) ("the usual presumption is that tax arbitrage is an evil to be controlled'). Professor
Strnad carves out an exception to that general rule, however: Since high-bracket taxpayers'
ability to take advantage of tax arbitrage is limited, it may make sense to keep or create less
destructive types of tax arbitrage to displace more destructive forms of tax arbitrage. See
Strnad, supra note 103, at 555-60.
Professor Strnad argues that a good tax system displays the properties of "universality"
and "consistency." See Strnad, supra, at 572. A tax system displays the property of universality
only if the system specifies particular treatment for any possible transaction. See id. A tax
system displays the property of consistency only if the system provides a unique tax treatment
for any possible cash flow pattern. See id. at 573. In a consistent tax system, "it is not possible
to manipulate tax outcomes by repackaging cash flows into different financial vehicles." Id.
Universality and consistency are both theoretically possible in a first-best setting. See Strnad,
supra note 103, at 550. In a second-best world, however, a tax proposal has to be considered in
light of the discontinuities that the policymaker cannot eliminate. See id. at 553. Professor
Strnad also advocates the properties of "linearity" and "continuity." See Strnad, supra, at 572,
575-76. A tax system displays the property of linearity if "the tax on any transaction equals the
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The corporate tax itself is thought to create significant economic dis-
tortions." However, given the fact that the income tax includes many
other distortions, the distortionary corporate tax must be considered
in light of those other distortions.
For example, one could conceptualize the corporate tax as a
crude device for reducing the individual income tax distortion caused
by the realization requirement."s Under an ideal income tax base,
increases in wealth would be taxed, even if they were not realized, but
our individual income tax system waits to tax corporate retained
earnings until shareholders receive dividends or sell their appreciated
stock at a gain.'
The corporate tax could be thought of as a second-best measure
to tax unrealized shareholder level income. If earnings are retained
and dividend distributions or stock sales are deferred, the effective
rate of the double tax on the corporate earnings may approximate the
tax that would have been imposed solely at the shareholder level had
all of the earnings been distributed currently.' If the corporate tax
exists to ensure that the tax collected at least approximates the tax
that would have been collected solely at the shareholder level had all
corporate earnings been distributed currently as dividends, dividends
made out of current earnings should not be included in the corporate
tax base but retained earnings should be included in the base." The
corporate tax base would fit this efficiency justification if the corporate
tax base included retained earnings but not dividends paid to share-
holders?"
sum of the taxes on any collection of subtransactions that comprise that transaction." Id. at 576.
A tax system displays the property of continuity if nearly identical portfolios have nearly
identical tax consequences. See id. Our current tax system includes numerous inconsistencies
and ambiguities, including the debt-equity distinction and the double corporate tax. See id. at
592-93. A tax system with such inconsistencies cannot be linear, meaning that, in such a
system, altering the form of a transaction may alter its consequences. See Strnad, supra note
103, at 553.
297. See Strnad, supra note 296, at 592-93.
298. Professor Polite has observed,
One must assume, therefore, that the policy of imposing an "income tax" upon the
contrived measure of the income of a legal fiction is itself a stand-in for the achievement
of some other policy goal... Many .. . may... view the corporate income tax as a device
to reduce the personal income tax's mismeasurement of income.
Polito, supra note 48, at 767-69 (footnotes omitted).
299. See I.R.C. §§ 61(a)(3), 1001 (1994).
300. See Miller, supra note 150, at 266-68.
301. Recall that Professor Kwall takes the view that the double tax on distributed corporate
earnings was created inadvertently in 1936. See supra note 193 and accompanying text. Had
President Roosevelt's proposal become law, the corporate tax would have applied to retained
earnings but not to dividend distributions. See supra text accompanying note 194.
302. Of course we could eliminate this realization distortion more directly by abandoning the
realization requirement and taxing shareholders currently on a mark-to-market basis. See, e.g.,
2000] 1115
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Another way to conceptualize the corporate tax base is to think
of it as reducing a distortion that is created by federal law making
investments in public companies highly liquid. Professor Rudnick
argues that liquidity benefits public corporations and their share-
holders. Based on optimal tax theory, she argues that the corporate
tax should be converted into a profits tax that would tax the pure
profits of the investors both at the entity level and at the investor
level. 3 Consistent with this view, the investors' normal profit would
be excluded from the corporate tax base. In other words, corporations
would be permitted to deduct the normal profits, meaning the portion
of dividend distributions that compensates investors for the time value
of money, but not for risk.' Investors would include interest, divi-
dends, and gain from the sale of stock.
One could also conceptualize the corporate tax as an entity
level tax on shareholder return on capital. This normative argument
would not be based on efficiency; instead it would be a fairness-based
argument that depends on subscribing to the view that corporations
(or their investors) have greater ability to pay tax than other persons.
One variant of this is the discredited "benefit!' theory of corporate tax.
Also, if one subscribed to the artificial entity view of corporations in-
stead of the conduit theory, one might reify and anthropomorphize the
corporation and view it as having capacity to pay tax. Under this con-
ception of the corporate tax, dividends and interest would be included
in the corporate tax base and again at the investor level. In other
words, corporations would not be permitted to deduct interest or divi-
dends and investors would include interest, dividends, and gain from
the sale of stock. Edwin Seligman advocated this view of the corporate
tax base when the Corporate Excise Tax of 1909 was being debated.'
A variation on this theme would be that there should be a dou-
ble tax on the return on shareholder capital, since the shareholders
are the "owners" of the corporation, but there should not be a double
tax on the return on bondholder capital, since bondholders are not the
owners of the corporation. This view of shareholders as owners of the
corporation and bondholders as outside the corporation is, however,
based in part on an individualistic view of debtor-creditor relations
that was in vogue at the turn of the century but is outmoded today.
Dodge, supra note 199, at 268-78 (advocating mark-to-market taxation with respect to traded
stock and pass through taxation with respect to nontraded stock).
303. See text accompanying notes 261-266, supra.
304. See Rudnick, supra note 199, at 1172.




This conception of the corporate tax base is consistent with current
law and with some commentators' positive definition of corporate in-
come as the sum of dividend distributions made during the period plus
the increase in the value of the corporation during the period. In ef-
fect, the commentators who subscribe to this definition think of divi-
dend distributions as the corporate analog of personal consumption.'
The next part of this Article discusses proposals that would re-
duce or eliminate the current corporate tax bias in favor of issuing
debt instead of equity.
IV. EVALUATION OF THE PROPOSALS TO ELIMINATEm
THE DEBT-EQUITY DISTINCTION
A. The Second-Best Problem with Eliminating the Distinction
Commentators and the Treasury have made and considered
numerous proposals to eliminate the debt-equity distinction.' The
classes of proposals include proposals that would: '
306. See, e.g., Bryan, Junk Bonds, supra note 291, at 652. ("A corporation's distributions to
shareholders are analogous to an individual taxpayer's expenditures for consumption: both
transactions reduce the taxpayer's retained assets, and yet both are nondeductible and require
the use of after-tax dollars.')
Professor Warren suggested an alternate definition of corporate income, which would look
to the increase in wealth of all investors in the corporation, including both debtholders and
shareholders. See Warren, supra note 208, at 1589-98. Under this formulation, corporate income
would be defined as "the algebraic sum of (1) distributions to investors minus advances from
investors, and (2) the value of their investment at the end of the period minus its value at the
beginning." Id. at 1592. Although tax law has traditionally treated only the shareholders as the
investors in the corporation, Professor Warren argued that both debtholders and shareholders
should be treated as investors for purposes of defining the base of the corporate income tax.
Professor Warren later decided that corporations should not be denied interest deductions on
their debt. See Warren, supra note 199, at 717, 734 n.43.
If the corporate tax reached all corporate income [including profits and the pure cost of
capital], it would distort corporate investment decisions because the return subjected to
tax would not be reduced by the cost of capital. For example, a 12% annual return
financed by borrowing at 10% would produce a 2% profit before taxes, but a 4% loss after
taxes if the corporate tax rate were 50% and interest were nondeductible. [12% pretax
return less (6% taxes plus 10% interest) equals negative 4% after-tax loss.]
Id. at 734 (footnotes omitted).
307. The proposals discussed would bring the tax treatment of interest and dividends more
in line. Most of the proposals would not require that we completely eliminate the myriad
distinctions in the Code between debt and equity, so it is a bit of a misnomer to say that these
proposals would "eliminate" the debt-equity distinction. I will use the word "eliminate" here,
however, because that is the expression commonly used.
308. See generally William T. Plumb, Jr., The Federal Income Tax Significance of Corporate
Debt: A Critical Analysis and a Proposal, 26 TAX L. REV. 369 (1971) (arguing for the elimination
of the debt-equity distinction and cataloguing approaches for accomplishing that goal); TREASURY
INTEGRATION STUDY, supra note 161, at 17-60.
VANDERBILT LAWREVIEW
(1) adopt a shareholder allocation form of integration;
(2) adopt the comprehensive business income tax form of inte-
gration;
(3) allow a shareholder level dividends received exclusion;
(4) allow a corporate level dividends paid deduction;
(5) eliminate all or a part of the corporate interest deduction; or
(6) allow a limited deduction for a corporation's cost of capital,
regardless of whether that capital is equity or debt (referred
to as a cost of capital allowance system).
The general theory of second best"' reminds us that elimi-
nating an economic distortion does not necessarily increase efficiency
if other economic distortions remain, so any proposals to eliminate the
debt-equity distinction should be considered in light of the remaining
distortions in our tax system."' For each proposal, this Article will: (1)
describe the proposal; (2) consider whether the proposal would reduce
the debt-equity distinction, in light of other distortions that will
remain in the income tax; and (3) consider the effect of the proposal on
other distortions. The other distortions considered in this Article
include the distortions caused by:
(1) the bias in favor of investing in noncorporate equity instead
of corporate equity;
(2) the bias in favor of retaining earnings;
(3) the investor level differences in the treatment of interest,
dividends, and gain from the redemption or sale of stock;
309. In addition, more radical proposals to completely replace the income tax system with a
cash flow tax system would eliminate the distinction between debt and equity. See, e.g., U.S.
DEP'T OF THE TREASURY, BLUEPRINTS FOR BASIC TAX REFORM (1977). Those proposals are not
discussed in this Article. There are also proposals to adopt a corporate cash-flow tax even if we
retain the individual income tax. See TREASURY INTEGRATION STUDY, supra note 161, at 192,
n.39; see also Alan J. Auerbach, Debt, Equity, and the Taxation of Corporate Cash Flows, in
DEBT, TAXES, AND CORPORATE RESTRUCTURING 91, 119-25 (John B. Shoven & Joel Waldfogel
eds., 1990).
310. See generally R. G. Lipsey & Kelvin Lancaster, The General Theory of Second Best, 24
REV. ECON. STUD. 11 (1956-57).
311. As Professor Schenk has stated:
One obvious problem with the incremental approach [limiting discontinuities], as with
any second-best proposal, is that although it might solve a specific problem, it might
exacerbate others because it only moves in the direction of an ideal, but, by definition,
does not reach it. It is rational, therefore, to evaluate a second-best proposal not by
comparing it to the ideal, but by comparing it to current law. Would it improve the
current regime or make it worse?
Deborah H. Schenk, Taxation of Equity Derivatives: A Partial Integration Proposal, 50 TAX L.
REV. 571, 640 (1995).
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(4) the limitations on the utilization of corporate losses;
(5) the immediate expensing of the costs of creating intangible
assets, but not the costs of creating tangible assets;
(6) the taxation of U.S. shareholders under the provisions of
the Code, while foreign shareholders are taxed under a
combination of Code and tax treaty rules;
(7) the tax preferences that apply to corporate taxpayers but
not individual taxpayers; and
(8) the difference in the tax rates applied to taxable and tax-
exempt investors.
None of the proposals completely eliminates the debt-equity
distinction but some of the proposals do a better or worse job of
equating debt and equity. Corporate managers make decisions about
the capital structure of a corporation based on both corporate level
and investor level consequences of issuing debt or equity. Some of the
proposals discussed below would equalize the corporate level conse-
quences of debt and equity but would not equalize the investor level
consequences of debt and equity. As long as investors are required to
include any portion of their returns on debt and equity (including in-
terest on bonds, dividends on stock, and gain from stock sales), the
investor level consequences of debt and equity will continue to vary.
There are several reasons for this. First, there are timing dif-
ferences between the taxation of bondholder interest, shareholder
dividends, and stock gain. Bondholders must include interest when it
is paid or accrued under the OED rules. Shareholders do not include
dividends until the shareholder is paid the dividends. Stock gain is
generally included only when the stock is sold, due to the realization
requirement." Second, there are character and rate differences be-
tween the taxation of bondholder interest, shareholder dividends, and
stock gain. Interest and dividends are taxed at ordinary income rates
but gain from the sale of stock typically qualifies for preferential capi-
tal gain rates."' Third, there are basis recovery differences between
the taxation of bondholder interest, shareholder dividends, and stock
gain. Bondholders include all of interest paid or accrued on their
bonds and shareholders include all of the dividends they receive."" On
the other hand, gain included from the sale of stock equals the amount
realized on the sale less the shareholder's basis in the stock."5 These
312. See I.R.C. §§ 1001(a) and (c) (1994).
313. See supra note 16.
314. See I.R.C. §§ 61(a)(4), (7) (1994).
315. See I.R.C. § 1001(a) (1994).
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timing, character, rate, and basis recovery differences will affect the
consequences of each of the proposals to eliminate the debt-equity
distinction.
The debt-equity proposals that have been made have not been
fully developed, which makes it difficult to predict some of the conse-
quences of adopting the proposals. For example, the effects of some of
the proposals depend, in part, on how the proposal would tax gain
from the redemption or sale of stock. Recall that there is currently a
bias in favor of retaining corporate earnings. The effect of the debt-
equity proposals on the retained earnings bias depends on how the
proposals would treat such gain from stock redemptions and sales.
If there were no investor level tax on distributions (e.g. if
shareholders could exclude dividends), corporate earnings would be
taxed once at the entity level. If gain on redemptions and sales were
included in income, as under current law, that would create a bias in
favor of current distributions and against retention of earnings be-
cause taxing the gain on redemptions and sales would impose a second
layer of tax on corporate earnings.316 If, on the other hand, share-
holders were permitted to exclude gain from redemptions or sales of
stock, that would create a bias in favor of corporations not disposing of
appreciated property and shareholders realizing that appreciation
through redemptions and sales that would not be taxed at the share-
holder level. In other words, it would encourage corporations to defer
earnings by deferring the realization of corporate level gain.
This part will also consider the distortion caused by taxing cor-
porate earnings at higher rates than noncorporate earnings and two
other distortions that may, to some extent, offset each other. First,
limitations on utilization of corporate losses discourage investment in
high growth businesses with volatile earnings and intangible assets
and encourage investment in lower growth businesses with stable
earnings and tangible assets. Second, allowing immediate expensing
of the costs of creating intangible assets but not the cost of tangible
316. See TREASURY INTEGRATION STUDY, supra note 161, at 83. To the extent that a
shareholder's gain is attributable to retained earnings on which the corporation had already paid
tax, taxing the gain would be the second layer of tax. To the extent that a shareholder's gain is
attributable to future corporate gain or earnings, the first layer of tax would be imposed at the
shareholder level and the second layer of tax would be imposed at the corporate level when the
income was earned or the assets were sold. The Treasury Study notes that corporations might
be permitted to adopt a dividend reinvestment plan ("DRIP"), which would permit a shareholder
to increase stock basis by earnings reinvested in the corporation. See id. at 87. Capital gain from
the sale of stock then would not double tax prior earnings. DRIP plans are discussed later in this
section. See infra text accompanying notes 378, 379.
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assets encourages investment in intangible assets and discourages
investment in tangible assets.17
The Treasury Integration Study also focused on three other
distortions that will be considered in this part: (1) distortions caused
by taxing U.S. shareholders under the Code but taxing foreign share-
holders under a combination of Code rules and tax treaty rules; (2)
distortions caused by having certain tax preferences that apply to cor-
porate taxpayers but not individual taxpayers; and (3) distortions
caused by distinguishing between taxable and tax-exempt investors.
The Study recommended that: (1) the benefits of corporate integration
should only be extended to foreign shareholders through tax treaties;318
(2) corporate integration should not result in corporate tax preferences
being extended to individuals;. 9 and (3) corporate income distributed
to tax-exempt shareholders should not escape tax altogether. In
other words, the Treasury Integration Study concluded that these dis-
tortions should not be eliminated.
The next section will consider each proposal to eliminate the
debt-equity distinction, in light of the existing distortions mentioned
above. The following two sections will summarize and evaluate the
proposals.
B. The Proposals to Eliminate the Debt-Equity Distinction
1. Shareholder Allocation
The shareholder allocation proposal discussed in the Treasury
Study would continue to treat the corporation as a separate reporting
entity. The corporation would continue to pay corporate tax based on
its annual corporate income at regular corporate tax rates. The corpo-
ration would then allocate its aggregate taxable income among its
shareholders. Shareholders would have to include in income their
share of the corporate income and would owe tax on that income, com-
puted using the shareholders' tax rates, but the shareholders would
receive a tax credit for their share of corporate taxes paid. The credit
would offset the tax due from the shareholder. If the shareholder's tax
317. See supra note 166; infra note 402.
318. See TREASURY INTEGRATION STUDY, supra note 161, at ix. The U.S. government
negotiates tax treaties with many other countries. A tax treaty provides special rules for the
taxation of residents of the countries that are the parties to the treaty. Treaty provisions usually
override the rules in the Internal Revenue Code. If foreign shareholders qualified for favorable
tax treatment without regard to specific tax treaties, the U.S. would be less able to bargain for
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rate exceeded the corporation's tax rate, the shareholder would have
to pay some tax on the corporate income. A shareholder would have an
excess credit if the corporation's tax rate exceeded the shareholder's
tax rate. A shareholder with an excess credit could use the excess
credit to offset tax owed on other income, but unused credits would not
be refundable..32'
Shareholders would increase their stock bases to account for
their share of corporate income on which extra shareholder level tax
was paid.3" This basis increase would reduce potential gain from the
redemption -3 or sale of stock, but gain in excess of the increased basis
would be fully included and subject to capital gain rates.324
The Treasury shareholder allocation proposal would not pass
corporate losses through to shareholders. 325 The proposal would permit
corporate level preferences to be passed through to shareholders. Tax-
exempt and foreign shareholders would not be able to get a refund of
their shareholder credit for tax paid by the corporation.32
The shareholder allocation method would reduce the current
bias in favor of issuing debt because it would reduce the double tax on
equity.2 Corporations would still be able to deduct interest on corpo-
rate debt, so interest on debt would continue to be subject to one layer
(or, if the bondholder were a tax-exempt entity, zero layers) of tax. Tax
losses would, however, not be passed through to shareholders. In addi-
321. See id. at 27-28.
322. The shareholder's basis would be increased by the amount of taxable corporate income
allocated to the shareholder, less the portion of the tax paid by the corporation that is allocable
to the shareholder. See id. at 28. Basis would also be increased to reflect some, but not all,
preference income. See id. at 30-31. Presumably, basis would be reduced by any excess credit
that the shareholder could use to reduce other tax due.
323. A redemption is a repurchase of the corporation's equity by that corporation. See I.R.C.
§ 317(b) (1994). As used in this Article, the term "redemption" means a redemption that is
treated, for tax purposes, as a sale of the stock by the shareholder, not as a dividend from the
redeeming corporation. See I.R.C. § 302(b) (1994).
324. See id. at 82-83. Gain could be attributable to unrealized appreciation or inflation.
325. See id. at 27-28.
326. See id. at 28-29. Nor could a foreign shareholder use the credit to offset the foreign
shareholder's dividend withholding tax liability. See id. at 29. For a separate discussion of the
shareholder allocation treatment of foreign taxes paid, see id. at 36-37. Basically, the Treasury
proposal treats foreign taxes paid like tax paid to the U.S. government, which may result in zero
tax being paid on foreign source corporate income. Treasury considered denying foreign tax
credits to shareholders but decided that that approach was too complicated and was inconsistent
with the conduit nature of the shareholder allocation proposal. Allowing the corporate foreign tax
credit to be passed through to shareholders introduces its own complexity because it is not clear
how the corporate level foreign tax credit limitation rules should be applied if that credit is
passed through to shareholders. See id. at 36.
327. The shareholder allocation proposal would not completely eliminate the second layer of




tion, the corporation's ability to utilize losses would be even more
limited than under current law because loss carrybacks would be
eliminated.3"
The shareholder allocation model would tax corporate income
once, at the shareholder's tax rate, as the corporation earned the in-
come. Shareholders would be taxed on distributions and stock redemp-
tions and sales only to the extent that the dividend or amount realized
on sale exceeded the shareholder's basis, which would have been
increased to reflect additional tax paid by the shareholder. Retaining
earnings would no longer offer a shareholder level timing or basis re-
covery advantage over dividend distributions so the proposal would
reduce the current bias in favor of retained earnings. The shareholder
allocation method would not eliminate this bias, however, because
taxable stock redemptions and sales would still offer a shareholder
level character and rate advantage over taxable dividends;" share-
holders would typically pay tax on gain from redemptions and sales at
preferential capital gains rates, but would pay tax on dividend income
at ordinary income rates.
The shareholder allocation method would greatly reduce the
bias against investment in corporate form since corporate earnings
would be taxed once at the shareholder rate with the corporation effec-
tively acting as a withholding agent for the tax. Utilization of corpo-
rate losses would continue to be limited under the Treasury share-
holder allocation formula, so it might seem as though the shareholder
allocation method would retain a bias against investment in corporate
form. This bias is not too pronounced, however, since various Code
provisions currently limit individual investors' utilization of losses
they report.' For example, the passive loss rules of § 469 prevent an
investor from using passive activity losses to offset active business
income or portfolio losses. If corporate losses were passed through to
passive public shareholders, these individual investor limitations
328. The current law carryback of losses would be eliminated because the taxes already paid
would have been allocated and credited to the shareholders. Corporate losses would continue to
be carried forward. See TREASURY INTEGRATION STUDY, supra note 161, at 28. Professor Knoll
argues that the loss limitation rules would even discourage corporations from issuing debt. See
Knoll, supra note 143, at 1514.
329. Stock redemptions and sales are taxable under this proposal if the shareholder's amount
realized on the sale exceeds the shareholder's adjusted stock basis. Stock dividends are taxable
under this proposal if the dividend amount exceeds the shareholder's adjusted stock basis.
330. These limitations include the I.R.C. § 704(b) substantial economic effect rules, the basis




would apply, which would prevent full utilization of the losses passed
through to many shareholders.331
The Treasury Study rejected the shareholder allocation proto-
type due to what it called "policy" and "administrative" concerns.
332
Recall that one of the Study's recommendations was that the benefits
of corporate integration should only be extended to foreign share-
holders through tax treaties.333 The shareholder allocation method
could be consistent with that recommendation only by denying the
shareholder credit to foreign shareholders and imposing withholding
tax on dividends paid by U.S. corporations." Another recommendation
was that corporate integration should not result in corporate tax pref-
erences being extended to individuals." Treasury considered versions
of the shareholder allocation method that would not have extended
corporate tax preferences and the corporate foreign tax credit to
shareholders, but concluded that such a system would be unworkable
and would be inconsistent with the conduit nature of the shareholder
allocation method.
3 36
If the shareholder allocation proposal were implemented in a
manner completely consistent with conduit theory, it would also lose
significant revenue because corporate income allocable to zero-rate
shareholders would escape tax altogether. Making up that revenue
would potentially introduce new inequities and inefficiencies.337
The Treasury Integration Study also noted that using even a
basic shareholder allocation method would create significant
accounting and reporting difficulties.338 For example, using the share-
holder allocation method would require corporations to report corpo-
rate income and shareholder basis adjustments quarterly to every
shareholder who held any class of the corporation's stock for any
331. I.R.C. § 469 does not apply to corporations other than closely-held corporations, so under
current law, non-closely-held corporate shareholders would be able to utilize pass through losses
if the shareholder allocation method permitted the pass-through of losses. If losses did pass
through under the shareholder allocation method, Congress might amend § 469 to make it more
generally applicable. Permitting the pass-through of losses would make administration of a
shareholder allocation system even more difficult. The Treasury Study states that the
shareholder allocation method would not permit the pass-through of losses "[t]o avoid the
complexity created by applying additional loss limitations at the shareholder level and the need
for anti-abuse rules." TREASURY INTEGRATION STUDY, supra note 161, at 30.
332. See id. at 27.
333. See id. at ix.
334. See id. at 36.
335. See id. at ix.
336. See id. at 30, 36.
337. See Kwall, supra note 185, at 616.
338. See TREASURY INTEGRATION STUDY, supra note 161, at 35. The Treasury Study
articulated several reporting and auditing concerns.
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period of time during the quarter.339 In addition, the timing of report-
ing presents a problem under this method where corporations own
stock in other corporations with a different fiscal year; a corporate
shareholder would have to know its share of the income of the corpora-
tion in which it held stock before the corporate shareholder could com-
pute its income and allocate it to its own shareholders."
Although the shareholder allocation method is the darling of
academics, the complexity it would create is daunting and it would
lose significant revenue if it were implemented in a manner consistent
with the conduit theory that underlies it (e.g., if it extended corporate
tax preferences to shareholders and permitted foreign shareholders to
benefit directly from integration).
2. Comprehensive Business Income Tax
The Comprehensive Business Income Tax proposal was one of
the two integration proposals favored in the Treasury Integration
Study."1 Under the CBIT prototype, debtholders and shareholders
would not have to include interest, dividends, and possibly capital
gain from the sale of equity in income." There would be an entity level
tax, like the current corporate tax, but it would apply to all but the
smallest businesses regardless of whether the business was operated
in corporate, partnership, limited liability company, or sole proprietor-
ship form. The entity would not be permitted to deduct interest or
dividends.343 Entity-level losses would not pass through to the share-
holders.""
At the entity level, CBIT would treat debt and equity the
same. 5 Under CBIT, the business would pay the tax at the business's
339. A huge volume of shares trade during the course of a year. During the fourth quarter of
1998, the daily average trading volume for the New York Stock Exchange alone was around 730
million shares. See New York Stock Exchange Market Information Fact Book <www.nyse.com>
In addition, many corporations have multiple classes of stock, which would complicate allocation
of corporate income. A smaller number of corporations have many classes of stock. For example,
Citigroup has one class of common stock and 13 classes of preferred stock. See THE WALL ST. J.,
Sept. 14, 1999, at C6.
340. See TREASURY INTEGRATION STUDY, supra note 161, at 35.
341. See id. at viii.
342. See id. at viii, 83-84. The Study notes that not all gains and losses in the value of stock
or debt are attributable to income or losses that have been taken into account at the corporate
level. See id.
343. See id. at 40.
344. See id.
345. See id. at 39. Simulation models in the Treasury Study indicate that CBIT, relative to
the other integration prototypes, would produce the greatest economic welfare gains from
elimination of the bias in favor of debt. See id. at 132.
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marginal rate on interest and dividends distributed and on earnings
retained. Only very small businesses could escape the CBIT tax. CBIT
would thus reduce the bias against operating in corporate form."'
Whether CBIT would reduce the bias in favor of retaining
earnings depends on several variables. First, the effect of CBIT on
retained earnings would depend on whether the CBIT proposal in-
cludes a mechanism for preventing entity-level tax preferences from
being passed through to shareholders. CBIT would tax business earn-
ings at the entity level but would not tax investors on interest or
dividends.
Recall that the Treasury Study recommended that corporate
tax preferences not be passed through to individuals.347 There would be
two. ways to eliminate the pass through of the entity-level prefer-
ences.348 Either (1) a tax could be imposed at the investor level on
interest or dividends made out of preference income, 9 or (2) a com-
pensatory tax could be imposed at the entity level on distributions
made out of preference income."5 The Treasury Study notes that the
compensatory tax would be simpler because it would permit investors
to exclude all distributions."I It would, however, increase the tax bur-
den on distributions, which would encourage entities to retain
earnings.
If that problem could be resolved, the CBIT proposal might re-
place the incentive to retain earnings with an incentive to distribute
earnings on which entity-level tax had been paid. The corporation
would owe tax on its earnings whether they were distributed or not. If
the after-tax earnings were distributed, the holder would have the use
of the dividend immediately. If the after-tax earnings were not dis-
tributed currently, the holder would lose the use of those funds until
they were later distributed tax-free. This proposal would encourage
distribution of earnings352 but that incentive might be offset if redemp-
tions and sales of equity were treated more favorably than distri-
butions.
The tax treatment of redemptions and sales under CBIT is un-
certain. If a compensatory tax were adopted, Treasury's position was
that CBIT could exclude investor level gain or loss from redemptions
346. See id. at 40.
347. See id. at ix.
348. See id. at 43.
349. See id. This alternative is further developed in the Treasury Study. See id. at 45-49.
350. See id.
351. See id.
352. Shareholders would be in favor of the corporation retaining earnings as long as the
corporate managers could invest the retained earnings effectively for the shareholders.
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and sales of equity in the entity." If CBIT did not include a com-
pensatory tax, Treasury's position was that capital gain may or may
not be excluded, since it would be unclear what percentage of the gain
is attributable to entity-level earnings that had already been taxed
but were retained, and what percentage would be attributable to un-
taxed entity-level earnings or future entity-level earnings.' Excluding
investor level gain from income would create an incentive for the
business entity to defer its earnings, for example by deferring the sale
of appreciated entity assets. Taxing investor level gain would encour-
age the current distribution of earnings since distributions would be
taxed once but gain would be taxed twice.
CBIT would potentially create another type of distortion. Busi-
ness entities would have an incentive to recharacterize nondeductible
interest as a deductible form of expense, such as rent or principal on
debt used to acquire a depreciable asset. This incentive under CBIT
would not be as great as under the proposal to eliminate the corporate
interest deduction. Under the interest elimination proposal, bond-
holders would be required to include interest in income. Under the
CBIT proposal, the bondholder would be able to exclude interest. If the
bondholder's tax rate exceeded the entity's CBIT tax rate, interest
would be tax advantaged. If the entity's CBIT tax rate exceeded the
bondholder's tax rate (e.g., if the bondholder were tax exempt), the
entity would have an incentive to recharacterize interest.
The large amount of revenue raised by significantly expanding
the base of the business tax could be used to reduce the top business
tax rate. The 1992 Treasury Integration Study suggested replacing
the 34 percent marginal corporate tax rate with a 31 percent CBIT
rate, bringing the business tax rate in line with the marginal indi-
vidual tax rate at that time, 31 percent."n Since the issuance of the
Treasury Study, the top marginal corporate tax rate has increased to
353. Treasury noted:
If CBIT includes a compensatory tax, exempting gains and losses from the sale of equity
interests in CBIT entities could be justified on the ground that those gains and losses
either have been, or will be, taken into account in calculating the income tax imposed at
the entity level. Retained taxable income has already been subject to tax, retained
preference income will be subject to compensatory tax under CBIT when distributed, and
unrealized appreciation represents anticipated higher future earnings that will be subject
to entity level tax if and when they are realized.
Id. at 83.
If a compensatory tax were imposed on dividends but not on redemptions, redemptions
would be tax favored because they would allow the pass through of preferences. If redemptions
were treated like dividend distributions, that would create a bias in favor of shareholder sales to
third parties, instead of redemptions. See id. at 85.




35 percent and the top marginal individual income tax rate has in-
creased to 39.6 percent.3"
Having a 39.6 percent rate on individual income and a lower
rate on business income would create a new type of distortion, encour-
aging individuals to run their income through a business form subject
to the lower tax rate."7 This problem could be ameliorated by using
some of the revenue raised from broadening the business tax base to
reduce both the business tax rate and the individual tax rate. De-
pending on the incidence of the business tax, such a move may repre-
sent a redistribution of tax burdens. Another approach would be to set
the CBIT rate at the top marginal individual income tax rate, cur-
rently 39.6 percent.
The CBIT proposal would undermine the progressivity of the
income tax." CBIT would impose business tax at a single rate, e.g., 31
percent or 39.6 percent, but the individual income tax would impose
tax at progressive rates (currently 15 percent, 28 percent, 31 percent,
36 percent and 39.6 percent359). Since CBIT would apply to all but the
tiniest businesses, CBIT would reduce the progressivity of the indi-
vidual income tax because all business income (except perhaps capital
gain on the sale of CBIT equity) would be subject to the CBIT flat rate.
If low-bracket taxpayers responded by substituting wage income for
business income," the effect on progressivity would be reduced but a
new inefficiency would be created.36' The bias against business income
would be offset to some extent if gain from the redemption or sale of
CBIT equity were taxed at a lower rate.
Under the Treasury Study CBIT proposal, business losses
would not pass through to investors. Under current law, utilization of
corporate losses is very limited;362 losses of pass-through entities like
356. See I.R.C. § 1(a)-(e) (West Supp. 1999). Various provisions (e.g., the phase out of
itemized deductions under I.R.C. § 68) may make a taxpayer's effective tax rate higher than the
rate specified in I.R.C. § 1.
357. This may also undermine the progressivity of the income tax because high-bracket
taxpayers could reduce their effective tax rate by running their income through a CBIT entity.
358. The progressivity of the income tax is the subject of a highly regarded article by
Professors Bankman and Griffith. See generally Bankman & Griffith, supra note 198.
359. See I.R.C. §§ 1(a)-(e) (West Supp. 1999).
360. A significant amount of publicly traded stock is owned by individuals and families who
are not subject to the top tax rate bracket. In 1992, American individuals and families with
income of under $15,000 owned 2.7 million shares of stock. Individuals and families with income
of between $15,000 and $25,000 owned another 4.9 million shares and individuals and families
with income of between $25,000 and $50,000 owned another 15.2 million shares. Individuals and
families with income of $40,000 or less collectively owned 40 percent of publicly traded stocks.
NEW YORK STOCK EXCHANGE, INC., FACT BOOK FOR THE YEAR 1997, at 57, 59 (1998).
361. See Bittker, supra note 198.
362. See I.R.C. §§ 172, 382 (amended 1996) (1994).
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partnerships do pass through to investors, but may be subject to sev-
eral statutory limitations that effectively prevent passive individual
and closely-held corporate investors from using pass-through losses to
offset their other income.' Adopting CBIT with corporate-style loss
limitations may increase the current bias against investment in risky
businesses, including start-ups.' Professor Knoll has argued that
risky technology businesses disproportionately fuel economic growth,
so the tax system should encourage investment in such businesses.'
Congress could reduce that distortion by liberalizing our existing loss
limitation rules. That would, of course, reduce the amount of revenue
raised by CBIT.
3. Shareholder Level Dividends Received Exclusion
Under the shareholder level dividends received exclusion pro-
posal, corporations would continue to pay the corporate tax at the cor-
porate tax rates, but shareholders would exclude dividends received to
the extent that corporate tax had already been paid on those distrib-
uted earnings.' The shareholder would include in income the portion
of a dividend that exceeded the excludable amount. Corporate interest
would still be deducted by the corporate issuer and included by the
bondholder. Dividends received by tax-exempt or foreign shareholders
would be subject to corporate level tax at the corporate rate. This
proposal would require shareholders to pay tax on dividends to the
extent the dividends were paid out of corporate income that had not
been taxed at the corporate level because of a corporate tax
preference." '
The shareholder level dividends received exclusion prototype
would reduce the debt-equity distortion, but it would not eliminate it
because the dividend exclusion prototype taxes interest and dividends
differently: interest would be deducted by the corporate issuer and
363. These limitations include the I.R.C. § 704(b) substantial economic effect rules, the basis
limitation rule of § 704(d), the passive loss limitations of § 469, and the at-risk limitations of
§ 465.
364. On the other hand, Professor Bankman's research indicates that many risky Silicon
Valley start-ups are initially organized as corporations despite the fact that doing so frequently
results in the inability to utilize millions of dollars of losses incurred in the start-up phase. See
Joseph Bankman, The Structure of Silicon Valley Start-ups, 41 UCLA L. REV. 1737, 1737, 1743-
46 (1994).
365. See Knoll, supra note 143, at 1504-05.
366. See TREASURY INTEGRATION STUDY, supra note 161, at 17. Corporations would
maintain an "Excludable Distributions Account" ("EDA") to keep track of the distributable




included by the bondholder when paid or accrued. Dividends would
not be deducted by the corporation but would be excluded by the
shareholders when received. In other words, corporate interest would
be taxed at the bondholder's tax rate and dividends and retained
earnings would be taxed at the corporate rate.
The effect of this proposal on the bias in favor of issuing debt
would also depend on the corporation's marginal tax rate and its
marginal investor's top tax rate. If the corporation's effective tax rate
were higher than the marginal investor's tax rate, issuing corporate
debt would still be tax advantaged." As the corporation issues debt,
the corporate interest deductions would reduce the corporation's
effective tax rate. 6' The incentive to issue corporate debt would be
eliminated when the corporation's effective tax rate equaled the
marginal investor's tax rate."'
If, on the other hand, the corporation's effective tax rate were
lower than the marginal shareholder's tax rate, issuing debt would be
disadvantaged from a tax point of view.371 For example, if a
corporation's effective tax rate were 35 percent (the top corporate rate
today) and the marginal investor's tax rate were 39.6 percent (the top
individual rate today), issuing corporate debt would be tax
disadvantaged because the interest on the debt would be taxed at a
39.6 percent rate instead of a 35 percent rate. If the corporation
instead issued equity, the dividend return on that equity would be
taxed at the 35 percent corporate rate instead of the 39.6 rate.
Adopting a shareholder level dividend exclusion model would thus
retain a distortion based on the debt-equity classification.
The dividend exclusion proposal does not affect loss utilization
directly. If the proposal created a bias in favor of issuing equity
instead of debt, as it would with the current corporate and individual
rates, corporate losses would be lower, which would reduce the effect
of the distortion caused by incomplete corporate loss offsets.
The dividend exclusion proposal would, at first, seem to
eliminate the incentive to retain earnings instead of paying them out
as dividends. The corporation would owe tax on its earnings whether
they were distributed or not. If the after-tax earnings were
distributed, the shareholder would have the use of the dividend
immediately at no additional tax cost. If the after-tax earnings were
not distributed currently, the shareholder would lose the use of those
368. See Knoll, supra note 143, at 1513.
369. See id. at 1513-14.




funds until they were later distributed. This aspect of the proposal
would encourage distribution of earnings, 2 but this incentive might be
offset if redemptions and sales of stock were treated more favorably
than distributions.
In other words, the effect of dividend exclusion on retained
earnings depends in part on how gain from the redemption or sale of
stock would be treated. The treatment of redemptions and stock sales
to third parties is uncertain under this prototype. The possibilities are
that shareholders: (1) fully include gain from stock redemptions and
sales as they do under current law; (2) fully exclude gain from stock
redemptions and sales; or (3) exclude a portion of gain from stock
redemptions and sales. If the gain on the redemption or sale of stock
were solely attributable to appreciation from retained earnings
already taxed at the corporate level, it would be consistent to permit
the shareholder to exclude all of the gain.
The Treasury Study notes, however, that retained earnings
may not account for all of the appreciation in the value of stock for
several reasons.373 First, the corporation may have realized and
retained some income that is not taxed at the corporate level because
of a corporate tax preference.Y Second, corporate assets may have
appreciated but that appreciation will not have been taxed at the
corporate level if gain from that asset has not yet been realized at the
corporate level.7 5 Third, the stock may have appreciated in value
because investors have increased their estimates of the future cash
flows of the corporation, which have not yet been earned.' In any of
these cases, the shareholder gain from the sale or redemption of stock
would not be attributable to earnings that have already been taxed at
the corporate level, so it may not make sense to permit the
shareholder to exclude all of the sale or redemption gain.
Permitting shareholders to exclude gain from redemptions or
sales of stock would create a bias in favor of corporations not disposing
of appreciated property and shareholders realizing that appreciation
through stock redemptions and sales that would not be taxed at the
372. Shareholders would be in favor of the corporation retaining earnings as long as the
corporate managers could invest the retained earnings effectively for the shareholders. The
shareholders would not be in favor of managers retaining earnings to invest in projects with a
negative net present value.
373. See TREASURY INTEGRATION STUDY, supra note 161, at 82.
374. See id. The Treasury Study articulates a recommendation that corporate tax
preferences not be passed through to shareholders. See id. at viii. Consistent with that
recommendation, shareholder level gain attributable to such preference income should be taxed
at the shareholder level.




shareholder level. In other words, it would encourage corporations to
defer the realization of gain.
Requiring shareholders to fully include gain, as under current
law, would create a bias against retaining earnings because taxing the
gain on redemptions and sales would impose a second layer of tax on
corporate income."' To the extent a shareholder's gain was
attributable to retained earnings on which the corporation had
already paid tax, taxing the gain would be the second layer of tax. To
the extent a shareholder's gain was attributable to future corporate
gain or earnings, the first layer of tax would be imposed at the
shareholder level, and the second layer of tax would be imposed at the
corporate level when the income was earned or the assets were sold.
Imposing a double tax on these corporate earnings would encourage
corporations to distribute earnings instead of retaining them.
The Treasury Study notes that corporations could be permitted
to adopt a dividend reinvestment plan ("DRIP"). 8 Under such a plan,
the corporation would be deemed to have distributed the taxed
earnings of the corporation. The shareholder would exclude the
deemed dividend, then be deemed to have reinvested it in the
corporation, which would increase the shareholder's basis in the stock
by the reinvested amount."9 Any capital gain from the sale of the stock
would then, at least theoretically, be attributable to appreciation that
had not been taxed at the corporate level. If this were the case,
Treasury's position is that the gain should be taxed at the shareholder
level. Note that this would still result in double taxation of future
corporate income and gain, which would still be subject to corporate
tax in the future. This problem arises in part because of the distortion
caused by the realization requirement.
The other problem with the DRIP mechanism is the complexity
it would add to the shareholder dividend exclusion proposal."
Employing a DRIP would require corporations to allocate earnings
shareholder by shareholder. On the other hand, corporations have to
do just that type of allocation when they declare and pay a real
dividend. The task of allocating and paying real dividends is made
simpler by fixing the list of shareholders as of a so-called record date.
The shareholder dividend exclusion proposal, combined with a DRIP,
is less complex than the shareholder allocation proposal because the
377. See id. at 83.
378. See id. at 87.
379. See id.
380. Kwall argues that the DRIP mechanism is even too complex to be applied to complex
private firms. See Kwall, supra note 283, at 273-75.
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former could allocate earnings and distribute a deemed dividend to
shareholders of record as of a record date while the latter requires the
allocation of earnings to all shareholders who held stock throughout
the year.
If this proposal taxed shareholder capital gain but did not
permit DRIPs, the proposal would replace the bias in favor of
retaining earnings with a bias in favor of distributing earnings.
Inverting an existing distortion may be just as inefficient as the
existing distortion. In this case, however, replacing the bias in favor of
retaining earnings with a bias in favor of distributing earnings may
increase efficiency. The current bias encourages managers to retain
earnings to fund projects even if the projects do not have a positive net
present value.38" ' If the bias in favor of retaining earnings were
replaced with a bias in favor of distributing earnings, managers who
needed to raise capital to fund projects would have to justify those
projects to investors in order to raise the capital. If a corporation were
permitted to adopt a DRIP, there would be a deemed distribution and
reinvestment in the corporation, which would exacerbate the current
distortion caused by the retained earnings bias.
4. Corporate Level Dividends Paid Deduction
Under this proposal, corporations would continue to pay
corporate tax but would be allowed to deduct both interest and
dividends. This proposal would do a better job of eliminating the debt-
equity distortion than the shareholder level dividend exclusion
proposal because this proposal would tax both interest and dividends
at the investor's rate. It would not eliminate the distinction, however,
in part because it would not eliminate the investor level differences
between stock and debt. Whether the proposal would encourage the
issuance of debt or equity depends on whether it would force corporate
managers to currently distribute earnings, which in turn depends on
how gain from the redemption or sale of stock would be treated.
Under current law, retaining earnings is tax advantaged
compared to distributing dividends. If shareholders were required to
fully include gain from stock redemptions and sales, this proposal
would invert the current bias in favor of retaining earnings. Under
this proposal, one level (or perhaps zero levels) of tax would be
imposed on earnings currently distributed as dividends. If a
corporation retained earnings, the corporation's income would include
those earnings. In addition, any shareholder stock gain attributable to
381. See Arlen & Weiss, supra note 229, at 348.
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those retained earnings would presumably be taxed a second time
when the shareholder sold the stock. This would create pressure to
distribute dividends currently. Replacing the bias in favor of retaining
earnings with a bias in favor of distributing earnings may increase
efficiency for the reasons discussed above in conjunction with the
shareholder dividend exclusion proposal.
If the potential double tax on retained earnings forced
managers to currently distribute earnings, the corporate dividend
deduction proposal would invert, not simply neutralize, the bias in
favor of issuing debt because of investor level differences between
stock and debt. For example, there are timing differences between the
investor level consequences of stock and debt. Bondholders include the
interest when it is paid or accrued under the OID rules and pay tax on
that interest at ordinary income rates. Shareholders include dividends
when they are paid and pay tax on those dividends at ordinary income
rates. Considering this timing difference, it would seem that high-
bracket taxpayers would prefer to own equity so they have cash with
which to pay the tax on the distribution. Bonds would no longer be tax
favored at the corporate level, so corporations would not be willing to
discount their bonds to attract taxpayers other than tax-exempt
shareholders. (If managers did not currently distribute earnings, the
double tax on retained earnings would make equity much less
desirable to investors.)
Inverting an existing distortion may be just as inefficient as
the existing distortion. In this case, however, replacing the bias in
favor of debt with a bias in favor of equity would probably increase
efficiency. Debt levels have grown significantly in the last 15 years,
increasing the overleveraging problem discussed in Part II. Replacing
the debt bias with an equity bias would reverse that problematic
trend, but what kind of new inefficiencies might the equity bias
create? Some commentators have argued that high corporate debt
levels are beneficial because lenders are effective monitors of
corporate management,38" although other commentators disagree."' If
reduced debt levels led to reduced monitoring of corporate managers,
however, that monitoring problem could be addressed directly.
Allowing corporations to deduct dividends would increase
corporate losses" so this proposal would increase the distortion
382. See supra note 161.
383. See supra note 162.
384. Even without the additional corporate dividend deduction, a significant percentage of
public corporations have net operating losses.
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caused by the limitations on utilization of corporate losses. This
proposal would also lose a significant amount of revenue."
The 1992 Treasury Integration Study rejected the dividend
deduction prototype."M Recall that the Study recommended taxing
corporate income once38 but suggested that (1) integration should not
reduce the total tax collected from tax-exempt shareholders, and (2)
integration benefits should be extended to foreign shareholders by
treaty, not by statute. Treasury was concerned that, if a corporation
deducted the dividends it paid shareholders, and the dividends were
paid to tax-exempt or foreign shareholders, no tax would be collected
on the corporate earnings. " A dividend deduction model was thus
inconsistent with Treasury's goal of taxing business income once.3
5. Eliminate the Corporate Interest Deduction 9 '
If Congress eliminated the corporate interest deduction,
earnings distributed as interest would be taxed twice, first at the
corporate rate, then at the bondholder's ordinary income rate.39 Under
this system, current distributions would be taxed twice at ordinary
income rates, whether distributed as interest or dividends. Retained
earnings would be taxed first at the corporate rate. The second layer of
[1n 1993 .... just slightly over one-half of the [C corporation] income tax returns
filed... reported net income. The C corporation returns without net income reported an
aggregate loss of over $127 billion, an average loss of over $136,000 for each C
corporation return without net income. Moreover, over 39% of the C corporation returns
with net income claimed a net operating loss deduction from a prior year loss, with a total
of over $45 billion in such deductions claimed.
Yin, supra note 287, at 182 (citing INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, 1993 STATISTICS OF INCOME,
CORPORATION INCOME TAX RETURNS, Publ. 16, thl. 18, col. (1), (1996)).
385. In 1984, Treasury estimated that a proposal to permit corporations to deduct half of the
dividends they paid would lose $38 billion of revenue for fiscal year 1990. See 1 TREASURY DEP'T
REPORT, TAX REFORM FOR FAIRNESS, SIMPLICITY, AND ECONOMIC GROWTH 248 (1984).
386. See id. at 107.
387. See id. at 12.
388. See id. at ix.
389. See id. at 107.
390. See id.
391. There are many versions of this type of proposal. For example, the report on corporate
restructurings prepared by the Joint Committee on Taxation included the following variations:
(1) disallowing a flat percentage of all interest deductions; (2) disallowing interest deductions in
excess of a specified rate of return to investors; (3) interest indexing for inflation; (4) disallowing
interest deductions in excess of a specified percentage of pre-interest deduction taxable income or
earnings and profits; (5) disallowing interest deductions on debt issued in exchange for
repurchasing the issuer's equity;, and (6) disallowing interest deductions on debt issued to
purchase another corporation. See CORPORATE FINANCIAL STRUCTURES, supra note 144, at 103-
12. In the discussion in the text, I will consider the broad-based disallowance of the corporate
interest deduction.
392. Again, this assumes that the bondholder is not tax-exempt.
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tax would be deferred until the corporation distributed the retained
earnings as a dividend or the shareholder sold stock that had
appreciated because of the retained earnings. Retaining earnings
would be the only way to defer the second layer of tax, so retaining
earnings would be even more tax favored under this proposal than
under current law.
If the retained earnings were later distributed to the
shareholder as a dividend, they would be taxed again at the
shareholder's ordinary income rate. If the shareholder sold the stock,
the value of which had increased because of undistributed retained
earnings, the shareholder would pay tax on the gain from the sale of
the stock at capital gain rates. 3 If two layers of tax on corporate
earnings were unavoidable, deferring the second layer of tax, being
allowed basis recovery, and qualifying for capital gains rates would be
even more tax-advantaged than they are now. In addition, if the
marginal corporate rate were lower than the marginal individual rate,
as it is now for taxpayers in the top bracket, and the shareholder
capital gain tax were deferred for long enough, the effective tax on
corporate equity under this proposal could be lower than the
shareholders' marginal individual tax rates. In other words, deferral
of the second layer of tax could reduce the second layer of tax
substantially.
Under this proposal, debt would no longer be tax-advantaged at
the corporate level, so corporations would not be willing to discount
their debt to attract higher bracket investors. High bracket taxpayers
would still prefer to own equity, because retained earnings would be
tax-favored, so eliminating the corporate interest deduction would
probably encourage the issuance of equity instead of debt.394 Replacing
the bias in favor of debt with a bias in favor of equity would probably
increase efficiency for the reasons discussed above in conjunction with
the corporate dividends paid deduction proposal.
The increased bias in favor of retained earnings could
potentially be offset by expanding the enforcement of the accumulated
earnings tax."' Under current law, a corporation that retains earnings
beyond the reasonable needs of the corporation is subject to a penalty
393. The same would be true for a redemption.
394. The magnitude of this effect depends on the breakdown of investors between high and
low bracket taxpayers. Demand from taxpayers in different brackets would affect the returns on
those investments. Over time, if the economy reaches equilibrium, there may be no tax
advantage to issuing debt or equity.
395. See I.R.C. § 531 (1994).
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tax of 39.6 percent. Expanding the enforcement of the accumulated
earnings tax could discourage the retention of earnings.
Eliminating the interest deduction for corporate taxpayers but
not other taxpayers would magnify the current distortion caused by
taxing corporations differently than other businesses. New businesses
that could use the tax shield provided by interest deductions would be
encouraged to operate in noncorporate form. Existing corporations
that could use the tax shield provided from an interest deduction
would be encouraged to disincorporate. Disincorporating is less tax-
advantaged than initially setting up a business in noncorporate form,
however, because disincorporating would trigger gain at both the
corporate and shareholder levels.3" In addition, operating as an
unincorporated business would permit the business to deduct interest
on its debt only if the business remained private, since unincorporated
businesses with publicly traded interests are subject to the corporate
tax.
397
Eliminating the interest deduction would raise significant
revenue.39 The substantial revenue raised from eliminating the
corporate interest deduction could be used to reduce the corporate tax
rates, thereby reducing the disadvantage from operating in corporate
form. Eliminating the corporate interest deduction would expand the
corporate tax base, but the tax rate on that expanded base could be
reduced so that there would be no aggregate increase in corporate tax
revenue. There would however be industry-wide and individual
winners and losers under the new system. Businesses in industries
with higher debt capacity would owe more corporate tax and
businesses in industries with lower debt capacity would owe less
corporate tax. New businesses with low debt capacity potential would
be encouraged to incorporate, but businesses with high debt capacity
would be discouraged from incorporating.
On the other hand, the incentive to operate in corporate form
may be offset to some extent because of the limitations on the
utilization of corporate losses. Recall that utilization of corporate
losses is severely limited. Pass-through entities, however, ,are
permitted to pass losses through to investors, although many
individual shareholders would not be able to fully utilize the losses
396. See Auerbach, supra note 309, at 93-94.
397. See I.R.C. § 7704 (1994 & West Supp. 1999) (amended 1998); Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-
3(b)(1).
398. cf. U.S. DEPT. OF COMMERCE, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES 544, tbl.
863 (118th ed., 1998). The table shows the aggregate annual interest corporations deducted in
nine years between 1980 and 1995. In 1995, for example, corporations deducted $744 billion of
interest.
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because of various statutory limitations.399 Start-ups, for example high
tech start-ups, are risky and are likely to generate tax losses, although
the interest elimination proposal would increase corporate income and
reduce the likelihood of a corporation having losses. The corporate
limitations on full loss offsets may thus discourage risky, low debt
capacity businesses from incorporating; by operating in noncorporate
form, the business could offer investors the advantage of the pass
through of losses.4" On the other hand, the proposal would encourage
incorporation of low debt capacity businesses that are expected to be
profitable.
If elimination of the interest deduction and corporate tax rate
reduction favored low debt capacity businesses, that might be
beneficial to the economy because low debt capacity companies
disproportionately spur economic growth."' On the other hand, this
proposal would magnify another distortion that already encourages
investment in such companies-the costs of creating intangible assets
are often currently deductible, but the costs of purchasing tangible
assets are deducted over time. That distortion is already considered
significant enough that commentators have felt the need to make
proposals to eliminate it.4"'
399. Losses passed through are subject to various limitations, including the I.R.C. § 704(b)
substantial economic effect rules, the basis limitation rule of § 704(d), the passive loss limitations
of § 469, and the at-risk limitations of § 465.
400. However, Professor Bankman has observed that risky new technology ventures with
intangible assets often incorporate despite the limitations on the utilization of corporate losses.
See Bankman, supra note 364, at 1737, 1743-46. The Silicon Valley executives who Professor
Bankman interviewed offered several justifications for incorporating start-ups (although many of
the executives admitted that they had never focused on the tax incentives). For example, one
justification for incorporating was that organizing a start-up as a corporation permitted the
business to do a future initial public offering without having to pay to convert the business into a
corporation. See id. at 1749.
401. See Knoll, supra note 143, at 1504-05.
402. See, e.g., House Hearings on Mergers and Acquisitions, supra note 162 (proposing a
corporate cash flow tax that would permit corporations to immediately deduct the cost of tangible
assets).
Professor Feldstein, among others, has argued that we should replace the corporate
income tax with a corporate cash flow tax, even if we retain the rest of the income tax. See id.;
see also R. Glenn Hubbard, Tax Corporate Cash Flow, Not Income, WALL ST. J., Feb. 16, 1989;
Mervyn A. King, The Cash Flow Corporate Income Tax, in THE EFFECTS OF TAXATION ON
CAPITAL ACCUMULATION 378 (Martin Feldstein ed., 1987).
The base of the corporate cash flow tax would be (1) the corporation's cash revenue less (2)
its cash expenses other than payments to debt and equity capital providers. In other words,
corporations would not be able to deduct interest or dividends. Under this corporate cash flow
tax, investments in plant, equipment, and inventory would be expensed immediately.
Eliminating the interest deduction would reduce the current bias in favor of issuing debt. See
House Hearings on Mergers and Acquisitions, supra note 162. Allowing immediate expensing of
the cost of tangible assets would remove a perceived distortion that encourages investment in
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Professor Knoll would also tax shareholders currently on their
share of corporate retained earnings to ameliorate the increased
incentive to retain earnings. 3  In effect, his proposal blends
elimination of the corporate interest deduction and current
shareholder level tax on undistributed earnings allocable to the
shareholder. This would seem to offer high debt capacity corporations
the worst of both worlds: (1) loss of the interest deductions the
business would have been allowed had it operated in noncorporate
form, and (2) current shareholder level taxation of earnings in line
with a pass-through model (but perhaps without crediting the
shareholder for the corporate tax paid). Professor Knoll would reduce
corporate rates, but operating in corporate form may still be tax-
disadvantaged for high debt capacity businesses.
Eliminating the corporate interest deduction would create a
new type of distortion. Corporate taxpayers would have an incentive to
characterize the costs of financing as a deductible form of expense
(e.g., rent or principal on debt used to acquire a depreciable asset)
instead of as interest. This new distortion could create new forms of
uncertainty, complexity, and tax arbitrage, but this new problem
would be limited to the types of costs that could be plausibly
recharacterized.
6. Corporate Cost of Capital Allowance Deduction
A number of economists and tax commentators have proposed
that Congress repeal the corporate interest deduction and replace it
with a cost of capital allowance ("COCA") deduction.4" The COCA
deduction would equal a fixed percentage of the corporation's
intangible assets, the cost of which can be immediately deducted, and discourages investment in
tangible assets, the cost of which is deducted over a period of years. See id. On the other hand,
Professor Knoll argues that we should encourage investment in risky, potentially high-growth
businesses, which tend to employ intangible assets.
Under a corporate cash flow tax, there may still be a bias against investing in the
corporate sector. See TREASURY INTEGRATION STUDY, supra note 161, at 192 n.39. If the effective
tax rate on dividends exceeded the effective tax rate on capital gain from the sale of stock, the
bias in favor of retaining earnings would continue. See id.
403. See Knoll, supra note 143, at 1508-10. The increased incentive to retain earnings could
also be offset by expanded enforcement of the accumulated earnings tax. See I.R.C. § 531 (1994).
404. See, e.g., George N. Hatsopoulos et al., Overconsumption: The Challenge to U.S.
Economic Policy, 1989 AM. BUS. CONF. & THERMO ELECTRON CORP.; The Cost of Capital
Consequences of Curbing Corporate Borrowing: Hearings Before the House Comm. on Ways and
Means, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. (1989) (statement of James M. Poterba); Kleinbard, supra note
103. The Joint Committee on Taxation included discussion of a variation of COCA in its 1989
report on corporate restructurings. See CORPORATE FINANCIAL STRUCTURES, supra note 144, at
116.
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aggregate capitalization, regardless of whether that capital was in the
form of debt or equity."°5 The effect would be similar to giving a
corporation a partial interest deduction and a partial dividends paid
deduction. The COCA deduction percentage rate could be set to make
the substitution of COCA for the interest deduction revenue neutral,"
or it could be set to track a risk-free rate, such as the interest rate on
Treasury bonds."7
Under Edward Kleinbard's version of COCA, if a corporation
entered into a contract to manage interest rate risk, such as an
interest rate swap, gain or loss on that risk management contract
would be disregarded for tax purposes."8
Example 3:
X Corporation's total capitalization is $100 million. The COCA percentage is five
percent. X Corporation has outstanding $40 million of equity and $60 million of debt.
The debt bears a floating interest rate, such as LIBOR. 409 X Corporation wants to cap
its annual interest payments at $6 million (or 10 percent of its debt), so it enters into
an interest rate swap contract with a counterparty, Y. The contract obligates X
Corporation to pay Y an annual amount equal to 10 percent of a $60 million notional
principal amount.410Y is obligated to pay X Corporation the floating LIBOR rate on the
$60 million notional principal amount. In year one, X Corporation pays $7 million of
interest on that debt. Under the notional principal contract between X Corporation and
Y, X Corporation is obligated to pay Y $6 million and Y is obligated to pay X
Corporation $7 million. The payments are netted and Y pays X Corporation $1 million.
X Corporation's actual interest cost is $6 million ($7 million X Corporation paid the
debtholders less $1 million X Corporation received from Y). Under the Kleinbard COCA
proposal, X Corporation's COCA deduction would equal $5 million, which is the product
of multiplying the $100 million X Corporation capitalization by the five percent COCA
rate. Although X Corporation made $1 million on its contract with Y, X Corporation
405. Hatsopoulos, supra note 404, at 16.
406. Hatsopoulos, Krugman, and Poterba give an example, computed in 1989, employing
1989 debt-equity ratios and interest rates. They estimate that a COCA deduction could be
revenue neutral if the COCA percentage were set at five percent. See id. at 26-27, app. IV.
407. See Rleinbard, supra note 103, at 943.
408. See id. at 959:
Since the whole purpose of the COCA System would be to substitute an arbitrary annual
deduction for all the various components of a corporate taxpayer's actual annual cost of
capital, under the COCA System corporations would not recognize gain or loss on any
liability management transaction, just as corporations currently recognize no gain or loss
on trading in their own stock .... Similarly, gain or loss attributable to any designated
liability management tool employed by a corporate issuer to manage capital costs (e.g., an
interest rate swap, cap or forward contract), once identified as part of a taxpayer's cost of
capital "account," simply would generate tax-free cash flows.
409. LIBOR (London Interbank Offered Rate) is a standardized interest rate used as the
benchmark in many international loan transactions.
410. The notional principal amount is not actually loaned. It is simply used to determine
each party's payment obligation to the other party.
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does not have to include that $1 million in income because it is part of X Corporation's
cost of capital management system
41 1
The COCA deduction would appear to reduce the debt-equity
distinction, focusing only on the corporate level consequences of the
proposal. Corporate capital structure is, however, a function of both
corporate level consequences and investor level consequences. Taking
into account the investor level consequences, the COCA deduction
proposal would invert the bias in favor of issuing debt, creating a new
bias in favor of issuing equity.
Under a COCA deduction system, corporate earnings in excess
of a time value of money component would be taxed twice, first at the
corporate level and again at the investor level. Bondholders would
include interest when it is paid or accrued. Shareholders would
include dividends when they were paid. If the corporation retained
earnings and paid dividends later, shareholders would be able to defer
the second layer of tax until the dividends were paid. If the
corporation retained earnings and did not pay the earnings out as
dividends, the shareholders could later sell the stock and qualify for
basis recovery and capital gains rates. If the sale (at which time the
second layer of tax would be imposed) were deferred for long enough,
the effective cost of the second layer of tax could be substantially
reduced. Retaining earnings would be the only way to defer the second
layer of tax, so retaining earnings would be even more tax favored
under this proposal than under current law. The increased incentive
to retain earnings could perhaps be offset by expanded enforcement of
the accumulated earnings tax."u
High bracket taxpayers would prefer equity as they do now.
Debt would no longer be tax-advantaged at the corporate level, so
corporations would not be willing to discount their debt in order to
achieve tax savings. The COCA proposal would thus discourage the
issuance of debt and encourage the issuance of equity. Replacing the
bias in favor of debt with a bias in favor of equity would probably
411. Here is a variation on the example: Assume the same facts as in the last example
except that, in year one, X Corporation pays $5 million of interest to its debtholders. Under the
notional principal contract between X Corporation and Y, X Corporation is obligated to pay Y $6
million and Y is obligated to pay X Corporation $5 million. The payments are netted and X
Corporation pays Y $1 million. X Corporation's actual interest cost is $6 million ($5 million X
Corporation paid the debtholders plus $1 million X Corporation paid 1). Under the Kleinbard
COCA proposal, X Corporation's COCA deduction would equal $5 million, which is the product of
multiplying the $100 million X Corporation capitalization by the five percent COCA rate.
Although X Corporation lost $1 million on its contract with Y, X Corporation would not be
allowed to deduct that $1 million payment because it is part of X Corporation's cost of capital
management system.
412. See I.R.C. § 531 (1994).
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increase efficiency for the reasons discussed above in conjunction with
the corporate dividends paid deduction proposal.
Since the COCA deduction proposal would eliminate the
current corporate level incentive to sell equity dressed up as debt, it
would also render certain complex financial products obsolete.413 In
addition, it would simplify the reporting of risk management devices
such as interest rate swaps and currency swaps. This would reduce
complexity, uncertainty, and tax arbitrage opportunities. It might
create a new distortion though, as corporations try to recharacterize
the nondeductible portion of their cost of capital as some type of
deductible cost.1 4 Although this new distortion could create new forms
of uncertainty, complexity, and tax arbitrage, this new problem would
be limited to the types of costs that could be recharacterized.
Professor Knoll argues that the debt-equity distinction should
be eliminated because it discourages investment in high growth
businesses with intangible assets and encourages investment in stable
businesses with tangible assets. High growth businesses with
intangible assets are less able to borrow than stable businesses with
tangible assets. Adopting a COCA deduction would seem to favor low
debt capacity businesses. On the other hand, risky, high growth
businesses have a higher cost of capital than stable businesses.415 The
annual COCA deduction would be a higher percentage of a stable
business's actual cost of capital than the high growth business's cost of
capital, so a COCA deduction proposal might still favor stable
businesses.
The COCA deduction proposal might also magnify the bias
created by rules in the Code that do not permit corporations to make
current use of all their losses. Not permitting corporations to
completely use their loss offsets discourages investment in risky
businesses."" Adopting a COCA deduction would increase this bias
because it would reduce corporate income.1 Replacing the interest
deduction with a COCA deduction would reduce the income of
corporations that would not use much debt in their capital structures
413. For a discussion of Monthly Income Preferred Shares (MIPS) and related products, see
supra notes 132-37 and accompanying text.
414. For example, a corporation buying a depreciable asset with purchase money
indebtedness would have an incentive to try to recharacterize the nondeductible portion of the
economic interest on the loan as part of the purchase price of the asset, which would be
deductible over time.
415. See WILLIAM A. KLEIN & JOHN C. COFFEE, JR., BUSINESS ORGANIZATION AND FINANCE:
LEGAL AND ECONOMIC PRINCIPLES 320 (6th ed., 1996).
416. See Knoll, supra note 143, at 1502-03.
417. See id. at 1509 n.183.
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and increase the income of corporations that would use lots of debt in
their capital structures.4"8
Profitable low debt capacity corporations would pay less tax
under this proposal. Unprofitable low debt capacity may have losses
even without a COCA deduction; increasing the losses by the amount
of the COCA deduction would not currently benefit the corporation
because of the limitations on the utilization of losses."1 9 Of course
418. For example, assume that ABC Co. has outstanding $40 million of debt and $60 million
of equity. ABC Co.'s net income for the year, before taking into account the interest on the debt,
is $6 million. The debt pays annual interest at 10 percent, so ABC Co. pays $4 million of interest
each year to its bondholders. Under current law, ABC Co. deducts the $4 million of interest and
is left with $2 million of income on which it would have to pay tax. Assume that ABC Co. is in
the 35 percent rate bracket. ABC Co. owes $700,000 (35 percent of $2 million of net income) of
tax.
Under the COCA proposal, assuming a fixed COCA percentage of 5 percent, ABC Co.'s
COCA deduction would be $5 million (5 percent of $100 million combined debt and equity). ABC
Co.'s net income would be $1 million ($6 million net income before the COCA deduction less $5
million COCA deduction). ABC Co. would owe $350,000 (35 percent of $1 million of income) of
tax instead of $700,000 of tax.
Next, consider an example where the corporation has more debt than equity. For
example, assume that XYZ Co. has outstanding $60 million of debt and $40 million of equity.
XYZ Co.'s net income for the year, before taking into account the interest on the debt, is $6
million. The debt pays annual interest at 10 percent, so XYZ Co. pays $6 million of interest each
year to its bondholders. Under current law, XYZ Co. deducts the $6 million of interest and is left
with zero income so XYZ Co. owes no tax for the year.
Under the COCA proposal, assuming a fixed COCA percentage of 5 percent, XYZ Co.'s
COCA deduction would be $5 million (5 percent of $100 million combined debt and equity). XYZ
Co.'s net income would be $1 million ($6 million net income before the COCA deduction less $5
million COCA deduction). Assume that XYZ Co. is in the 35 percent tax bracket. XYZ Co. would
owe $350,000 (35 percent of $1 million of net income) of tax instead of zero tax.
419. Consider an example with an unprofitable, low debt capacity start-up company. Assume
that high tech start-up company Edge Co. has outstanding $2 million of debt and $8 million of
equity. In each of the first two years of operations, Edge Co. had a $300,000 net operating loss.
Before taking into account the year three interest on the debt, Edge Co. has year three net
income of $50,000. The debt pays annual interest at 10 percent, so Edge Co. pays $200,000 of
interest each year on its debt. Under current law, Edge Co. deducts the $200,000 of interest and
is left with a year three loss of $150,000. Edge Co. would not owe any tax for year three but
would not be able to utilize the year three loss currently. The $150,000 year three loss would be
carried forward, under I.R.C. § 172, along with the $600,000 of losses from years one and two.
Under the COCA proposal, assuming a fixed COCA percentage of 5 percent, Edge Co.'s
COCA deduction would be $500,000 (5 percent of $10 million combined debt and equity). Edge
Co.'s year three loss under the COCA proposal would be $450,000 ($50,000 of net income before
the COCA deduction less the $500,000 COCA deduction). Edge Co. would not owe any tax for
year three but would not be able to utilize the year three loss currently. The $450,000 year three
loss would be carried forward along with the $600,000 of losses from years one and two.
Although Edge Co.'s hypothetical $500,000 COCA deduction would be greater than its
$200,000 interest deduction under current law, the increased year three loss that would result
from the higher COCA deduction would not benefit Edge Co. currently because of the limitations
on the utilization of corporate losses.
Worse yet, if more than 50 percent of the equity of Edge Co. changed hands, for example
because venture capitalists acquired equity in exchange for venture capital, the utilization of
losses would be even more severely restricted by I.R.C. § 382. For a discussion of the § 382
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Congress could address that problem by liberalizing the rules that
limit utilization of corporate losses.2 ° In addition, as noted earlier, low
debt capacity businesses that anticipated losses might choose to
operate in noncorporate form in order to permit greater utilization of
firm losses.
If Congress replaced the corporate interest deduction with a
corporate COCA deduction, high debt capacity businesses would have
an increased incentive to operate in noncorporate form (assuming the
business did not need to raise capital in the public markets, which
would necessitate corporate tax treatment"1 ). Said another way, a
business would have an incentive to operate in noncorporate form if
the interest on the business's potential debt would exceed the COCA
deduction the business could deduct if it operated in corporate form."'
This incentive would be stronger for new businesses than for existing
corporations that would need to disincorporate4 Profitable low debt
capacity businesses would have an incentive to operate in corporate
form because the COCA deduction would exceed the corporation's
interest deduction under current law.
The average corporate cost of capital would likely be lower with
a COCA deduction than with elimination of the corporate interest
deduction and a reduction of the corporate tax rate."' Eliminating the
limitations in the context of start-ups, see Richard L. Parker, The Innocent Civilians in the War
Against NOL Trafficking: Section 382 and the High-Tech Start- Up Companies, 9 VA. TAX REV.
625 (1990).
420. See, e.g., Mark Campisano & Roberta Romano, Recouping Losses: The Case for Full Loss
Offsets, 76 NW. U. L. REV. 709 (1981).
421. See I.R.C. § 7704 (1994 & West Supp. 1999) (amended 1998); Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-
3(b)(1).
422. This assumes that the incomplete loss offset rules would not prevent the business from
utilizing the potential interest deduction currently.
423. Disincorporating is less tax-advantaged than initially setting up a business in
noncorporate form because disincorporating would trigger gain at both the corporate and
shareholder levels. See Auerbach, supra note 309, at 93-94. Return to the earlier example
involving XYZ Co. in supra note 418. XYZ Co. could save $350,000 by operating in noncorporate
form, other things being equal. XYZ Co. may nonetheless not disincorporate for two reasons.
First, as Professor Auerbach has noted, disincorporation would result in tax at the corporate and
shareholder level. Second, even if XYZ Co. disincorporated, it would be subject to the corporate
tax and the COCA rules if interests in XYZ Co. were publicly traded. See I.R.C. § 7704 (1994)
(amended 1998); Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-3(b)(1).
424. See Hatsopoulos, supra note 404, at 26-27 (app. IV). Hatsopoulos, Krugman, and
Poterba give an example to illustrate the relative advantage of adopting the COCA deduction
proposal. The following example tracks their example. Assume that shareholders demand a 12
percent return on investment, and creditors demand a 10 percent interest rate on corporate
bonds. Also assume that inflation is 4 percent and that the corporate tax rate is 40 percent.
Assume that the corporation can earn a 20 percent pre-tax return on investment. (They note
that a reduction in corporate tax rates would probably reduce pre-tax returns over time, but
assume for purposes of the example that the proposals would not change the pre-tax return.)
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corporate interest deduction would provide a windfall to owners of
outstanding capital and increase the cost of capital for new capital.
The COCA deduction, on the other hand, would not increase the cost
of capital or discourage new investment.n In addition, investments
that can be expensed, such as research and development costs, can
typically be financed only with equity, so adopting a COCA proposal
would provide a stronger incentive to make those types of investments
than under either the interest elimination proposal or under current
law.
42 7
C. Summary of the Proposals
How effective is each proposal at eliminating the debt-equity
distinction and what happens to the remaining distortions under each
Based on these assumptions, the after-tax equity cost of funds for the average corporation
would be 8 percent. which equals the 12 percent return on equity less 4 percent inflation. The
after-tax debt cost of funds for the average corporation would be 2 percent, which equals 6
percent (the 10 percent bond interest multiplied by .6, which is 1 less the .4 corporate tax rate)
less 4 percent inflation. If a corporation had a 1:1 debt equity ratio, meaning that it had 50
percent debt and 50 percent equity in its capital structure, its cost of funds would be 5 percent,
which is the sum of 4 percent (.5 multiplied by 8 percent equity cost of funds) plus 1 percent (.5
multiplied by 2 percent debt cost of funds).
The corporation's cost of capital depends on the rate at which the funds invested could be
deducted. If the invested amount were used to purchase an asset that would depreciate, for
economic purposes, at a rate of 10 percent a year, the corporation's cost of capital would be 5
percent if the cost could be expensed immediately, 8.1 percent if the tax code permitted double
declining balance cost recovery deductions, and 9.7 percent if the tax code permitted only cost
recovery at the economic depreciation rate.
Under the proposal to eliminate the interest deduction and lower corporate rates,
Hatsopoulos, Krugman, and Poterba arrive at a cost of funds of 7 percent. See id. at 27. In order
to compute this percentage, they first compute the rate that the corporate tax would be if the
revenue from eliminating the interest deduction were used to fund the rate reduction. Based on
the assumptions in the example, they compute the new corporate tax rate of 29 percent. The cost
of funds would be 7 percent, which is the sum of (.5 multiplied by (12 percent return on equity
less 4 percent inflation)) plus (.5 multiplied by (10 percent interest less 4 percent inflation)).
This raises the corporation's cost of capital to 7 percent if the cost could be expensed
immediately, 9.5 percent if the tax code permitted double declining balance cost recovery
deductions, and 10.6 percent if the tax code permitted only cost recovery at the economic
depreciation rate.
Under a COCA deduction proposal, with a COCA deduction of 5 percent of the combined
debt and equity, the cost of funds and the cost of capital are the same as before adopting either
proposal. See id. at 27. Although the COCA deduction proposal increases the cost of debt, it
decreases the cost of equity by the same amount. See id.
425. See id.
426. See id. An example in their article, explained in supra note 424, illustrates the effect of
an interest elimination proposal and the COCA proposal on the cost of capital.
427. See id. This assumes that the business is profitable.
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proposal? This section will summarize the effects of each proposal, as
discussed in the last section. " '
Under current law, interest on corporate debt is taxed once at
the bondholder's rate. Other corporate earnings are taxed twice, first
at the corporate level and again when the shareholder receives a
dividend or sells stock that has appreciated in value at least in part
due to earnings that have not been distributed. The following four
proposals (simplifying a bit) would tax corporate distributions,
including both interest and dividends, only once: (1) shareholder
allocation; (2) CBIT; (3) shareholder dividend exclusion; and (4)
corporate dividend deduction.
The shareholder allocation proposal opts for conduit treatment
and would tax interest at the bondholders' rates and corporate
earnings at the shareholders' rates. The CBIT proposal opts for
expanded entity taxation and would tax dividends and interest at the
same entity rate. The shareholder dividend exclusion proposal would
tax dividends at the corporate rate and interest at the bondholders'
rates. The corporate dividend deduction proposal would tax dividends
at the shareholders' rates and interest at the bondholders' rates.
The proposal to eliminate the corporate interest deduction
would tax all corporate earnings twice. The COCA proposal would tax
normal profits distributed as dividends at the shareholders' rates and
normal profits distributed as interest at the bondholders' rates. The
COCA proposal would tax pure profits twice.
The following table illustrates the layers of tax on corporate
earnings under each proposal and the rate that would apply to each
layer of tax.
428. The discussion in this section assumes that the reader is familiar with the detailed
discussion of each of the proposals in the last section.
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TABLE 1: Layers of Tax on Corporate Earnings
Under Current Law and Proposals
1147
Type of proposal Number of layers of tax and rates
Current law
Dividends 1-2 (corporate rate and shareholder ordinary income rate)
Interest 0-1 (bondholder ordinary income rate)
Gain from sale 1-2 (corporate rate and shareholder capital gain rate)
Shareholder
Allocation
Dividends 0-1 (shareholder ordinary income rate)
Interest 0-1 (bondholder ordinary income rate)
Gain from sale 0-2 (shareholder ordinary income rate and capital gain rate)
CBIT
Dividends 1 (entity rate)
Interest 1 (entity rate)
Gain from sale 1-2 (entity rate and shareholder capital gain rate)
Shareholder dividend
exclusion
Dividends 1 (corporate rate)
Interest 0-1 (bondholder ordinary income rate)
Gain from sale 1-2 (corporate rate and shareholder capital gain rate)
Corporate dividends
paid deduction
Dividends 0-1 (shareholder ordinary income rate)
Interest 0-1 (bondholder ordinary income rate)
Gain from sale 1-2 (corporate rate and shareholder capital gain rate)
Eliminate corporate
interest deduction
Dividends 1-2 (corporate rate and shareholder ordinary income rate)
Interest 1-2 (corporate rate and bondholder ordinary income rate)
Gain from sale 1-2 (corporate rate and shareholder capital gain rate)
COCA
Dividends 0-1 on normal profits (shareholder ordinary income rate)
1-2 on pure profits (corporate rate and shareholder ordinary
income rate)
Interest 0-1 on normal profits (bondholder ordinary income rate)
1-2 on pure profits (corporate rate and bondholder ordinary
income rate)
Gain from sale 1-2 (corporate rate and shareholder capital gain rate)
The discussion in the last section demonstrates that there are
several ways in which Congress could impose tax once on distributions
and make the treatment of dividend and interest distributions roughly
or exactly equivalent. Doing so creates collateral problems, however.
One problem that came up repeatedly in the last section is the failure
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of some proposals to ensure that corporate income will be taxed at least
once where the investor is foreign or tax-exempt or the corporation has
benefited from corporate tax preferences.
Although the current system is thought of as a double tax
system, the current system may result in only one layer of tax on
corporate earnings if the shareholder is tax-exempt or foreign (so
subject to either no tax or a reduced rate of tax) or the corporation
takes advantage of corporate tax preferences. The shareholder
allocation proposal and the corporate dividends paid deduction
proposal would attempt to tax corporate earnings once at the investor
level. To the extent that the investors were tax-exempt or foreign or
the corporation qualified for corporate level tax preferences, there may
be less than one layer of tax on the corporate earnings.
The shareholder dividend exclusion proposal would attempt to
tax corporate earnings once, with dividends being taxed at the
corporate rate and interest being taxed at the bondholders' rates. This
proposal removes the second layer of tax on dividends but ensures
that at least one layer of tax will be collected on dividends at the
corporate level. This proposal, like current law, would result in less
than one layer of tax being collected on interest, since the bondholder
may be tax-exempt or foreign.
CBIT is the only proposal that ensures that one layer of tax
will be collected, because it is the only method that taxes corporate
earnings at the entity level.4' Under CBIT, the tax rates of the
investors are irrelevant.' Therein lies the beauty of CBIT and the
problem with CBIT: investor rates would be irrelevant for purposes of
computing the tax on business income, so CBIT would undermine the
progressivity of the income tax.
The proposal to eliminate the corporate interest deduction puts
debt and equity on more equal footing by taxing all corporate earnings
twice. Again, if investors were tax-exempt or foreign or the corporation
qualified for corporate tax preferences, the earnings might be taxed
only once. For investors that are subject to tax, however, this proposal
would impose a double tax on all corporate earnings.
The COCA proposal would impose one layer of tax, at the
investor rate, on the normal returns on debt and equity (i.e., the
429. CBIT could result in less than one layer of tax on business earnings where the entity
level tax is reduced by entity level tax preferences and investors exclude distributions. The
Treasury Integration Study suggested two mechanisms for preventing the pass through of entity
level preferences: (1) tax investors on distributions made out of preference income, or (2) impose




portion of the return that simply compensates the investor for the
time value of money). It would impose two layers of tax on the pure
profit returns on debt and equity (i.e., the returns in excess of the
normal returns). Again if investors were tax-exempt or foreign, or the
corporation qualified for corporate tax preferences, the pure profit
portion of the earnings might be taxed only once.
Another problem that came up repeatedly in the last section
was the inability of the proposals to equate the tax treatment of
corporate distributions and gain from stock redemptions and sales. If
all gain were attributable to corporate earnings that had already been
taxed once, then gain should not be taxed under the proposals that
attempt to tax corporate earnings once. The problem is this: All, part,
or none of the gain from the sale of stock may be attributable to
previously taxed corporate earnings. Some of the gain may be
attributable to unrealized appreciation in corporate assets or
increased estimates of future corporate earnings.
Under the shareholder allocation proposal, the shareholders'
stock bases would be increased to reflect the corporate income
allocated to the shareholders each year. If the shareholder exclusion
proposal were combined with a DRIP, the shareholders' stock bases
would be increased if the corporation did not make a dividend
distribution.' Any capital gain from the redemption or sale of the
stock would then be attributable to appreciation that had not already
been taxed at the corporate level. If this were the case, Treasury's
position is that the gain should be taxed at the shareholder level. Note
that this would still result in double taxation of future corporate
income and gain, which would still be subject to corporate tax when
realized in the future.
CBIT theoretically taxes business income once at the entity
level. Recall that CBIT could have an entity level compensatory tax on
distributions made out of income that was not taxed at the entity level
because of a preference. Treasury's position was that, if such a
compensatory tax were part of CBIT, investors could be permitted to
exclude gain even though some of the investors' gains might be
attributable to future entity level income and gain. Excluding investor
level gain from income might create an incentive for the business
entity to defer its earnings, for example by deferring the sale of
appreciated entity assets.
430. Under the dividend exclusion proposal with a DRIP, a shareholder would exclude the
deemed dividend then be deemed to have reinvested it in the corporation, which would increase
the shareholder's basis in the stock by the reinvested amount.
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The corporate dividend deduction proposal, the proposal to
eliminate corporate interest deductions, and the COCA proposal would
not alter the current treatment of gain from stock redemptions and
sales. The corporate dividend deduction proposal would impose one
layer of tax on distributions on debt and equity, but would impose two
layers of tax on some corporate earnings (prior corporate earnings that
have been retained and future corporate earnings) that cause the
value of stock to appreciate. This would encourage the distribution of
corporate earnings. Under the proposal to eliminate the corporate
interest deduction, however, even distributions would be double taxed
so distributions would not be tax favored. If two layers of tax were
inevitable, equity would be tax favored because gain would be tax
favored over distributions. If the corporation retained earnings, and
the retained earnings increased the value of the stock, shareholders
could reduce the effective rate on the second layer of tax on the
corporate earnings by holding the stock and later selling it. This would
permit the shareholder to take advantage of preferential capital gain
rates, basis recovery, and the deferral of the gain until the stock is
sold. The COCA proposal would have a similar effect because the
benefits of the COCA deduction do not depend on the distributions the
corporation actually makes.
The next two tables summarize the effects of each proposal on
the current biases in favor of retained earnings and debt financing.
Again, the consequences of the proposals depend on how capital gain
is treated.
TABLE 2: Effect of Proposals on Bias in Favor of
Retaining Earnings
Type of proposal Effect on the distortion
Shareholder Allocation Reduces it.
CBIT Reduces it (but device to prevent pass through of corporate
tax preferences might discourage distributions).
Shareholder Inverts it (creating a bias in favor of distributing earnings) if
dividend exclusion shareholder level capital gain is taxed.
Corporate dividends Inverts it (creating a bias in favor of distributing earnings) if
paid deduction shareholder level capital gain is taxed.
Eliminate corporate Increases it (but could perhaps be offset by expanded
interest deduction enforcement of the accumulated earnings tax).
COCA Increases it (but could perhaps be offset by expanded
enforcement of the accumulated earnings tax).
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TABLE 3: Effect of Proposals on Bias in Favor of Debt
Type of proposal Effect on the distortion
Shareholder Allocation Reduces it.
CBIT Creates slight bias in favor of equity if investor level capital
gain is not taxed and corporate gain can be deferred.
Retains it but reduces bias in favor of debt if capital gain is
taxed.
Shareholder Reduces it if corporation's effective tax rate is lower than the
dividend exclusion marginal shareholder tax rate.
Corporate dividends Inverts it, creating a bias in favor of equity, if the double tax
paid deduction on retained earnings forces managers to distribute earnings
currently.
Retains it if managers do not distribute earnings currently.
Eliminate corporate Inverts it, creating a bias in favor of equity.
interest deduction
COCA Inverts it, creating a bias in favor of equity.
The next table summarizes the consequences of the proposals
on the distortion caused by taxing corporate earnings at higher rates
than noncorporate earnings. Each of the proposals that would (at least
theoretically) eliminate one layer of tax on corporate earnings would
reduce this distortion. The interest elimination proposal would subject
all corporate earnings to two layers of tax, which would increase the
distortion. The COCA proposal subjects the corporation's normal
profits to one layer of tax and subjects the corporation's pure profits to
two layers of tax, so it retains the current distortion.
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TABLE 4: Effect of Proposals on Distortion Caused by
Taxing Corporate Earnings at Higher Rates than
Noncorporate Earnings
Type of proposal Effect on the distortion




Corporate dividends Reduces it.
paid deduction
Eliminate corporate Increases it.
interest deduction
COCA Retains it.
D. Evaluation of the Proposals
Which proposals, on balance, would be the most efficient and
fair and which would be politically feasible? This section will evaluate
the proposals, incorporating political feasibility concerns about the
administrability of each proposal,43' the normative justifications for
and revenue effects432 of each proposal, and likely support or opposition
from interest groups such as corporate managers.3"
If one subscribes to the conduit view of corporations, the
shareholder allocation proposal would be the fairest proposal because
it would eliminate the separate corporate tax base altogether and tax
corporate earnings at the shareholders' rates. In addition, the
shareholder allocation proposal would seemingly increase efficiency
because it would: (1) reduce the bias in favor of retained earnings; (2)
reduce the bias in favor of debt financing; and (3) reduce the distortion
431. Administrative complexity can cause inefficiencies. See Schenk, supra note 311, at 577.
Administrative complexity can also cause political resistance to a particular proposal.
432. Revenue lost by a proposal may be made up in less efficient or equitable ways. Cf
Kwall, supra note 185, at 616. 'To determine whether integration is desirable, the equity and
efficiency gains achieved by eliminating double taxation must be weighed against the equity and
efficiency costs incurred by utilizing an alternative revenue source." Id. The political feasibility
of a proposal also depends on whether it would lose revenue that would have to be made up with
income tax rate increases, income tax base broadening measures or elimination of special rules
such as accelerated cost recovery.
433. Past experience with integration proposals indicates that opposition from corporate
managers can kill a proposal. See Arlen & Weiss, supra note 229, at 365-66.
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caused by taxing corporate earnings at higher rates than noncorporate
earnings.
Unfortunately, there is an efficiency downside to the
shareholder allocation proposal; it is too complicated to administer
because it would require the allocation of income to all shareholders,
from all classes of stock, who held stock during the year. In addition,
this method would lose significant revenue if implemented in a
manner consistent with its conduit theory underpinnings (e.g., passing
through corporate preferences and taxing corporate earnings
distributed to tax-exempt or foreign shareholders less than once).
Replacing the lost revenue may create new inequities and
inefficiencies. The shareholder allocation method would be even more
complicated if it were modified to reduce the revenue loss, for example
by preventing the pass through of corporate preferences to
shareholders.
The CBIT proposal is just as extreme as the shareholder
allocation proposal but it takes the opposite tack to solve the
distortions of the corporate tax. Instead of taxing corporate income
once at the shareholder rate, CBIT would tax business income once at
the entity level and expand the scope of the business tax to reach all
but the smallest businesses. CBIT, with its consistent treatment of
most businesses, seemingly earns high marks for efficiency because it
would: (1) reduce the distortion caused by taxing corporate earnings at
higher rates than noncorporate earnings; (2) reduce the distortions
caused by the debt-equity distinction; (3) reduce the bias in favor of
retaining earnings; and (4) ensure that corporate income distributed
to tax-exempt and foreign shareholders would be taxed.
The CBIT proposal has its drawbacks, however. The
paramount problem with CBIT is that it would be unfair because it
would undermine the progressivity of the income tax, since business
income would be subject to the CBIT rate regardless of the investor's
tax rate. This new inequity may be reduced if low bracket taxpayers
substituted wage income for business income, but that would in turn
create a new inefficiency.
In addition, adoption of the CBIT proposal may not be
politically feasible for several reasons. First, corporate managers
would likely oppose CBIT if it discouraged retention of earnings."
434. The behavior of corporate managers in connection with corporate tax integration
proposals is an example of the old adage that 'losers scream louder than winners." See, e.g.,
JEFFREY H. BIRNBAUM & ALAN S. MURRAY, SHOWDOWN AT Gucci GULCH 15 (1st ed., 1988):
Senator Russell Long, who chaired the Senate Finance Committee from January 1966 to
December 1980... saw the tax code as his tool for changing society. He had no interest
in reform. A wise student of human behavior, Long realized the losers from tax overhaul
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Second, uncertainty about how CBIT would be implemented may
make corporate managers and pass-through investors and managers
wary of CBIT. Third, pass-through investors and managers may
oppose CBIT if it would subject CBIT entities to the severe corporate-
style loss limitation rules, as suggested by the Treasury in its CBIT
proposal.
The shareholder dividend exclusion proposal would seemingly
increase efficiency because it would: (1) reduce the bias in favor of debt
financing; (2) reduce the distortion caused by taxing corporate
earnings at higher rates than noncorporate earnings; and (3) invert
the bias in favor of retaining earnings, replacing it with a bias in favor
of dividend distributions. It would also insure that dividend
distributions are subject to tax even if the shareholder is tax-exempt
or foreign. In addition, the shareholder dividend exclusion proposal is
easier to administer than the shareholder allocation proposal even if
the dividend exclusion proposal includes a DRIP.
There are two major drawbacks with the dividend exclusion
proposal. First, it would be a big revenue loser. Replacing the lost
revenue may create both political and normative problems. Second,
instead of merely neutralizing the current bias in favor of retaining
earnings, it replaces that bias with one in favor of distributions.
Corporate managers would therefore likely oppose this proposal.
The dividend deduction proposal would also seemingly increase
efficiency because it would: (1) reduce the distortion caused by taxing
corporate earnings at higher rates than noncorporate earnings; (2)
invert the bias in favor of retaining earnings, replacing it with a bias
in favor of dividend distributions; and (3) invert the bias in favor of
debt financing, replacing it with a bias in favor of equity financing
(assuming that the higher tax rate on retained earnings forces
managers to distribute earnings currently). This proposal would not
would make far more noise than the winners. "When we proceed to shift the taxes
around so that one set of taxpayers pays a lot more taxes and somebody else pays a lot
less taxes, the people who benefit from it do not remember it very long," Chairman Long
said in 1976. 'They tend to feel that it should have been that way all the time, and the
people who are paying the additional taxes resent it very bitterly."
Id.
Although corporate integration would have benefited many companies, corporate managers
nonetheless opposed corporate integration because they were more concerned about preserving
existing tax subsidies, such as accelerated depreciation, than about eliminating the corporate
tax. In addition, many corporate managers wanted to keep the tax bias in favor of retaining
earnings because it frees them from having to justify to the corporate investors the corporate
projects in which the managers will invest. See Arlen & Weiss, supra note 229, at 366-67.
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ensure that dividends distributed to tax-exempt and foreign
shareholders would be taxed.
In addition, this proposal shares the two drawbacks of the
shareholder dividend exclusion proposal. First, it would be a big
revenue loser. In fact, this proposal would lose even more revenue
than the shareholder dividend exclusion proposal because it would fail
to tax the dividends paid to tax-exempt and foreign shareholders.
Second, the corporate dividend deduction proposal would create a bias
against retained earnings so corporate managers would likely oppose
it.
The proposal to eliminate the corporate interest deduction
would be relatively easy to administer and would raise a huge amount
of revenue, some or all of which could be used to reduce corporate tax
rates. Taxing both dividends and interest at the corporate and
investor levels would be consistent with the notion that it is fair to
impose greater tax liability on corporate investor returns on capital
because corporations have greater ability to pay than individuals do.
The notion that corporations have greater ability to pay has been
discredited, however.
The proposal would invert the current bias in favor of debt
financing, replacing it with a bias in favor of equity financing, which
would probably increase efficiency as discussed earlier. On the other
hand, the proposal would: (1) increase the distortion caused by taxing
corporate earnings at rates higher than noncorporate earnings; (2)
increase the bias in favor of retaining earnings; and (3) potentially
create a new distortion as corporations recharacterize nondeductible
interest as deductible forms of expense.
The increased distortion caused by taxing corporate earnings at
rates higher than noncorporate earnings would be offset to some
extent if the corporate tax rates were reduced in conjunction with this
proposal. Also, this distortion would affect new businesses more than
existing ones, because existing businesses would incur tax liabilities if
they disincorporated. In addition, this distortion would be offset to
some extent .because businesses could qualify for the lower
noncorporate rates only if they did not raise capital in the public
markets.
The increased bias in favor of retaining earnings presents a
problem, but that distortion may be reduced by expanded enforcement
of the accumulated earnings tax. The new incentive to recharacterize
interest is also a problem, although that problem is limited in scope.
The proposal to eliminate the corporate interest deduction is
probably not politically feasible, despite its administrability and
positive revenue effects. Although corporate managers would like the
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fact that this proposal does not eliminate the bias in favor of retained
earnings, the managers of corporations that stand to lose the most
from elimination of the interest deduction are likely to strongly oppose
this proposal.
Although each of the proposals would create winners and
losers, this proposal is the most likely to create a clear and vocal class
of losers. Past experience and behavioral psychology indicate that the
outcry of the potential losers may outweigh the support of the
potential winners. People exhibit a status quo bias, meaning a
preference for remaining at the status quo. 35 More importantly in this
context, Kahneman and Tversky have documented the phenomenon of
loss aversion, meaning that the disutility associated with giving up an
object is greater than the utility of acquiring it.43
It is in connection with this proposal that loss aversion would
be the most pronounced. The interest deduction losers would be a
clearly identifiable group. This group would probably oppose the
interest elimination proposal vocally. The group could perhaps even
garner the support of the public by arguing that the proposal would
unfairly limit corporations from deducting a real cost of earning
income.
The COCA proposal is consistent with the notion, based on
optimal tax theory, that the corporate tax should be a form a profits
tax."' Adopting the COCA proposal would turn the corporate tax into a
form of profits tax because the COCA proposal would permit the
corporation to deduct its normal returns (i.e., the time value of money
component on the corporation's debt and equity), but would not permit
the corporation to deduct the corporation's pure profits (i.e., the
returns in excess of the normal returns). In other words, the COCA
proposal would double tax only pure profits.
The COCA proposal would invert the current bias in favor of
debt financing, replacing it with a slight bias in favor of equity
financing, which would probably increase efficiency. On the other
hand, it would: (1) retain the distortion caused by taxing corporate
earnings at rates higher than noncorporate earnings; (2) increase the
bias in favor of retaining earnings; and (3) potentially create a new
distortion as corporations recharacterize nondeductible interest as
deductible forms of expense. The first of these three problems may be
435. William Samuelson & Richard Zeckhauser, Status Quo Bias in Decision Making, 1 J. OF
RISK & UNCERTAINTY 7 (1988).
436. See generally Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, Choices, Values, and Frames, 39 AM.
PSYCHOLOGIST 341 (1984).
437. See supra note 303 and accompanying text.
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offset for the reasons discussed in conjunction with the proposal to
eliminate the interest deduction. The second problem could be
addressed through expansion of the accumulated earnings tax, and
the third problem is of limited scope.
The COCA deduction proposal is the most politically feasible of
all of the proposals. Like the proposal to eliminate the corporate
interest deduction, the COCA deduction proposal is easy to
administer. In fact, it would eliminate some of the complexity that
exists under current law in connection with the tax treatment of risk
management transactions like interest rate swaps. In addition, the
COCA proposal can be made revenue neutral. As economists George
Hatsopoulos, Paul Krugman, and James Poterba have observed:
'Ideally, we would want to lower the cost of equity to that of debt
without affecting the latter. That, however, would be too costly to the
federal government and, therefore, we have to find other ways to bring
these two costs in line.""" In addition, the COCA proposal would also
likely produce a lower cost of corporate capital than the interest
elimination proposal.
The fact that the COCA proposal does not eliminate the
retained earnings distortion may improve the chances of getting
broad-based support for the proposal from corporate managers. In
addition, although the COCA proposal takes away part of the current
interest deduction, it gives back a partial dividend deduction, which
may make the COCA proposal more politically palatable to corporate
managers. The corporations that would be big losers under the
interest elimination proposal would not be losers under this proposal
or would lose much less. 9
V. CONCLUSION
Given the strengths and weakness of each of the proposals, the
author prefers the shareholder level dividend exclusion model to the
other proposals since it would produce many of the benefits of the
438. Hatsopoulos, supra note 404, at 15.
439. Consider the effect of the COCA proposal on corporations in the examples in note 418,
supra. ABC Co., financed with $40 million of debt and $60 million of equity, would lose a $4
million annual interest deduction under the interest elimination proposal; under the COCA
proposal, ABC Co.'s $4 million annual interest deduction would be replaced by a $5 million
COCA deduction. XYZ Co., financed with $60 million of debt and $40 million of equity, would
lose a $6 million annual interest deduction under the interest elimination proposal; under the




shareholder allocation model with less administrative complexity."'
That proposal, however, is not politically feasible. One compromise
would be to pair (1) a percentage cap on the corporate interest
deduction (e.g., permit corporations to deduct 50 percent of the
interest on their debt), with (2) a limited shareholder level dividend
exclusion (e.g., permit shareholders to exclude 50 percent of dividends
received). This compromise would take care of the revenue loss
disadvantage of the shareholder dividend exclusion proposal, but
would probably not eliminate the opposition of (1) corporate managers
who do not want to be forced to distribute earnings, and (2) the
interest deduction losers.
The COCA proposal is the most politically feasible proposal. As
the earlier summaries of the proposals make clear, the more extensive
integration proposals, such as the shareholder dividend exclusion
proposal, would neutralize multiple current distortions more
effectively than the COCA proposal. The COCA proposal is a limited
proposal that targets only the debt-equity distinction. On the other
hand, the debt-equity problem, by itself, warrants a solution and the
salutary effects of the COCA proposal outweigh its negative effects. In
addition, the COCA proposal is consistent with notion that the
corporate tax should be a profits tax. Congress should thus adopt the
COCA proposal. Even in a second-best world, half a loaf is sometimes
still better than none.
440. This assumes that Congress would not be willing to adopt more radical reform
measures, such as a mark-to-market corporate tax.
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